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1. Abstract 
 
Lloyd’s of London is well-known throughout the world as a major insurance market.  Lloyd’s 
history in South Africa, however, until now has not been documented.  This dissertation seeks to 
provide a detailed account of a history of Lloyd’s in South Africa, highlighting its contribution 
towards the development of the South African insurance market.  The study starts with a history 
of Lloyd’s in the United Kingdom.  This is followed by the history of Lloyd’s in South Africa 
starting with the first discovered record of Lloyd’s in South Africa and concludes by setting out 
its current position in the South African insurance market. 
 
Keywords: Lloyd’s of London, South African insurance market, business history. 
JEL classification: G22, N17. 
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2. Research Objective 
 
This dissertation does not have a research question in the traditional sense.  It has a research 
objective.  The objective of this research is to provide a detailed history of Lloyd’s of London 
operation in South Africa and thereby add to the academic body of knowledge.  This dissertation 
can be divided into two parts, the history of Lloyd’s in the United Kingdom and the history of 
Lloyd’s in South Africa.  The first part sets the scene for the second and will focus on the 
changes at Lloyd’s since its establishment - starting with the history of Lloyd’s from its early 
days as a coffee house run by Edward Lloyd, the move to premises at the Royal Exchange, 
Lloyd’s branching out into non-marine insurance, the large claims and fraud allegations from the 
1980s and the formation of Equitas in response to the liability crisis of the 1980s, and its 
subsequent sale.  Legislation governing Lloyd’s will also be discussed including the Lloyd’s 
Acts throughout its history. 
 
The second part seeks to document a history of Lloyd’s in South Africa, from the time Lloyd’s 
first started transacting business, its development, the legislation governing its operation in South 
Africa and the influence it has exerted in the South African insurance market. 
14 
 
3. Methodology 
 
There is a large body of literature covering the history and operation of Lloyd’s of London in the 
UK and other parts of the world especially the United States of America.  From this literature a 
comprehensive summary of a history of Lloyd’s in the UK is produced herein to contextualise 
the South African development. 
 
Currently the history of Lloyd’s in South Africa has not been documented.  The following 
methodology was implemented to construct this thesis.  Firstly, persons who had information 
were interviewed.  An interview with the former long standing, South African representative of 
Lloyd’s, Mr Ronnie Napier was conducted to discuss his role as representative, recollection of 
historical events and gathering documents on the history of Lloyd’s in South Africa.  This was 
followed by interviews with the current South African representative of Lloyd’s, Mr John 
Sibanda and the general manager of Lloyd’s South Africa, Mr Amit Khilosia, regarding their 
duties and responsibilities.  Secondly, documents dealing with Lloyd’s in South Africa were 
searched for in the industry and an in depth examination of the Hansard Parliamentary debates 
covering the records pertaining to the legislation dealing with Lloyd’s in South Africa was made.  
This was followed by an in depth examination of the South African Select Committee reports 
dealing with Lloyd’s in South Africa.  Insurance magazines from the 1900s onwards ending with 
the latest industry magazine, Cover, were read for any articles dealing with Lloyd’s.  Finally, a 
visit was made to Lloyd’s of London in the UK in an attempt to obtain information on Lloyd’s in 
South Africa.  This methodology sought to gather information including any documents that 
might be available as well as personal knowledge and experience. 
 
To engage with others in the academic field on this topic, two work-in-progress presentations on 
a history of Lloyd’s in South Africa were presented.  One was at the Economic Research 
Southern Africa (Ersa) Business History Workshop held in Muldersdrift
1
 and the other was at the 
                                                 
1
 Bartylak, A.M (2010) “A History of Lloyd’s in South Africa” Economic Research Southern Africa, Business 
History: Theory and Practice Workshop, Muldersdrift. 
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36
th
 Annual Economic and Business Historical Society Conference held in Columbus, Ohio, 
USA
2
.  From the information obtained through this process the history of Lloyd’s was compiled. 
                                                 
2
 Bartylak, A.M (2011) “A History of Lloyd’s in South Africa” 36th Annual Economic and Business Historical 
Society Conference, Columbus, Ohio, USA, 14 – 16 April. 
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4. A History of Lloyd’s in the United Kingdom 
 
4.1. Origins of Lloyd’s (1680s – 1920s) 
 
4.1.1. Edward Lloyd 
 
Lloyd’s originated from merchants who came together in a coffee house, owned by Edward 
Lloyd to discuss business in the city centre of London.
3
  Lloyd’s bears the surname of the man 
who operated the coffee house, and controlled and ran it for over 20 years.  “He was Edward 
Lloyd and his shop was situated in Tower Street at the eastern end of the city” (Gibb, 1957: 4).  
Not much is known about the life of Edward Lloyd (Esquiros, 1868: 167).  The most that can be 
said is that he was born in or close to 1648, was married three times and owned his first coffee 
house around 1688-1689 (Straus, 1973: 47).  His business grew over time and prospered.  Men 
would meet at his coffee house and find reliable men that would insure ship owners against perils 
of the sea, men-of-war, fire, enemies, pirates and thieves.  His clients consisted mostly of ship-
owners, captains and commercial businessmen.  The exact date of Edward Lloyd’s death is 
uncertain.  Various authors provide different dates.  Wright & Fayle (1928: 31) observe that 
Edward Lloyd’s health was failing in 1712 and he died in the same year at the age of 65.  
However, Raphael (1995: 37) holds that Edward Lloyd died on the 16
th
 February 1713 while 
Raynes (1950: 110) states that it was on the 15
th
 February 1713. 
 
The first printed reference made to Lloyd’s coffee house is dated February 1688 and occurs in an 
advertisement which appeared in the London Gazette.
4
  A gentleman was robbed and he wanted 
to offer a reward for anyone who found his stolen gold watches.  If anyone had any news they 
could either give it to him personally or to the coffee house of Edward Lloyd.  This indicates that 
Lloyd’s coffee house must have been quite well-known and popular to be the one chosen out of 
all other coffee houses available.  Lloyd’s was seen as the place to do business (Gibb, 1957: 7) 
                                                 
3
 Anonymous (1925b: 19); Anonymous (1928b: 33); Anonymous (2010b: 6); Kuvin (1954: 407); Elliott (1907: 11); 
Stewart (1984: 1) Fegan (1919: 2); Panama-Pacific Exposition (1915: 14). 
4
 Gibb (1957: 6), Raphael (1995: 33), Davison (1987: 20), Hodgson (1987: 49), Flower & Jones (1981: 20), Martin 
(1876: 60), Brown (1973: 17) and Straus (1973: 48). 
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and if one was looking for recreation or socializing other coffee shops or taverns were visited 
(Raphael, 2005: 34).  London was the heart of the shipping world in the 17
th
 century and Edward 
Lloyd took that opportunity to make his coffee house the meeting place for individuals interested 
in shipping (Raphael, 1995: 35).   
 
In 1696 Lloyd tried his hand at the newspaper business.  He published Lloyd’s News which 
unfortunately only lasted 5 months (Hodgson, 1986: 49; Raphael, 1995: 36).  However, it was 
seen as a respectable newspaper containing information valuable to merchants and captains 
which was not published in the general newspaper, London Gazette, at that time (Martin, 1876: 
74).  In his last edition he accidently published the proceedings followed by the House of Lords 
which contained a small mistake.  The House of Lords immediately ordered him to correct the 
mistake in his next edition.  He refused and thereafter never published Lloyd’s News again.5  As 
a general newspaper it was below standard but as a shipping newspaper it was well ahead of its 
time (Martin, 1876: 65).  Even though his newspaper was unsuccessful, Edward Lloyd still 
supplied his customers with shipping intelligence which he received from correspondents 
(Wright & Fayle, 1929: 25).  Roughly 10 years after the opening of the coffee house, Lloyd was 
seen as a shipping expert.  He had become well informed on shipping and did not disclose the 
names of his correspondents from whom he received shipping information.  By 1710 Lloyd’s 
coffee house was considered the “chief commercial Salesroom in London” (Flower & Jones, 
1981: 29) and, according to Raynes (1950: 112) Lloyd’s was already the “main home of 
individual underwriting” as early as 1760 insuring marine risks as well as dabbling in other risks.  
 
A custom was formed at Lloyd’s coffee house whereby the Kidney (a youth) read any news 
arriving at Lloyd’s in a clear voice while everyone listened to him reciting the newspaper with 
any new information.
6
  Susequently, this took the form of news being read from a rostum, 
followed, many years later, by the caller who informed brokers of any telephone calls (Raphael, 
1995: 36).  Auctions also took place at the Lloyd’s coffee house where many items, not 
necessarily to do with shipping, were sold (Flower & Jones, 1981: 27 & Martin, 1876). 
                                                 
5
 Raynes (1950: 110); Flower & Jones (1981: 24); Martin (1876: 75); Straus (1973: 53); Elliott (1907: 11). 
6
 Wright & Fayle (1929: 26); Hodgson (1987: 49); Flower & Jones (1981: 27); Martin (1876: 105); Brown (1973: 
18); Straus (1973: 55); Fegan (1919: 2 – 3). 
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4.1.2. 17th and 18th century structure of insurance market  
 
The insurance market at the end of 17
th
 century and beginning of 18
th
 century consisted of 
brokers and underwriters (Gibb, 1957: 18).  Underwriters accepted risk and the brokers fixed the 
terms for both parties.  At this point in history brokers preferred to be called ‘office-keepers’ as 
the word broker had become disreputable and had negative connotations to it.
7
  The appellation 
broker was used by shady and dishonourable traders resulting in the word broker acquiring an 
aura of dishonesty.  For the purposes of this text, however, the term brokers will be used 
throughout without negative connotation. 
 
Brokers worked as the agents for the merchants and ship-owners.  After the terms were written 
up the broker made sure that each party had signed the contract.  Underwriters at that time did 
not occupy offices.  Individuals who were underwriters underwrote part-time in their spare time, 
separate from the daily running of their businesses (Wright & Fayle, 1929: 35).  The market was 
not concentrated at the Royal Exchange and brokers had to travel the whole city seeking 
merchants, bankers and ship-owners who would be interested in insuring their goods.  
Underwriters risked their personal fortunes and not only the profits made from their trade.  
Therefore the only control mechanism in place at the time was the broker’s good judgement.  
The broker’s duty was to his client, the insured.  His job was to insure the full value of the risk at 
the best possible price with reliable underwriters who could pay their share of the loss should the 
risk materialise. 
 
The market at Lloyd’s was described as follows: “A successful merchant would become an 
underwriter, a member of an underwriting syndicate, who wrote through a deputy, usually a 
member of the syndicate, each name taking a line of risk” (Raynes, 1950: 279).  An underwriter 
would write through a deputy that he hired when he was not at his writing box
8
 (Raynes, 1950: 
186). 
 
                                                 
7
 Gibb (1957: 18); Flower & Jones (1981: 40); Brown (1973: 22); Raphael (1995: 35); Hodgson (1987: 50). 
8
 For a discussion on the box refer to Chapter 5.2.1. 
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Through the Bubble Act of 1721 two insurance companies received royal charters, the Royal 
Exchange Assurance
9
 and the London Assurance,
10
 conferring the privilege of being the only 
two companies that were able to provide marine insurance in England.  An Act was passed to 
stop other companies, many of them being insurance companies, from competing with the South 
Sea Company thereby declaring all companies without a royal charter to be illegal.  The Bubble 
Act stated that no other companies were allowed to enter into insurance business.
11
  This 
prohibition, however, did not extend to any individual wanting to underwrite risks, thereby 
allowing individual underwriters to continue at Lloyd’s (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 54; Martin, 
1876: 98; Tomlins, 1820; Billah, 2009: 37).  However, these two corporations did not stay 
exclusively in marine underwriting and by April 1721 both had received fire and life charters.  
Their main focus shifted to fire insurance and left marine to be dealt with by the private 
underwriters and merchants.  In reality, the Bubble Act actually favoured the Lloyd’s 
underwriters by removing any competition that might have arisen in the field of marine 
insurance.
12
  The Bubble Act was repealed in 1825 (Morgan & Thomas, 1962: 40). 
 
4.1.3. A broker in the 18th century 
 
Gibb (1957: 54) describes a broker of the 18
th
 century as having the duty to find the best terms 
for his client as well as correctly selecting strong underwriters, who have the means to pay, from 
the financially poor underwriters, and had to make sure that any underwriter of doubtful financial 
standing would not underwrite a line of his client’s risk.  The brokers knew the men, watched 
them and knew who was reckless and who was cautious.  A broker had many more duties in the 
18
th
 century compared to a broker in the 1900s.  He had to show the risks, write out the policies, 
get underwriters to sign it and adjust the claims. 
 
                                                 
9
 Histories of the Royal Exchange include: The Royal Exchange by A.E.W Mason in 1920; The Royal Exchange 
Assurance: A History of British Insurance 1720 – 1970 by Barry Supple in 1970; The Stock Exchange: Its History 
and Functions by Professor E. V. Morgan and W.A Thomas in 1962. 
10
 Histories of the London Assurance include The London Assurance: A Second Chronicle by Bernard Drew in 1949 
as well as The London Assurance: 1720 – 1920 by G.S. Street in 1920. 
11
 Morgan & Thomas (1962: 34, 37); Hodgson (1987: 51); Martin (1876: 90); Brown (1973: 23). 
12
 Hodgson (1987: 51); Martin (1876: 103); Brown (1973: 24). 
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The broker slip
13
 was, until recently, the keystone of Lloyd’s business.  It became popular in the 
18
th
 century.  Wright & Fayle (1929: 289) explain how all insurance at Lloyd’s was done through 
the broker making a ‘slip’ where the risk was set-out and each underwriter would initial at the 
bottom of the slip stating how much of the risk he was willing to take (Fegan, 1919: 3).  This 
would continue until the slip was filled and the whole risk was insured.  From this slip, a formal 
policy would be drawn-up and thereafter be signed by the underwriters concerned.  The slip has 
now been replaced by an electronic system. 
 
4.1.4. Lloyd’s List 
 
In 1734, Lloyd’s made another attempt at providing its customers with shipping intelligence 
through the creation of Lloyd’s List.  “It was the demand of the underwriters for shipping 
intelligence that led, in 1734, to the establishment of Lloyd’s List” (Wright & Fayle, 1929: 71).  
Insurance was similar to gambling at that stage and merchants, having suffered a loss would 
attempt to insure their ship after the loss had occurred, hoping to find someone willing to insure 
it and who had not heard that the loss had occurred.  Lloyd’s provided the much needed 
information which deterred this practice through the Lloyd’s List.14  Wright & Fayle (1929: 76) 
describe Lloyd’s List as being a single sheet of paper in length, the front having general adverts 
and commercial information and the back contained the shipping intelligence.  For the first three 
years Lloyd’s List only contained shipping intelligence and from 1737 it added the price of 
stocks as well as the rates of exchange, the price of gold and silver, the price of annuities and 
announced the lottery prizes to be won (Raynes, 1950: 111; Flower & Jones, 1981: 48 & Martin, 
1876: 109). 
 
There were many wars during the 18
th
 century i.e. the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739 – 1742), the 
Seven Years War (1756 – 1763), the American War of Independence (1775 – 1783) and the 
Napoleonic Wars (1799 - 1815).  Almost every policy Lloyd’s wrote covered the risk of capture 
by privateers while travelling in convoy, seizure in a port and detention.  Throughout these wars 
Lloyd’s suffered many losses – some of which tested the possibility of destroying Lloyd’s - but it 
                                                 
13
 For an example of a Lloyd’s slip, refer to Appendix 1. 
14
 Davison (1987:21); Martin (1876: 107); Esquires (1868: 174); Anonymous (1925b: 19); Anonymous (1928b). 
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nevertheless remained successful, profitable and was most brokers’ first port of call when 
looking for underwriters.  These wars brought lucrative shipping risks to Lloyd’s (Flower & 
Jones, 1981: 60).  Lloyd’s List became very popular as it published details of captured English 
ships, or any capture of the enemy ships due to the English (Martin, 1876).  The Government 
sent all its shipping intelligence directly to Lloyd’s Coffee House (Straus, 1973: 66). 
 
The first Register Book, which contained the particulars of ships needing insurance, was 
established at Lloyd’s between 1764 and 1766.15  This was only available to members of the 
society and not to the public.  The information contained in the Register Book included: the 
name of the ship, who is the master of the ship, the port of destination, weight of ship, men on 
board and the date and place of when the ship was built (Hodgson, 1986: 65).  The last column 
was reserved where members would indicate by way of a vowel the condition of the ship.  The 
vowels A, E, I, O, U represented the grading of the hull while the letters G, M, B, standing for 
good, middle and bad, depicted the condition of the equipment on board the ship.
16
  Esquiras 
(1868: 171), Martin (1876: 400) and Brown (1973: 134) also mention the Loss Book or the Black 
Book of Lloyd’s which was written by hand and contained everyday accounts of shipwrecks or 
any other marine disasters. 
 
Lloyd’s List is still published on a daily basis and is the oldest existing newspaper in the world 
(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 58).  
 
4.1.5. Lloyd’s dividing into two factions and the move to new premises 
 
After the Seven Year War and during the peace which followed, gambling, which had nothing to 
do with legitimate insurance, became popular (Straus, 1973: 77).  It became a trend for people to 
take out insurance on the lives of famous individuals (without having an interest in their lives) by 
betting on how long they were expected to live.  As soon as it became known that a well-known 
individual was ill, a market on the prospect of his survival would be established at Lloyd’s or at 
other coffee houses (Raphael, 1995: 38; Hodgson, 1986: 52; Fegan, 1919: 4, 7).  Another 
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 Wright & Fayle (1929: 84), Martin (1976: 327); Straus (1973: 75). 
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example was that of insuring whether an accused would be convicted of murder or set free 
(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 58). 
 
The more serious underwriters at Lloyd’s found this gambling form of business distasteful and, 
in 1769, moved premises to set up their own business, a competitor to Lloyd’s, at 5 Pope’s Head 
Alley led by the head waiter Thomas Fielding (died January 1778) who took the lease out on the 
new premises in his name.
17
  In this way the new Lloyd’s coffee house was founded.  This was 
the end of the old Lloyd’s and it is regarded as the birth of the Society which continues to exist to 
the current day (Gibb, 1957: 46).  The gambling form of business was the immediate cause of the 
split.  The building that new Lloyd’s occupied was too small and after 2 years, in 1771; they 
moved out but struggled to find suitable new premises.  This move led to the election of a 
committee consisting of nine subscribers who were given full powers to find an appropriate 
building to be the new venue of Lloyd’s.  This was the first Committee of Lloyd’s which formed 
in January 1772.  This election of a committee and move to new premises also led to the first 
payment of a subscription fee.  This move signalled the change from Lloyd’s operating from 
privately owned coffee house to a self-governing body (Gibb, 1957: 47; Hodgson, 1986: 53).  At 
this time, as stated by Straus (1973: 86) “Lloyd’s Coffee-house fades out of the picture.  
Henceforth we are dealing with Lloyd’s”. 
 
By 1773 the committee still had not found new premises and John Julius Angerstein (1732 - 
1823) decided to take charge.
18
  Angerstein’s marine policies had become very well-known and 
were simply known as ‘Julians’ throughout the market.19  He was not a committee member but 
an ordinary foreign subscriber.  He approached the Mercers Company (which managed the Royal 
Exchange) without consulting the committee and represented himself as an envoy of Lloyd’s.  
He called a meeting of the subscribers, attended a meeting of the committee to which he was not 
invited and fixed a deal with the Mercers Company to let one of the rooms above the Royal 
Exchange.  Lloyd’s moved to their new premises in March 1774 (Flower & Jones, 1981: 57; 
Straus, 1973, 98).  The location included a kitchen, two coffee rooms and a smaller room used by 
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 Raynes (1950: 113); Flower & Jones (1981: 54); Martin (1876: 120, 275); Brown (1973: 28); Hodgson (1987: 
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the Committee.  The first room was opened to the public and any customers could enter, whilst 
the second room was used exclusively by the subscribers.  Investigation of his contribution to 
Lloyd’s - finding the new premises and organising additional property - he was elected as a 
member of the Committee, bringing it to 10 members (Straus, 1973: 110).  Angerstein later 
became the chairman of Lloyd’s for the period 1790 – 1796 and also became known as the father 
of Lloyd’s with his portrait hanging at the library at Lloyd’s.20 
 
The committee left the masters
21
 to look after the room, collect information for Lloyd’s List, 
manage the newspaper, collect the subscription fees and carry on the correspondence with 
informants abroad.  But at the same time let it be known to the subscribers that Lloyd’s could get 
rid of the masters at any time.  From 1774 it was known that the committee had the balance of 
power in their favour and ran Lloyd’s.  The masters were only tenants.22  Gibb (1957: 64) is of 
the view that they were actually servants with a free hand to perform any action they chose.  
Gibb (1957: 69) goes further and states that since 1774 the committee had become the “guardian 
of the underwriters general interests, their defence against attack and their mouthpiece when they 
wanted to speak as a body to the outside world”.  Today, the committee has much the same 
function, its reach however has become stronger operating within more elaborate regulations.   
However, the core of its duties has remained the same. 
 
The Room became increasingly crowded as the number of underwriters subscribing to its use 
increased drastically due to the alluring high profits that could be made during the period of war.  
By the year 1786, the Subscribers Room had become unbearably overcrowded and Angerstein 
negotiated for the adjacent property to be leased to provide additional space as another 
Subscribers Room (Wright & Fayle, 1929: 171).  This overcrowding led to one of the most 
fundamental reforms in the constitution of Lloyd’s.  Several underwriters (including Angerstein) 
told the Committee that they were making a declaration at a general meeting held on the 26
th
 
March 1800 to address the problem of overcrowding and decided to restrict the right of being a 
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 Flower & Jones (1981: 80); Martin, (1876, 178 & 241). 
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subscriber to only include merchants, underwriters and brokers on being recommended by two or 
more members (Straus, 1973: 142).  On that day the Committee acquired the power to choose the 
subscribers that it liked and refuse those to whom it objected. 
 
By 1810, London was the centre of the business of insurance, as it was indeed of commerce in 
general, and Lloyd’s underwriters had ninety percent of the total insurance business in London.  
Gibb (1957: 51) mentions that the Royal Exchange Assurance and London Assurance were too 
timid and cautious to provide any competition worth mentioning. 
 
4.1.6. Trust Deed of 1811 
 
In 1810, the organizational considerations of underwriters at Lloyd’s were limited.  The solvency 
of the underwriter was not investigated and no security had to be offered in case an underwriter 
defaulted.  Gibb (1957: 56) states that “the greatest insurance market in the world, a market 
which offered its customers nothing but promises to pay, took no steps to see that the promises 
would ever be implemented.”  This shows that failures to pay a valid claim must have been rare 
since this unregulated system worked.  Indeed to this day Lloyd’s maintains that in its entire 
history it has never failed to pay a valid claim. 
 
A resolution was confirmed on the 15
th
 August 1811 that a Trust Deed should be signed by all 
subscribers where the committee’s functions and powers were to be formally written down 
(Wright & Fayle, 1929: 273; Martin, 1876: 288).  In 1811 Lloyd’s members signed a Trust Deed 
binding themselves to a set of rules and regulations, organised a central discipline which they 
obeyed, and adopted a constitution of the society which was used for the next 60 years (Raphael, 
1995: 43; Hodgson, 1986: 57; Straus, 1973: 230).  The original deed document was destroyed by 
a fire in 1838 but a copy survived in the Minute Books.  Up until the passing of the 1871 Act of 
incorporation, the Trust Deed “was the one formal bond of association between the Subscribers 
to Lloyd’s” (Wright & Fayle, 1929: 273).  Each individual had to sign the Trust Deed before he 
could become a subscriber and over 1 100 men subscribed their names (Straus, 1973: 170). 
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Wright & Fayle (1929: 382) summarise Lloyd’s as follows: “In reviewing the development of 
Lloyd’s which has covered more than two centuries, this epoch of Incorporation is seen to be the 
culmination of that evolution of which the first stage was marked by the formation of New 
Lloyd’s in 1769, the second by the move to the Royal Exchange in 1774, and the third by the 
execution of the Trust Deed in 1811.” 
 
4.1.7. Development of the Agency System 
 
A benefit from the committee was that they developed and supported the system of Lloyd’s 
agents throughout the world.  Before 1811, each underwriter had their own agent at different sea 
ports using them to survey damaged ships and goods that the underwriter was personally 
interested in.  A special committee proposed that the house committee of Lloyd’s should be 
given the power to appoint Agents who would act for the benefit of all underwriters and not just 
for individual underwriters.  This suggestion was accepted and in August 1811 the committee 
started appointing Agents with the first Lloyd’s agents being appointed on the 13th November 
1811.  Agents received no remuneration from Lloyd’s and received a fee from the parties they 
dealt with.  The Agency System was an immediate success as agents surveyed damage to ships 
in foreign ports, suppled information to Lloyd’s on the movement of ships and approved 
claims.
23
 
 
Lloyd’s appointed its first Secretary in 1804 by the name of John Bennett, Jnr who held that 
position of office till 1834.  John Bennett, Jnr was ambitious and driven.  He developed the news 
service and organised the mechanism of using agents (Flower & Jones, 1981: 118; Straus, 1973: 
144; Martin, 1876: 282).  He was a great figure in the history of Lloyd’s and his contribution was 
extremely valuable.  He made his agents perform two services i.e. looking after the underwriters’ 
interests in the area to which they were assigned to, and supplying Lloyd’s with constant news of 
ships’ movements which was then placed into the daily editions of Lloyd’s List (Davison, 1987: 
21).  Another benefit that Lloyd’s received from the Agency System was that Lloyd’s was able 
to learn what type of insurance policies, customs and insurance business existed overseas. 
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The committee also started another source of gathering news by founding signal stations to 
report the movements of ships as they travelled from port to port on their routes.  Some of these 
stations were maintained and controlled by employees of Lloyd’s and not the Agents. 
 
Gibb (1957: 96) notes that other insurance companies wanted desperately to get hold of the 
Lloyd’s agencies and their intelligence service.  Lloyd’s had a massive advantage over all other 
conventional insurance companies.  Gibb (1957: 97) summarises the condition of Lloyd’s in 
1838 as follows: the number of subscribers was declining and it was under heavy pressure from 
competitors but the one thing it had going for it was the almost world-wide organisation of 
shipping news that Lloyd’s (through its agents) was able to maintain.  Lloyd’s was still the “hub 
of the wheel for the world’s marine insurance” (Gibb, 1957: 97). 
 
4.1.8. The Great Fire of 1838 
 
On the 10
th
 January 1838, the Royal Exchange was devastated by fire and Lloyd’s was suddenly 
homeless.  This disaster was classified as a national disaster (Raphael, 1995: 44; Hodgson, 1986: 
58).  The very next day Lloyd’s was saved from a total stoppage in their business by the help of 
its rivals, the Jerusalem Coffee House, announcing that they would be open to receive Lloyd’s 
business (Flower & Jones, 1981: 97; Straus, 1973: 201).  Afterwards, Lloyd’s moved into 
temporary premises at the South Sea House where it stayed for 6 years.  The chairman of Lloyd’s 
stated that no valuable documents were destroyed (the minute books had been saved) and the 
financial loss to the subscribers was minimal.  However, there was total destruction of files 
containing the Lloyd’s List.  The original Trust Deed of 1811 did not survive but a copy survived 
(Straus, 1973: 199).  The committee had a new deed prepared (with the same terms and 
conditions as before) after this loss and every subscriber had to sign it along with every new 
member.  This lasted for 33 years until Lloyd’s received a new constitution, this time enshrined 
in legislation as the 1871 Lloyd’s Act of Parliament. 
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4.1.9. Structural changes at Lloyd’s 
 
Gibb (1957: 103) and Straus (1973: 205) describes that until 1843 every subscriber to Lloyd’s 
had full access to Lloyd’s.  £25 had to be paid as an entrance fee and 4 guineas for the annual 
subscription otherwise no admission was permitted.  If the money was paid the individual could 
use the Room for anything that he wanted: broking, underwriting or just reading the shipping 
intelligence.  As from 1843 the Committee separated Lloyd’s into two rooms, the Underwriting 
Room and the Merchants Room.  Subscribers could choose to only use the Merchants Room but 
then were not allowed to enter the Underwriting Room.  Gibb (1957: 103) outlines the new 
committee’s segregation of four types of subscribers:  
 
(1) Members: They had access to all facilities at Lloyd’s – brokers, shipping news, voting at 
meetings and access to all the other rooms.  This new system that Lloyd’s had implemented 
meant that the old system of underwriting (free-for-all underwriting) with which Lloyd’s had 
initially started had changed forever.  The creation of this membership finalised that change.  
Wright & Fayle (1929: 346) make it very clear that only Members could sit on the Committee, 
vote at the General Meetings and underwrite risks.  This category included the Names 
(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 69). 
 
(2) Annual Subscribers: They were allowed to use all the Rooms’ but could not vote, stand for 
the Committee or sign a policy.  This category consisted of mostly brokers who took orders from 
the public and placed their risks with the underwriting member.  They had to pay 4 guineas 
subscription fee and no entrance fee (Straus, 1973: 205). 
 
(3) Merchant’s Room: Merchants, bankers, traders, accountants and lawyers used this room.  
They had full access to all the news about the shipping world and also had access to the Lloyd’s 
brokers if there was ever anything they wanted to insure.  They had to pay 2 guineas subscription 
fee and no entrance fee.  It only lasted 10 years (even though it was so successful) and in October 
1853 was scrapped because of the lack of space at the premises and space was needed for the 
other rooms (Straus, 1973: 213).  All the subscribers of the Merchant’s Room, if they wanted to 
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continue being at Lloyd’s, had to pay the full entrance fee and 4 guineas and become members.  
Most of the Merchant’s Room subscribers accepted this offer. 
 
(4) Captains Room Subscribers:  Outsiders who could not get entry into the Underwriting room 
or the Merchant’s room used this Room.  There was a restaurant which could be used as a 
meeting place for seamen, people who wanted to buy ships, people who wanted to conduct 
auctions etc.  This room was open from 9am – 9pm.  They had to pay 1 guinea subscription fee 
and no entrance fee.  Soon after its opening, gate-crashing started and individuals used it as a 
normal restaurant (Hodgson, 1986: 58).  This room was judged to be a failure. 
 
4.1.10. New premises 
 
Lloyd’s moved back to the newly rebuilt Royal Exchange which opened its doors on the 26 
December 1844 (Flower & Jones, 1981: 98; Straus, 1973: 207).  The move to the new Royal 
Exchange inspired the revision of the Constitution of Lloyd’s and led to Lloyd’s making another 
significant change in 1846 by the division of Lloyd’s into two categories.  Members of Lloyd’s 
were put into two different classes: those who had the privilege of underwriting risks, called the 
underwriting members, and those who did not have such a privilege, called the non-underwriting 
members.  Both paid, on election, an entrance fee of £25 but the underwriting agents also paid an 
annual subscription of 10 guineas while the non-underwriting members continued to pay only 4 
guineas (Esquires, 1868: 188; Straus, 1973: 214). 
 
Initially, in 1844 Lloyd’s did not remove membership of any member who became insolvent – it 
was not worried about insolvency of members.  As from December 1851, enforced through a 
bye-law passed by the committee, a member was automatically expelled if he was found to be 
insolvent (Raphael 1995: 45 & Straus, 1973: 220).  By 1866 this view had changed and the 
deposit system was well established (Brown, 1973: 38).  New candidates wishing to be accepted 
as members had to deposit £500 each as security before being accepted.  Lloyd’s was the first to 
require deposits.  They were the pioneers of this idea and the government followed suit when it 
became concerned about the number of failed insurance companies.  Up until 1867 Lloyd’s was 
the only institution that put money aside for the eventuality of an insolvency. 
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4.1.11. The Lutine Bell 
 
In 1799, during the Napoleonic wars, the HMS Lutine was lost in a storm and was shipwrecked.
24
  
In 1857 the ship’s bell was salvaged and installed in the front of the trading room at the Royal 
Exchange.  Each time Lloyd’s moved to new premises the bell moved with it and is always 
placed in the middle of the trading floor.  This bell was rung to announce to the room that news 
had arrived of an insured disaster (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 51) or news of an overdue ship 
(Raphael, 1995: 20).  It was rung once for bad news and twice for good news (Flower & Jones, 
1981: 114).  However, today it is mostly used only on ceremonial occasions (Raphael, 1995: 32; 
Hodgson, 1986: 78; Brown, 1973: 117). 
 
4.1.12. Signal stations 
 
The agency system was boosted by the introduction of the signal stations.  Colonel Sir Henry 
Hozier (1838 - 1907) occupied the position of Secretary from 1874 till 1906 (Davison, 1987: 21; 
Straus, 1973: 240).  He was extremely intelligent and a talented mathematician and scientist.  
Raphael (1995: 49) described him as “forceful, vain, ambitious and autocratic, he rapidly 
established his authority, putting proposals for the reform of the market to the committee within 
a week of his arrival”.  One of Hozier’s contributions to Lloyd’s was expanding and 
strengthening the signal stations (Hodgson, 1986: 66; Flower & Jones, 1981: 114; Brown, 1973: 
99).  He pioneered wireless telegraphy and as a result the first telegraphic instrument was 
installed in the Merchant’s Room.  He secured permanent wireless rights for Lloyd’s at their 
signal stations used by the Agents.  These signal stations would watch for ships and as a ship 
passed they would send news to London which would be received in a matter of seconds.  In 
September 1873 Hozier married Henrietta Ogivly.  Their second daughter was Clementine who 
married Sir Winston Churchill, later the Prime Minister. 
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4.1.13. Cuthbert Heath (born 23 March 1859- died 8 March, 1939) 
 
Cuthbert Heath played a pivotal role in the development of Lloyd’s.  Gibb (1957: 161) expressed 
the following opinion of Heath “by his experiments and achievements in fire and accident 
insurance he did more than any other man of the last hundred years to change the character of 
Lloyd’s and fix the pattern of its future”.  “He was the father of modern Lloyd’s and foster-father 
of modern company insurance”. 
 
Heath was born partially deaf and could not realise his first passion to follow in his father’s 
footsteps into the Navy (Raphael, 1995: 51; Straus, 1973: 254).  “Throughout his life Cuthbert 
Heath had one overwhelming asset.  He knew how to capitalise his talents” (Brown, 1980: 40).  
He had inherited the family talent for languages and he decided to build on this talent.  At the age 
of 16 Heath spent a year in France followed by 9 months in Germany where he studied both 
languages.  Afterwards, at the age of 18, he worked for Messrs Henry Head and Co’s, which was 
a firm of Lloyd’s underwriters and insurance brokers.  Heath began at the bottom by filling 
inkwells and worked his way through the ranks.  This was the start of his historical and 
memorable career (Brown, 1980:61). 
 
Heath was elected as an underwriter in 1880 at the age of 21 and by 1885 had started his first 
non-marine syndicate
25
 at Lloyd’s (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 61; Brown, 1973: 66).  In the 
beginning of Heath’s career he was a marine underwriter who wrote non-marine fire business on 
the side and towards the end of his career he was a non-marine underwriter who wrote marine 
business on the side.  The development of the non-marine market at Lloyd’s occurred in the late 
nineteenth century which was during the time of Heath.  He was largely responsible for Lloyd’s 
diversifying out of marine insurance (Dickson, 1960: 158).  When non-marine underwriting 
began at Lloyd’s it was done by the marine underwriters who had decided to branch into this 
new form of insurance and started up new syndicates.  Lloyd’s at that stage did not have separate 
marine and non-marine underwriters (Raynes, 1950: 327). 
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Heath’s success can be attributed to the fact that he was not afraid to take risks and accepted 
risks that other underwriters would not, based simply on the fact that it had not been done before.  
In his view, if people wanted to insure something that meant that there was demand for such 
insurance and he was prepared to supply the insurance for that new demand.  His famous answer 
was ‘Why not?’ when asked why he insures the risks that he did (Raphael, 1995: 52; Hodgson, 
1986: 62).  “Cuthbert was young, ambitious and doing something no underwriter had done 
before him” (Brown, 1980: 69).  He hardly ever turned down a risk; he would always find a way 
to insure, at the right premium. 
 
Heath did not shy away from paying claims in full if they were legitimate as he did in 1906 with 
the San Francisco earthquake when he told his agent to pay all policyholders in full, regardless of 
the wording of their policies (Davison, 1987: 22; Hodgson, 1986: 64).  This placed Lloyd’s on 
the insurance map in North America (Way, 1989: 8). 
 
Some of the policies that Heath pioneered include: burglary policy, risk of merely losing 
something, all risks on personal jewellery a.k.a. jeweller’s block,26 revolutionising fire policies to 
include insuring loss of profits, theft, bomb-damage cover, employer’s liability, earthquake and 
hurricane insurance, workmen’s compensation, banker’s blanket bond insurance, (Luessenhop & 
Mayer, 1995: 61), trade indemnity (Raphael, 1995: 53), and excess of loss insurance.
27
  He even 
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1995: 63). 
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insured people against getting smallpox provided that the insured was vaccinated (Brown, 1980: 
90).  He also started to insure the diamond industry as far back as 1887 for lost or stolen 
diamonds.  The cover for lost or stolen diamonds led to Lloyd’s offering one of its most 
specialised forms of insurance – kidnap and ransom insurance (K&R) – still used by corporations 
in developing countries (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 61).
28
 
 
As an individual he is remembered as being “in every way a giant but always a gentle one” 
(Brown, 1980: 77).  He was very tall and very intelligent, always wore a moustache, driven to 
success, soft spoken and a kind natured soul who was courteous to everyone regardless of their 
rank at Lloyd’s. 
 
The Lloyd’s Act of 1871 only dealt with marine insurance and Heath brought into Lloyd’s new 
business that was outside the protection of the Act and the protection of the deposits.  According 
to the Trust Deed the deposits could only be used to pay marine policies.  It was clear that there 
was no security available for fire and other non-marine insurance except the private accounts of 
the underwriters and the premiums that were paid.  The committee viewed non-marine business 
to include fire insurance only.  Gibb (1957: 171) states that Lloyd’s now had ‘two different 
standards of security – the marine fortified by deposits and guarantees and the non-marine 
dependent only on current premiums and the underwriters’ uncharged capital”.  As long as Heath 
did nothing to prejudice or upset marine underwriters the committee had no jurisdiction over him 
when he was writing (in his personal capacity and not as a Lloyd’s underwriter) non-marine 
polices in the Room.  But by 1902 Lloyd’s started collecting non-marine deposits and non-
marine polices were viewed as being Lloyd’s policies and the original Act was extended to 
include any business of insurance not only restricted to marine in the second Lloyd’s Act of 
1911.  This second Lloyd’s Act legally recognised that non-marine insurance was being written 
at Lloyd’s stating that “the carrying on by members of the Society of the business of insurance of 
every description, including guarantee business” (Raynes, 1950: 329). 
 
The deposit was a cure to help underwriters once they were already in financial trouble and was 
not a preventative mechanism.  New ways were constantly being thought of to increase the 
                                                 
28
 Specialist firms now offer K&R insurance. 
33 
 
security at Lloyd’s which led to the creation of the Lloyd’s audit and the mechanism of putting 
premiums in trust
29
 (Straus, 1973: 262).  The first steps to these two reforms were taken in 1903 
by asking every new candidate before his election whether he would agree to put all his 
premiums in trust so that they would be available only to cover his underwriting liabilities. He 
would not be able to spend the premium money in any other way.  Everyone agreed.  It would 
however, be unfair to ask the new members to put their premiums in a trust without asking the 
older members belonging to the same syndicates to do the same thing.  Therefore the reform was 
started but then had to be postponed for either the older members to die, retire or voluntarily put 
their premiums into a trust. 
 
Another achievement made by Heath was the expansion of the syndicate size.  Underwriters 
would only write risks for themselves and maybe for one or two friends.  Heath expanded this 
until underwriters had many Names they were writing risks for, this being the direct predecessor 
of the large size of syndicates today (Raphael, 1995: 55; Flower & Jones, 1981: 127). 
 
The Times wrote the following about Heath in December 1911 summarising his achievements: 
“Mr Heath is head of CE Heath and Co, brokers and underwriters, and a director of the Excess 
Insurance Company, the Fine Arts and General Insurance Company, and of John Broadwood & 
Sons.  He was the pioneer of Lloyd’s fire business, and practically all the miscellaneous classes 
of insurance.  While he has been a leader in what may be decided as the most hazardous risks, he 
has consistently pressed for safeguarding further the financial security of Lloyd’s members” 
(Brown, 1980: 115). 
 
4.1.14. The Audit 
 
Heath created a model to test the solvency of an underwriter and refused to guarantee any of his 
colleagues unless their account was audited and they received an auditor’s certificate (Hodgson, 
1986: 70; Straus, 1973: 260).  After the San Francisco earthquake of 1906 (Hindley, Allen, 
Czernuszewicz et al, 2000: 2) Heath’s certificate was the model on which the committee created 
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 The premium trust fund was set up by the committee compelling underwriters to place the premiums they 
received into such fund to be used as security for the future payment of claims (Brown, 1973: 40). 
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their audit certificate.  Heath was the brain behind the mechanisms of the audit and its 
implementation in 1908 and thereafter (Flower & Jones, 1981: 136; Brown, 1973: 41). 
 
The mechanism of the audit is as follows.  The accounting format used is the underwriting 
accounts method where each year is treated as a separate risk year.  The finalised results of each 
year are only known 3-4 years after the close of the year.  Profits (if any) are retained in a reserve 
from each year as a precautionary step and the Name has to pay his expenses from his own 
personal savings.  Once the first 3-4 years are over, the Name can receive his profits made every 
year from that point onwards i.e. the profits an underwriter made in 1911 would only be received 
in 1915, the profits he made in 1912 would only be received in 1916 etc.  During the 3-4 years 
the account is subjected to a meticulous audit to make sure that each year has sufficient assets to 
cover all current and future liabilities associated with that and previous years.  If the 
requirements are not met at any time the underwriters is forced to stop underwriting immediately 
(Wright & Fayle, 1929: 424). 
 
This audit provided valuable protection for the Names and gave them confidence.  A Name 
usually does not have any underwriting knowledge and relies on his underwriter to know which 
risks to accept and which to decline.  A Name is defined by Wright & Fayle (1929: 422) as “an 
underwriting member of Lloyd’s represented by an Agent.  He is a capitalist pure and simple.”  
The Name exposes himself to limitless liability and trusting everything he owns on the ability of 
his underwriter.  Gibb (1957: 213) summarises that the audit, premium trust deeds, deposits and 
guarantees were all testimony to the security at Lloyd’s.  The audit was seen as the best measure 
of making sure that no irresponsible underwriters existed. 
 
The amount of information and intelligence needed by an underwriter at Lloyd’s had increased 
tremendously to be able to competently deal with all of the new risks which needed to be 
insured.  It influenced the growth of the underwriting syndicate.  In the beginning every man 
signed a line for himself personally.  Later an underwriting member would appoint a substitute 
(today known as an underwriting agent) and authorise him to write a line on his behalf.  This 
substitute then started writing lines on behalf of more than one underwriter.  In this way the 
underwriting syndicate was formed. 
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In October 1936 Lloyd’s decided to include a clause in all their policies that would exclude war 
risks on land.  The whole world was asked to sign the agreement, excluding America because 
they were outside of bombing range.  Everyone agreed.  A resolution was passed to exclude land 
war risks.  This was the birth of the war exclusion clause in all land based non-marine insurance 
policies worldwide.  This agreement worked well for underwriters and insurers but had the 
opposite effect on merchants’ and property owners who no longer could receive war cover and 
had to cover their own risk.  For two years this gap created by the war exclusion clause was left 
open.  A month before the start of WWII, on the 4 August 1939, government finally filled this 
gap and as from the 28
th
 August 1939 companies and individuals were able to buy government 
war risks insurance on their property.  The universal agreement signed by all private insurers 
gave the government a monopoly in land war risks. 
 
4.1.15. The Signing Office 
 
Overcrowding was again a problem at Lloyd’s as the rooms remained the same size but the 
number of underwriting and non-underwriting members increased.  The difficulty of signing 
policies (because of this lack of space) forced the brokers to suggest a new system/method of 
getting policies signed to the Committee.  This made the Committee finally realise that Lloyd’s 
was in desperate need for new space.  Gibb (1957: 247) and Wright & Fayle (1929: 437) 
describe the old method of getting a policy signed as being chaotic and frantic as the following:  
 A broker’s senior clerk presented a slip of paper to many underwriters.  This slip 
contained all the details of the risk.  Different underwriters acting for different syndicates 
would each accept a certain percentage of the risk. 
 Once the entire risk was placed the senior clerk would take it back to his office and give 
it to the policy department. 
 The policy department transcribed the details onto a stamped policy – to serve as a legal 
document carrying the names of the underwriters who insured the risk. 
 Once the policy was printed, the broker had to take this policy back to the underwriters 
who had signed the original slip to now also sign the policy. 
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 Once the underwriting clerk had signed the policy (the actual signing was done by the 
junior clerks of the underwriters by stamping them with a rubber stamp) it was put into a 
metal box on the side of the table from which the broker would collect the signed slip and 
move onto the next underwriter. 
 This partially signed policy would be taken back to the broker’s office every evening and 
taken back to the Room every day until the entire policy was signed. 
 
“This was a crude way of doing important business” (Gibb, 1957: 248).  As business grew, the 
underwriting clerks started getting more and more polices to sign.  Eventually signing up to 400 
polices a day.  It became very difficult to check if every policy was correct.  The broker’s clerks 
“swarmed and struggled around the signing boxes searching for their policies in the wire baskets, 
grabbing them when found and carrying them along to other boxes until the process of signing 
was complete” (Gibb, 1957: 249).  This process could take up to a week on a large policy.  The 
condition of the document was terrible as it deteriorated by being passed between many hands to 
get signed.  Usually it would be tattered and torn and this would be sent to the insured in that 
same deteriorated state. 
 
In 1913 brokers devised a new, more efficient method of signing polices and brought it to the 
Committee for approval.  The Committee realised that the only way to implement this new 
method would be to have more space.  The Committee approved closing down the Captains 
Room and used it as extra space for policy signing and the underwriting purposes. 
 
This led to the formation of the Signing Office in 1917.  The Signing Office brought three 
advantages to Lloyd’s (Wright & Fayle, 1929: 438): (1) Policies were systematically checked 
against the slip ensuring the policy accurately represented the terms agreed upon.  (2) Polices 
were no longer separated or accidentally lost from the slip.  (3) Slips were no longer crumpled 
and dirty since they were no longer passed between so many hands. 
 
Space was still needed since business was steadily growing.  Lloyd’s was forced to move from 
the Royal Exchange to new premises at Leadenhall Street in 1923.  Gibb (1957: 261) states that 
one of the main reasons for moving was to bring all the groups that had scattered into different 
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buildings over time back together again under one “parental roof”.  The rest of the building was 
brought by Lloyd’s in 1936 and the housing problem was temporarily solved.  By 1948 Lloyd’s 
had once again outgrown its new home and in 1950 it was decided to buy a bombed site on the 
opposite side of Lloyd’s on the other side of Lime Street and build a new building there. 
 
4.1.16. The Harrison Scandal30 
 
In 1923 a Lloyd’s underwriter, Stanley Bruce Knowles Harrison, offered credit insurance which, 
because of its financial nature, is a difficult class of insurance compared to, for example, 
property insurance which is subject to real property and specific perils.  He became involved 
with dishonest people and fraudulently suffered serious losses.  He hid his real negative financial 
position from the committee by supplying the audit with a false book of accounts.  It was 
subsequently found that he owed £367 000 which he could not pay (Hodgson, 1986: 72; Straus, 
1973: 265).  Lloyd’s as an organisation acted contrary to its historical position and agreed to 
settle the underwriter’s obligations.  Sturge (chairman at the time) made a historical statement: 
“If we do not pay these bills, the name of Lloyd’s will be seriously injured and will never 
recover during our lifetime” (Hodgson, 1986: 73; Brown, 1973: 43; Gibb, 1957: 271).  This was 
the first action of collective responsibility for Lloyd’s.  Underwriters had never been asked to 
pay for a fellow underwriter’s defaulted accounts.  There was no legal authority forcing them to 
pay, Sturge was playing on their moral sense of duty asking them to pay for the sake of Lloyd’s 
survival and safeguarding its reputation in the public eye.  They all agreed, saving Lloyd’s from 
being labelled as dishonest by the public (Flower & Jones, 1981: 169).  “The settlement of 
Harrison’s is an important milestone, because it was the first time that the market publicly 
acknowledged its collective responsibility for the actions of its members” (Raphael, 1995: 58). 
 
The Harrison scandal left Lloyd’s unwilling to have anything more to do with credit insurance.  
However, some underwriters were unhappy with the decision to exclude credit insurance from 
being offered at Lloyd’s (Brown, 1973: 43).  A compromise was reached, credit insurance would 
be allowed but only through reinsurance i.e. Lloyd’s underwriters were not allowed to be direct 
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 The Harrison scandal was interesting enough to the insurance profession to receive brief mention in a South 
African insurance magazine, the African Insurance Record (Anonymous, 1924b: 15). 
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insurers of credit insurance.  The necessary machinery needed to prevent a reoccurrence of the 
Harrison scandal was found in the already existing Policy Signing Office (Gibb, 1957: 291).  As 
a result of the Harrison scandal, a further safe-guard was introduced into the Lloyd’s policy 
against fraud from the 1
st
 January 1924 stating that no policy will be recognised by Lloyd’s 
unless it bears the Lloyd’s Signing Office seal at the foot of the policy.  If the seal of the Policy 
Signing Office did not appear on a policy then it was assumed it was not a true Lloyd’s policy.  
The Lloyd’s marine policy became standardised on the 1st of January 1924 and no other policy 
shall be in force other than one with the seal of the Lloyd’s Policy Signing Office (Wright & 
Fayle, 1929: 127).  This scandal also led to the creation of the Central Fund set up to cover any 
future defaults by underwriters unable to pay claims consisting of contributions made by all 
members of Lloyd’s (Brown, 1973: 44). 
 
4.1.17. Foreign legislation 
 
Increasingly countries began to pass domestic legislation regulating insurance.  This had an 
impact on the operation of Lloyd’s.  The marine underwriters were not too worried about foreign 
legislation.  They were of the opinion that merchants sought the best market to insure their goods 
therefore if they offered better rates and quicker settlements of claims to clients than the foreign 
insurance companies then people would choose Lloyd’s over all other insurers.  The non-marine 
market was more sensitive to foreign legislation.  They were more aware of the battle they would 
have to fight to get business on the home ground of other insurers in foreign countries.  In 1937 
Lloyd’s finally saw that this could be a matter of concern and devised an approach to deal with 
problems of foreign legislation. 
 
There were a number of countries which had passed legislation requiring that domestic and 
foreign companies carrying on business within the country put down a deposit before opening an 
office for any type of insurance.  Gibb (1957: 297) is of the opinion that insurance is 
international in nature and it is illogical to require a country to say that all risks must be borne 
exclusively by its own national companies.  It does not make sense to require the same insurance 
company to deposit its assets and deposits in every country it operates.  This reduces the 
company’s overall financial strength by the amounts it has deposited in other countries.  They are 
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forced to stay immobile in one area and are not allowed to be moved to an area that is currently 
in need or would offer higher returns.  It should not matter where the money is being kept as long 
as the company can pay all its claims.  The problem was highlighted by Rhodesia, where after 
the Smith government declared UDI, sanctions were imposed and Lloyd’s was unable to pay 
valid claims.
31
 
 
The main question posed by Gibb (1957: 298) is “Why has it been more difficult for Lloyd’s 
than it was for companies to adapt itself to the changing conditions and comply with the demand 
of modern foreign legislation?”  An insurance company is one corporated body.  The insurance 
company provides the cover and signs the policy in its own name and 50 years later the same 
company is still covering that same risk.  At Lloyd’s, things work differently.  An underwriter 
takes on the risk personally and signs his own polices.  Underwriters could change from year to 
year.  Lloyd’s is a market and not a company.  The average career of an underwriter is 20 years 
and someone who has had a policy with Lloyd’s for 30 years might find that the Names who 
have taken on his risk have changed considerably in those 30 years.  “The policy is still a 
Lloyd’s policy but the shoulders that bear the risk are not the same shoulders” (Gibb, 1957: 299).  
This distinction between an insurance company and Lloyd’s plays a substantial role when 
discussing the placement of deposits overseas. 
 
In 1920 it became apparent that some foreign countries would require a deposit of £20 000 and if 
Lloyd’s did not provide such a deposit it would lose much of its foreign business.  This led to the 
question of who should pay the deposit.  Individual underwriters did not have that amount of 
capital in their personal capacities.  The Lloyd’s corporation had no power to make such deposits 
out of the Lloyd’s funds.  A third party would have to provide such funding.  It became clear that 
a body was needed that would deal solely with foreign deposits but be under the control of the 
Committee of Lloyd’s and not individual underwriters. 
 
The majority of foreign Acts focused on how to deal with foreign insurance companies and not 
how to deal with Lloyd’s as a market, which worked very differently from a normal company.  
In 1929 a clerk drafted a memorandum to the committee of Lloyd’s outlining the problem of 
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foreign legislation, and suggested a method to solve the problem.  The matter was urgent.  The 
memorandum stated the following three things that foreign governments insisted upon (Gibb, 
1957: 306): (1) Provision of a deposit, (2) Acceptance of legal service and (3) Payment of tax.  
The problem was that Lloyd’s found it difficult to fulfil these three criteria.  The only body that 
was equipped to deal with foreign government was the Committee of Lloyd’s.  The clerk 
proposed that in every country where legal representation was required “Lloyd’s should open a 
registration office which would keep track of the business done, would arrange the payment of 
taxes as they fell due, would be authorised to accept service on underwriters’ behalf and 
generally would superintend the relations between underwriters and the government” (Gibb, 
1957: 306).  The proposals where accepted and implemented in 1937 by the creation of a 
financial company which would be owned by the members but controlled by the Committee, 
whose sole purpose would be to provide foreign countries with the funds that domestic 
legislation required.  This company’s revenue would come from the underwriters’ premium 
income and would be separate from their trust funds.  The new company was named Additional 
Securities Limited (Flower & Jones, 1981: 172). 
 
4.1.18. Foreign Names 
 
Lloyd’s only allowed foreigners and women to become Names at Lloyd’s in 1969 (Luessenhop 
& Mayer, 1995: 20; Stewart, 1984: 2).  The first foreigner to become a Name at Lloyd’s was an 
American by the name of Bernard (Bernie) Daenzer (1916 - 2010) who was a director of the 
Alexander Howden agency (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 24). 
 
4.1.19. Foreign currencies and exchange 
 
Underwriters in the 1960s had a much broader general knowledge about international trade and 
finance than their predecessors.  According to Gibb (1957: 321) this change in the outlook of an 
underwriter and sudden need to gain knowledge about international trade can be traced to 
changes in underwriting techniques and the change in international finance.  When the sterling 
ruled supreme every exchange was carried out in pounds – underwriters had no need for 
knowledge of the exchange system and exchange rates and risks.  When the British pound lost its 
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dominance, policyholders started asking to be rather paid in their home currency, since the risk 
was in that currency and not in pounds.  In most countries this became a legal requirement.  This 
required the underwriter to have some knowledge of foreign banking and exchange rates.  This 
led to Lloyd’s facing the problem of dealing with foreign currencies and exchange. 
 
4.1.20. Risks insured at Lloyd’s 
 
Lloyd’s is very significant in the insurance market since it is able to accept large, complex and 
esoteric risks (Rasmussen, Owen & Smith 1997: 3) which no other insurer will underwrite 
(Davison, 1987: 12; S.C, 1943: 7).  Examples of some of the strange risks insured at Lloyd’s 
include as listed by Gibb (1957: 324), Wright & Fayle (1929: 442) and (Luessenhop & Mayer, 
1995: 62): 
 Owner of a block of flats insured his premises for the suicide of one of his tenants which 
might scare away prospective tenants,  
 A newspaper insured the risk of someone guessing the first three horses to finish a race 
and thereby winning a prize, 
 An advertisement was placed in a newspaper that every child who sends a letter to a 
certain address on the day of Mickey Mouse’s birthday will receive free cake.  Insurance 
was taken out for the risk that too many kids reply to the ad and would pay out if more 
than 2000 kids replied, 
 Surgeons can insure their hands, 
 Dancers can insure their feet, 
 A movie company can insure the possibility of their losses incurred if the lead actor was 
found to be on drugs, 
 Inventors of medication could insure themselves against any unknown disastrous side 
effects of their medicine, 
 The possibility of rain on the wedding day (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 116), 
 The possibility of giving birth to twins and the extra expense involved (Luessenhop & 
Mayer, 1995: 116), 
 Even the Loch Ness Monster was insured, in 1971, if anyone was to find the monster and 
deliver it alive at a premium of £2 500 (Borch, 1976). 
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 A film company took out a US$1million policy against the possibility of one of their 
actresses falling in love and getting married before the end of filming (Flower & Jones, 
1981: 161). 
 A European wine maker has insured a taster’s nose for the loss of his nose and sense of 
smell for 5 million euro (Hosken, 2008a: 69). 
Lloyd’s is prepared to write risks which fall outside the scope of a standard policy (Rasmussen, 
Owen & Smith 1997:  3). 
 
Most of the experiments at insuring strange risks were made by the non-marine underwriters of 
Lloyd’s who first insured cars in 1904 and branched into aviation insurance in 1911 (Luessenhop 
& Mayer, 1995: 65).  Today the aviation market is almost as big as the marine and non-marine 
market.  Marine underwriters also write some non-marine business and this business was named 
Incidental Non-Marine.  Aviation risks can be written by both marine and non-marine 
underwriters.  The birth of aviation insurance was in 1911 (Margo, 1979: 3).  Initially, when 
planes were still being experimented with, the plane itself was uninsurable but Lloyd’s did offer 
third-party liability cover to the planes’ owners since no airports existed and planes had to land 
where they had the space and would sometimes destroy a farmer’s crops (Flower & Jones, 1981: 
142; Margo, 1979: 9). 
 
4.1.21. Lloyd’s as a society 
 
Lloyd’s, according to Gibb (1957: 341) “has a personality of its own, a character without which 
the work that has been done by it would not have been possible”.  All members have different 
personality types but the one thing that they all have in common is their loyalty to Lloyd’s.  
“From this diversity the society develops a unity” (Gibb 1957: 341).  Lloyd’s harmonises all the 
different personality types to develop a personality of its own.  The necessity of making a 
livelihood brings all these men together but they end up being friends and a part of a very large 
family. 
 
The formation of the society is summarised in the following fashion (Gibb, 1957: 343): The 
Corporation was born in 1871 when Queen Victoria assented to the first Lloyd’s Act.  The Act 
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stated that Lloyd’s had “long existed as a society in the City of London”.  This was the first 
private statute of Lloyd’s (Ferguson, 1983: 57).  It does not say when the society was started.  
Some argue it was when Edward Lloyd first opened his coffee house in 1688, others say it was in 
1739 when the War of Jenkins’ ear broke out and others state it was when Lloyd’s moved to its 
new premises in Pope’s Head Alley.  By 1774 it was definitely a society when it moved to the 
Royal Exchange and by paying their first subscriptions recognized their mutual relations with 
each other.  This relationship was solidified in 1811 by the creation of the Trust Deed – the 
constitution of Lloyd’s.  In the same year the subscribers elected a Committee that would oversee 
the workings of Lloyd’s.  All the members now officially belonged to a single body.  Lloyd’s 
was already a society by the time the Act of Parliament of 1871 was put in place on the 25
th
 of 
May (Flower & Jones, 1981: 105; Martin, 1876: 356).  The essential functions of Lloyd’s were 
laid out in this Act as being (Martin, 1876): 
 “The carrying on of marine insurance by its members” (Gibb, 1957: 344). Premises were 
found to house this growing market. 
 “The collection, publication, and diffusion of intelligence with respect to shipping” 
(Gibb, 1957: 344). Lloyd’s published its own newspaper in 1734.   
 “The protection of the interests of members in respect of shipping, cargoes and freight” 
(Gibb, 1957: 344).  The election of the Committee, in 1772, (who stood up for the rights 
of underwriters making sure they were protected against fraudulent policyholders, hostile 
politicians, foreign government and other fraudulent underwriters) attests to this point as 
well as the creation of the network of agencies to protect underwriters from fraudulent 
claims. 
 
Three examples stated by Gibb (1957: 346) show how the Society has helped structure Lloyd’s 
and help underwriters: (1) Forming the Policy Signing Office which “revolutionized the system 
of signing polices at Lloyd’s” allowing a lot more polices to be signed in a much shorter space of 
time.  (2) Forming Additional Securities where the underwriters were given help in arranging 
their finances and in the best use of their resources.  (3) The annual audit was the most valued 
contribution that the Society gave to Lloyd’s in 1908.  Every member accepted the compulsory 
audit without revolt or disagreement, showing yet again the loyalty and trust that members had in 
the Society of Lloyd’s. 
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4.1.22. Conclusion 
 
In the history of Lloyd’s the following names stand out (Gibb, 1957: 364): 
In the infancy stage of Lloyd’s there was Edward Lloyd who opened up the coffee house where 
shipping merchants and owners gathered to discuss their business.  John Julius Angerstein, in 
1774, who added great value to underwriting at Lloyd’s and is named Father of Lloyd’s.  He 
moved Lloyd’s to the Royal Exchange premises.  John Bennet Jnr who was not an underwriter 
but employed by the Society, the first secretary of the Committee of Lloyd’s in 1804.  He was 
the founder of the modern day intelligence service at Lloyd’s.  Colonel Hozier, also not a 
member but an employee and was secretary from the 1
st
 April 1874 till 1906.  The work he did 
for the intelligence Service in founding the signal stations was very beneficial for the growth of 
Lloyd’s.  He also reformed the administration of Lloyd’s which added great value to the 
generations to follow.  Cuthbert Heath who was seen as the father of non-marine insurance and 
the first to introduce the idea of an audit which proved to be highly beneficial for Lloyd’s, and 
lastly, Arthur Sturge, in the excellent way in which he handled the Harrison scandal and for 
acquiring the property on Leadenhall Street for Lloyd’s. 
 
Gibb (1957: 363) makes the following statement on Lloyd’s “No one can study its history or 
understand its working without realizing how much every member owes to the corporate 
enthusiasm of its leaders, both in the past and in the present” and “Lloyd’s is at its best when the 
loyalty thread is at its strongest”.  Esquires (1868: 176) summarises Lloyd’s as being 
“Individuality in union”.  A good definition of Lloyd’s was provided by William Farrant, the 
Caller at Lloyd’s, who stated that “Individually, we are Underwriters; collectively we are 
Lloyd’s, and it is in the Room that the individuals combine together to become the most 
important insurance market in the world.”32 
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4.2. Period between 1960s – 1990s 
 
4.2.1. Cromer Report 
 
Starting in the 1960’s signs began to appear that all was not well at Lloyd’s.  The Cromer Report 
led by Lord Cromer, published in 1969, was one of the first official indications of things not 
running smoothly at Lloyd’s.  It was commissioned in response to the decline in the number of 
Names joining Lloyd’s resulting in a decline in the capacity of Lloyd’s to accept risks.  This was 
as a result of Hurricane Betsy in 1965.
33
  The report was concerned with the fact that some 
brokering companies owned underwriting firms which led to a serious problem of conflict of 
interest.  Members at Lloyd’s had limited knowledge, if any, of the law of agency although it 
was a key issue at Lloyd’s - where the broker is the agent and servant of his principle, the 
insured.  In law, the interests of the principal are paramount to the agent (Taylor, 2006: 3).  The 
broker is meant to act on behalf of the insured (the policyholder) and should deal with conflicts 
between insured and underwriter in the best interests of the policyholder.  This cannot be done 
however, if the broker has a personal stake in the dealings of the underwriter where he can be 
inclined to deal in the best interests of the underwriter for his own personal gain.  However, it 
could be argued that this relationship actually provided a benefit for the Names – a broker would 
not give the underwriter a bad risk since he would have a vested interest in the profits made by 
that underwriter.  In this indirect way Names were protected against bad risks (Luessenhop & 
Mayer, 1995: 114; Davison, 1987: 48). 
 
Some of the recommendations made by the Cromer Report and implemented by Lloyd’s were to 
lower the financial requirements/minimum standard of wealth needed for entry as a Name; to 
simplify the deposits; increase the premium income limits and allow for larger amounts to be 
reinsured (Kelley, 1995: 2; Davison, 1987: 43; Hodgson, 1986: 115).  Other implemented 
recommendations were to allow women for the first time to become Names and the inclusion of 
foreigners as Names (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 225; Hodgson, 1986: 129). These changes led 
to a dramatic increase in membership with individuals becoming Names who could not afford to 
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be involved in high risks based on their inadequate asset base (Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 2000: 
70; McClintick, 2000: 45; Davison, 1987: 44).  It can be argued that these new Names were 
exposed to higher risks.  The existence and contents of this report were not published and were 
not public knowledge.  The existence of the report was concealed until October 1986, when it 
became important, since it insinuated that insiders at Lloyd’s could profit at the expense of 
external Names (McClintick, 2000: 41).  However, in the 1960s it was still unthinkable that the 
very existence of Lloyd’s would ever be in jeopardy (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 115). 
 
4.2.2. Lloyd’s faces increasing difficulties 
 
Despite this report Lloyd’s, continued to be successful and profitable and remaned so until the 
1980s.  Lloyd’s had suffered many losses in the past, but always dealt with the problems as they 
arrived, paid every claim and survived.  In the 1980s Lloyd’s faced the real possibility that it 
might not be strong enough to endure and that defaulting on payments could become a real 
possibility.  “The vast expansion of the market in the past two decades hid serious conflicts of 
interest and declining standards of underwriting, and a terrible legacy from latent asbestos and 
pollution risks” (Raphael, 1995).  As from the 1980s Lloyd’s was no longer making profits and 
some of its Names were facing catastrophic claims that would bankrupt many of them. 
 
One of the main principles of insurance at Lloyd’s is that of Uberrima Fides34 which means 
utmost good faith, a consequence of which was that all parties in an insurance contract, the 
insured as well as the insurer, are required to disclose all material facts to each other (Wilkie, 
1997: 1041) i.e. Lloyd’s has a duty to act in utmost good faith with respect to its Names and its 
members.  Allegatinos of dishonest dealings and fraud were rare at Lloyd’s before the 1980s and 
only the odd underwriter defaulted on his payments, as in the case of Harrison.  When faced with 
a loss all underwriters contributed their share of the claim without complaint (Raphael, 1995, 
59).  However, the principle of uberrima fides was shattered by the catastrophic losses that befell 
Lloyd’s during the 1980s. 
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In the 1980s the chairman of Lloyd’s stated that the Lloyd’s insurance market followed a 
Laissez-faire attitude which favours the strong and powerful in the marketplace with very few 
rules or regulations to follow (Samli, 2008: 45; Kelley, 1995: 6) where underwriters used their 
own judgement in choosing the risks to insure and the level of profit to make (Raphael, 1995: 
22).  If something went wrong it was left to the underwriter to fix his own mistakes.  This 
attitude was a contributing factor that led to the large amount of losses faced by Lloyd’s as the 
more risky ventures brought in the higher premiums which directly converted into higher profits 
and therefore were more likely to be chosen by less conservative underwriters.  Everyone 
concerned, underwriters, members and Names, wanted to make large profits.  Risky ventures 
provided lucrative profits if no claims were made and were chosen by many underwriters.  If, 
however, a claim did arise from such an assumed risk then the loss was substantial.  There was 
very little regulatory oversight into the workings at Lloyd’s which attributed to the losses 
suffered by many syndicates (Kelley, 1995: 6). 
 
Certain syndicates at Lloyd’s suffered the most losses between 1988 and 1992, completely 
wiping out profits made over the previous 20 years.  Lloyd’s suffered an aggregate loss of £510 
million in 1988, £2.3 billion in 1990 and £2.3 billion in 1991 (Raphael, 1995: 23).  These figures 
did not taken into account the underwriters who still had open accounts that had not been closed 
because of the likelihood of future claims being brought against those policies.  It was stated that 
“no British institution has ever taken the losses that Lloyd’s has and survived” (Raphael, 1995: 
16). 
 
The worst hit Names were the individuals in the lower middle class income bracket (Raphael, 
1995: 24).  They were not poor, so were able to make the deposits required by Lloyd’s, but were 
not rich enough not to be affected by the additional income brought into their households by the 
premiums received.  These individuals were tempted by the additional money they could earn 
and became Names.  However, in reality, the unlimited liability to which they were exposed to 
bankrupted many taking all their assets to cover losses.  “More than half of the 29 000 members 
underwriting in 1986 had declared assets of under £150 000” (Raphael, 1995: 24).  This is not to 
say that the rich did not invest in Lloyd’s – they did, but they had more cushioning for the large 
number of claims that hit Lloyd’s in the 1980s (Raphael, 1995: 71; McClintick, 2000: 45).  Many 
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of these individuals who barely managed to get enough money together for the deposit found that 
they were exposed to risks of asbestos, pollution and catastrophic risks without knowing the risks 
involved (Raphael, 1995: 81).  Years later, those lower middle class people were exposed to 
losses that ran into the millions with no way for many to pay such claims.  The “explosive 
growth in Lloyd’s membership in the 1970s and 1980s was the root of future troubles.  It led to 
considerable over-capacity, and set off a cycle of rate-cutting that was to pave the way for the 
horrendous losses of the 1980s” (Raphael, 1995: 81). 
 
4.2.3.  Causes of the disastrous claims at Lloyd’s 
 
Three main factors contributed to the catastrophe at Lloyd’s: latent asbestos disease claims, long- 
tail pollution claims and large numbers of natural disaster claims.  These factors were largely 
brought about by unrealistic decisions made by the American courts (Raphael, 1995 & Cover, 
1991: 24). 
 
4.2.3.1. Latent asbestos disease claims 
 
Many American asbestos manufacturers filed for bankrupcy due to the avalanche of unaffordable 
liability claims.  Asbestos can cause a sickness in the lungs if inhaled for over a period of time.  
It takes many years for the inhalation of the tiny fibres to scar the lungs sufficiently enough for a 
recognizable deterioration in health to be noticed.  The side effects, including lung cancers, 
gradually show themselves.  The process takes between 20 and 30 years to manifest, so no 
treatment can be implemented before it is too late (Raphael, 1995: 130; Luessenhop & Mayer, 
1995: 165; Bannister, 1995: 12).  It takes decades to be revealed but once revealed no treatment 
is available usually resulting in permanent disability closely followed by death (Luessenhop & 
Mayer, 1995: 164). 
 
Asbestos was discovered by crushing ore of a mountainous rock and was believed to have 
valuable commercial uses.  It is a mineral ore that, when crushed into flexible fibres, could 
withstand extreme high temperatures of up to 500 degrees centigrade (Raphael, 1995: 130).  This 
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heat resisting quality made it popular to be used in industrial products such as the manufacturing 
of cars and mattresses, shipyards or construction work on buildings (Bannister, 1995: 12).  
However, only many years later were the side effects of asbestos discovered.  The sale of 
asbestos boomed as commercial companies used it in construction or manufacture of goods.  As 
manufacturers of asbestos produced more, they disregarded the health hazards associated with it 
(Raphael, 1995: 133).  It was only in the 1960s that it was discovered that asbestos not only 
affected individuals who worked with the mineral but could also affect the worker’s family and 
anyone who came into any contact with it. 
 
In 1964, the first shock hit the asbestos industry when a doctor, Dr Irving Selikoff (1915 - 1992), 
conducted a study examining the health of workers’ who came into contact with asbestos and he 
published his extraordinary results indicating the negative impact it had (Raphael, 1995: 134; 
Society of Lloyd's v. Jaffray (2000), EWHC (Commercial Court) Decision 51 (Comm); 
Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 165).  His results showed that 87% of people working with asbestos 
and inhaling asbestos dust for a 20 year period had “severe and irreversible damage to their 
lungs” (Raphael, 1995: 135).  Workers with asbestos had a seven times higher chance of dying 
from lung cancer and a 3% higher chance of dying with stomach cancer when compared to other 
industrial workers.  The publication of these results led to a huge jolt and wake-up call for the 
asbestos industry. 
 
The second shock that hit the insurance industry came from the legal sector which extended the 
basis of products liability in the US (Cupp, 2006: 512, 526; Herzog, 1990: 541).  Before 1960, 
individuals could only sue manufacturers under products liability for goods used for human 
consumption only i.e. food and cosmetics.  Now this had been extended to anything including the 
“defective condition of the product making it unreasonably dangerous to the user” (Raphael, 
1995: 135).  This opened up a new avenue of recourse allowing workers to sue the asbestos 
manufacturers directly for the damages they suffered leading to those manufacturers claiming 
from their insurers (Raphael, 1995: 136; Legh-Jones, 1969: 63). 
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The case of Borel v Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation
35
 was the first case where a worker, 
the plaintiff, sued the manufacturing company directly for the damages he sustained from 
asbestos.  The court ruled in favour of the plaintiff opening the floodgates for asbestos claims 
from workers against the asbestos manufacturers leading to a rush of people filing cases 
(McCambridge, 2007: 409; Warfel, 2004: 3).  Following this case the number of asbestos claims 
against producers increased dramatically over time (Society of Lloyd's v. Jaffray supra). 
 
In addition the social change that occurred around the 1970s led to a drastic increase in personal 
injury actions.  America became a litigious society.  This also added to the already increased 
claims against Lloyd’s.  “A struggling lawyer had only to find a pollution or latent disease 
sufferer whose background was parallel to those of thousands of other industrial workers, and he 
had found a goldmine” (Raphael, 1995: 152).  American lawyers were compared to vultures 
trying to cash in on the asbestos claims by representing the asbestos victim and working on a 
contingency fee basis.  A study undertaken in 1982 showed that £1 billion had been spent on 
asbestos litigation with the victims only receiving approximately 25% of the money, the rest 
going to lawyers’ pockets (Raphael, 1995: 153).  “The flood of asbestos litigation has been fed 
more by the greed of plaintiffs’ lawyers than by the urge to right a public wrong” (Raphael, 
1995: 154). 
 
Lloyd’s had started insuring asbestos manufacturers around the 1930s and 1940s up until the 
1970s when the syndicates involved in insuring the American manufacturers suffered 
catastrophic losses (McClintick, 2000: 42).  A well known and successful underwriter, Ralph 
Rokeby-Johnson, told a golfing partner as early as 1973 that “asbestos is going to change the 
wealth of Nations.  It will bankrupt Lloyd’s of London and there is nothing we can do to stop it” 
(McClintick, 2000: 38).  The first claims started coming against Lloyd’s in the middle of the 
1970s.  Liability underwriters determine their potential future claims based on past claims history 
and thereby estimating the correct premium.  In the case of asbestos this approach was wholly 
inadequate as asbestos was a new risk and no claims history existed (Raphael, 1995: 183).  The 
risk could not be adequately priced.  The claims started coming in slowly and increased 
exponentially so that by the end of the 1970s close to 5 000 asbestos claims had been reported to 
                                                 
35
 (1973) 493 F2d 1076, No. 72-1492. 
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Lloyd’s.  By 1980 the Secretary of Health stated that due to asbestos 67 000 people p.a. were 
estimated to die for the next 30 years (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 168). 
 
Ralph Rokeby-Johnson was an underwriter on the Sturge 210 syndicate which started in 1920 
and became one of the largest syndicates at Lloyd’s.  His main focus was insuring American 
industrial risks which included asbestos.  Syndicates at Lloyd’s protected themselves against run-
off claims with reinsurance to close (RITC)
36
 cover.  Risks prior to 1969 at Lloyd’s were 
reinsured to close with his syndicate and when claims started pouring in his then current Names 
had to fit the bill because of the reinsurance to close cover he provided.  In 1974, acting on the 
knowledge of the approaching asbestos claims, he reinsured all his risks prior to 1969 with two 
American reinsurers, one was the Fireman’s Fund, at a very high premium which he was more 
than happy to pay (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 167).  In 1976 Fireman’s Fund realized the 
problems that would arise from the risks it had reinsured from the Sturge syndicate and tried to 
retrocede the risk.  There was no domestic market available for such cover and it had to retrocede 
internationally with different companies around the world.  In 1981 it realised that even with the 
retrocession cover, it did not have enough to cover such losses (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 
174).  In total Fireman’s had to pay between $60-70 million in asbestos claims (Luessenhop & 
Mayer, 1995: 186). 
 
In August of 1980 it was becoming clear that asbestos claims were going to be a problem and 
Lloyd’s formed the Asbestos Working Party (AWP) to gather information about the large influx 
of claims and the damaging effect it was having on Lloyd’s (Raphael, 1995: 143; Luessenhop & 
Mayer, 1995: 169).  It was given the task to monitor the developments of asbestosis stating that 
the volume of claims for asbestos damage were rising exponentially with no sense of decrease in 
the claims being apparent at all (Raphael, 1995: 163).  The Asbestos Working Party is still in 
force today trying to establish the extent of asbestos claims yet to come. 
 
In March 1982 Lloyd’s informed its auditors that it was unwilling to specify a minimum IBNR 
(incurred but not reported) amount for the year 1979.
37
  Each syndicate had the discretion to 
                                                 
36
 For a discussion on reinsurance to close (RITC), refer to chapter 5.1. 
37
 Lloyd’s follows a three year accounting period. 
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calculate its own IBNR provision and if it constituted a considerable part of the syndicate’s total 
provisions without a specified IBNR or reinsurance to close, the syndicate would have to leave 
that year of account open (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 172).  Many syndicates, however, closed 
the 1979 year of account without fully understanding the substantial amounts needed for the risks 
they were involved in.  Many syndicates however, somehow managed to find the required RITC 
the year 1979 while still managing to pay the Names profits for that year, knowing large losses 
were soon to follow.  Since the Names were kept ignorant of the losses for the near future, many 
Names from 1979 stayed for the 1980 year of account.  Names that left Lloyd’s in 1979 were 
extremely lucky to avoid paying losses while new Names who entered Lloyd’s in 1980 were not 
warned about the looming losses (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 173). 
 
4.2.3.2. Long tail pollution claims 
 
The second factor which contributed to the problems at Lloyd’s was long tail pollution claims.  
Petroleum and air related pollution was acknowledged in the 1960s, as a major problem resulting 
in the Federal government in the US finally getting involved in its regulation (Pratt, 1978: 1, 6).  
Other forms of pollution also became a problem including where companies manufactured 
powerful insecticides which would contaminate the surrounding areas with their emissions and 
waste products.  They completely disregarded the disastrous effect their activities would have on 
the environment (Raphael, 1995: 190). 
 
The first large pollution claim involving Lloyd’s occurred in 1978 when a housing development 
situated in Love Canal, New York, USA was found to have been built on top of chemical waste 
dump (Raphael 1995: 199).  All the families were eventually evacuated but were concerned 
about higher probabilities of getting cancer, liver disease, suffering miscarriages and if a child 
was born it had a much higher likelihood of having a birth defect.  That land area had been used, 
from 1942 till approximately 1952, for dumping toxic waste by Hooker Chemical & Plastics 
Company, which sold the land in 1953.  For Lloyd’s, the Love Canal episode “was an ominous 
warning of a torrent of pollution claims to come” (Raphael, 1995: 199; Bannister, 1995: 14). 
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This led to public awareness of the problem of pollution and as from the 1980 companies had to 
start taking responsibility for environmental issues because of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA - commonly known as the 
Superfund) which was later amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA) of 1986 (Hird, 1993: 324; Tietenberg, 1989: 306; Bannister, 1995: 14).  CERCLA 
required that all polluted sites must be cleaned up regardless of the cost.  It retrospectively made 
companies liable for past pollutant actions (Raphael, 1995: 191).  This Act gave government 
three powers: firstly, it allowed them to clean up their waste and then recover the money spent 
from the companies responsible for the pollution costs, secondly, to issue orders to the corporate 
polluters forcing them to immediately begin with corrective measures to remedy the pollution 
they had caused, with a fine of $25 000 for each day of delay and finally, to apply to the federal 
courts to force corporate polluters to start remedial action.  The corporate polluters were forced 
by law to clean-up ‘toxic’ sites or the government would do it for them and send them with the 
bill.  In each scenario the corporation would turn to its insurer to pay under their liability policy.  
Lloyd’s was one of the insurers.  It should be noted the clean-up costs are imposed despite the 
absence of any injured persons. 
 
Cost of clean-ups can run into hundreds of billions of dollars and companies looked to their 
insurers, including Lloyd’s, for payment.  Lloyd’s became extremely vulnerable at this stage 
because before 1960 Lloyd’s had imposed no aggregate limits on its policy periods (i.e. their 
liability was on a per claim/occurrence basis with no capping of their liability) and it was one of 
the main insurers for North American businesses including their liability risks.  This led to a 
sudden rush in claims (Raphael, 1995: 192, 204).  The length of time such clean-up projects 
would take and the enormous costs involved is illustrated by the following scenario.  It was 
estimated that 400 000 sites needed to be rehabilitated, each site requiring $30-40 million and the 
clean-up would be done over a period of 15 years per site.  The approximate costs would be $302 
billion (Raphael, 1995: 203, 204).  This cost could destroy Lloyd’s and other American insurers 
(Raphael, 1995: 192).  It should be understood that in history these claims were unprecedented. 
 
A main problem with polluted sites was the high probability of it contaminating groundwater 
which is used as a primary source of drinking water for most of the population (Pye & Patrick, 
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1983: 713) and is constantly moving, thereby spreading the pollution substantial distances in 
short periods of time.  Contaminating groundwater results in contaminating the running water 
used by people needed for their survival, leading to the costs of clean-up rising even further. 
 
4.2.3.3. Unrealistic decisions made by the American courts 
 
The above factors were not only unprecedented in history; they were also unprecedented in law.  
The US judicial system for civil liabilities is based on the contingency fee principle.  The 
plaintiff’s legal team only gets paid if the case is won, payment coming from the award of 
damages made by the court.  The ‘injured’ plaintiff runs no financial risk in engaging in 
litigation.  The American jury is also seen to be generous in its attitude towards a plaintiff 
especially if the injury was allegedly caused by a company or where awards are paid by an 
insurance company or Lloyd’s.  Large corporations and insurers are perceived to have deep 
pockets and can afford to pay damages (Davison, 1987: 17; Bannister, 1995: 7, 11; Hans & 
Lofquist, 1992: 87).  All of this resulted in unprecedented awards being made against insurers 
including Lloyd’s.  The aggregated costs were sufficient to cause Lloyd’s problems. 
 
4.2.3.3.1. Asbestos 
 
Workers suffering injuries from asbestos would bring claims against a large company insured by 
a third party general liability policies since these policies included products liability cover which 
incorporated occupational injury claims (Society of Lloyd's v. Jaffray).  The first wave of claims, 
around 1979 onwards,
38
 against Lloyd’s and make it vulnerable was due to the large numbers of 
asbestos risks it had underwritten as well as “the loose all-embracing wording of its general 
liability polices” (Raphael, 1995: 144).  A general liability policy covers the insured against all 
losses that the insured will be legally liable to pay arising from bodily injury or property damage 
to others at the time without any aggregate limit for coverage (Adler, 2001: 22).  General liability 
policies at Lloyd’s were on an occurrence basis, at that time, so that any claim made could be 
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 http://truthaboutlloyds.com/fraud/timeline.html. 
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taken back to each year in which the policy was taken out.
39
  Because of this, no accounting year 
could, conceptually, be closed.  A loss sometimes takes years to manifest itself before a claim is 
made.  Lloyd’s only started restricting their general liability cover in 1985 by switching some 
liability policies from the occurrence to claims-made basis.
40
  Therefore, from 1985 the insured 
had to claim within the year that the policy was taken out otherwise the claim would not be paid.  
“If this had been done a generation earlier Lloyd’s would have saved itself 5 billion pounds” 
(Raphael, 1995: 150). 
 
Lloyd’s suffered billions of pounds as the courts interpreted insurance contracts to be “strictly 
construed in favour of the injured and promote coverage” (Raphael, 1995: 145).  In 1981 the 
courts extended asbestos cover offered by the insurers to state that “all periods of insurance 
cover were liable, from inhalation of the first harmful asbestos fibre to outbreak of the disease, 
often thirty years later” (Raphael, 1995: 146).  So a policy issued in 1946 could be liable to pay 
for asbestos damages that only manifested in 1983 for example.  This had serious implications 
for Lloyd’s. 
 
Lloyd’s was made even weaker in 1980 by the declaration of the courts that the burden of proof 
was moved from the plaintiff to the defendant.  Originally, the plaintiff i.e. the victim worker, 
had to prove that the manufacturing company had caused the damages that the victim suffered.  
If the plaintiff was unable to sufficiently prove his case the manufacturer was not held liable.  As 
from 1980 the burden of proof shifted to the defendant i.e. the manufacturer must prove that he 
did not cause the damages that the victim was claiming.  If he cannot prove that it did not cause 
of the damage, it would be held liable.  This led to another wave of asbestos litigation in the late 
1980s (McCambridge, 2007: 411) which again was very detrimental to Lloyd’s. 
 
Raphael (1995: 148) is of the view, however, that “Lloyd’s may have had rough treatment in the 
US courts, but it cannot escape responsibility for its cavalier attitude to the known risks of 
                                                 
39
 An example is used to illustrate this point: A loss occurred in 2005 and the claim is only made in 2007.  Under a 
loss occurring policy, the policy that was in force at the time the loss occurred is the policy that will respond to the 
claim i.e. the policy from 2005 will pay the claim even if it was not renewed for subsequent years. 
40
 A claim-made policy will only respond if a claim is first made against the insured within that period of insurance.  
That policy will cover the claim irrespective of when the loss event actually occurred (Doherty & Dionne, 1993: 
198). 
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asbestos”.  The risks and lethal side effects of asbestos were known as far back as the 1930s with 
some insurers refusing to insure asbestos manufacturers in the US and, since Lloyd’s was a 
principal insurer of American liability risks one would expect the underwriters to do their 
homework on the risks they are underwriting (Raphael, 1995: 149).  This was not the case as 
Lloyd’s had not considered the risks associated with asbestos when insuring asbestos 
manufacturers in the 1940s and 1950s.  However, in defence of Lloyd’s it is pointed out that 
historically insurance was priced on actual past claims, not conceptual risks or claims.  Until 
claims actually began, Lloyd’s was unprepared. 
  
These continual waves of claims had disastrous effects on the Names of Lloyd’s as Lloyd’s made 
calls on Names (Raphael, 1995, 156).  One family had to sell their 400-acre farm to pay for 
claims stating that Lloyd’s ruined their lives without explaining the full extent of the risks that 
they were being exposed to.  This is the sentiment of many Names at Lloyd’s.  By the 1970s it 
was already known that large numbers of asbestos claims were inevitable yet underwriters were 
still persuading Names to join Lloyd’s without disclosing this vital information.  Many Names 
had no idea about the asbestos and pollution claims their syndicates were involved in (Raphael, 
1995, 158).  At this stage clearly asymmetry of information between Lloyd’s and outside Names 
was a possibility. 
 
The accountants declared that many syndicates would not survive the increasing number of 
claims.  After this statement the Lloyd’s committee told the managing agents that they were 
responsible for having adequate reserves in place to make sure their syndicate survived and are 
able to pay all claims regardless of whether the account is opened or closed, and that they should 
inform the Names of their involvement in the asbestos claims and what steps the syndicates have 
taken to ensure the payment of their liabilities (Raphael, 1995: 175).  “The Names were all 
blissfully ignorant of the gathering storm” (Raphael, 1995: 177).  However, Lloyd’s dismissed 
the allegations of a ‘market-wide plot’ stating that “No evidence has been provided which 
supports the suggestion that in placing their contracts the underwriters took advantage of 
information which was available to the AWP but was not made available to the market” 
(Raphael, 1995: 177).  Lloyd’s failure to react to the evidence of the dangers of latent diseases, 
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the increase in US litigation and the courts desire to make the deepest pockets pay can all be 
attributed to the mounting problems Lloyd’s would face. 
 
4.2.3.3.2. Pollution 
 
The loosely worded general liability policies also make Lloyd’s vulnerable to the pollution 
claims as no mention was made of environmental damage, either in the coverage offered or in 
the exclusions (Raphael, 1995: 198).  In the 1950s some underwriters attempted to exclude non-
accidental pollution but the exclusion was not implemented, allowing policyholders to argue that 
deliberate pollution was covered.  Only in 1970 was the general liability policy reworded to 
cover only ‘sudden and accidental’ environmental damage.  Gradually developing claims, if 
covered, could be done so in terms of a separate policy.  As mentioned above general liability 
policies issued before 1985 covered property damage that was caused due to ‘an occurrence’.  
Property damage was defined as ‘physical injury to property of others’ and an occurrence was 
defined as “an accident which results in damage during the policy period which is neither 
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the assured” (Raphael, 1995: 207).  It can be seen 
through legal battles involving the interpretation of the general liability wordings that the courts 
are leaning towards benefiting the insured and making the insurer liable, even going so far as to 
unrealistically stretching the meanings of the words to cover the insured (Raphael, 1995: 209).  
The intention of insurers was to exclude deliberate environmental damage, the American courts 
however, disregarded this intention and construed polices for the benefit of the insured thereby 
making insurers liable even if the wordings plainly said otherwise.  One judge even stated that 
“public interest overrides contractual language” and since insures are assumed to have deep 
pockets they should be held liable (Raphael, 1995: 198). 
 
In 1991 Lloyd’s appointed the Rowland Task Force to assess the prospects for Lloyd’s in future 
years.  The Rowland Task Force concluded that if the courts continue to make judgements in 
favour of policyholders disregarding the policy wordings, then Lloyd’s only needed a fairly 
small share of the problem to suffer extraordinary and unaffordable losses (Raphael, 1995: 206). 
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Lloyd’s set-up an environmental department to gather information about the advancements in 
pollution and its litigation and to make this information readily available to the market.  Pollution 
claims take time to settle.  It takes 3-5 years for a court to decide on the matter, then another 3-5 
years before the issue gets resolved between the policyholder, insurer and reinsurer and Lloyd’s 
was depending on these delays to trade out of its predicament. 
 
4.2.3.4. Natural Disasters 
 
Hurricane Donna passed over the Florida Keys in 1960 and Hurricane Betsy passed over the 
same area in 1965 destroying and eroding coral reefs in that area (Perkins & Enos, 1968: 711, 
717).  Hurricane Betsy led to Lloyd’s having three loss making years in 1965, 1966 and 1967 
leading to a decline in new members as well as an increase in resignations of existing members.  
The Cromer Report, as mentioned previously, was commissioned in response to this decline in 
the number of Names.  Membership only started increasing again in 1971 (Davison, 1987: 43; 
Hodgson, 1986: 35). 
 
In addition to the ongoing asbestos and pollution losses, Lloyd’s suffered losses between 1987 
and 1990 through many natural disasters striking in that period.  These natural disasters were: the 
North European storm in 1987, Piper Alpha oil platform fire in 1988, Hurricane Gilbert also in 
1988, San Francisco earthquake in 1989, Hurricane Hugo in 1989, the spilling of crude oil 
through the Exxon Valdez tanker also in 1989 and more North European storms in 1990 (Bain, 
1998: 1; Craighead, 1993: 314).  The probability of so many catastrophes occurring in such a 
short period of time is extremely low and yet it happened.   Lloyd’s specialised in catastrophe 
insurance which exposed it to too many large losses in too short a span of time to be dealt with 
through proper provisions (Bain, 1998: 1).  Special mention needs to be made of the Piper Alpha 
oil platform disaster in 1988 as it was at the time the largest “single-site loss ever suffered by the 
insurance industry world-wide” (Lyon, Ball & Carroll et al, 1988: 7) estimating losses for 
property damage, liability to third parties and consequential damages. 
 
Many of these natural disasters occurred at a time when Lloyd’s was heavily involved in and was 
concentrating its risks on the London excess of loss (LMX) market and already struggling with 
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the asbestos and pollution claims added to the pressures felt by Lloyd’s (Luessenhop & Mayer, 
1995: 245; Cover, 1991: 24; Bannister, 1995: 8).  Piper Alpha, for example was mainly 
concentrated in the LMX market (Lyon, Ball & Carroll et al, 1988: 7; Bannister, 1995: 8). 
 
4.2.4. Spirals and the LMX market 
 
In the 1960s European insurers were eager to increase their presence in the US, the main 
contributor being Lloyd’s, forming subsidiaries and expanding the reinsurance capacity of the 
US (Werner, 2007: 21).  Lloyd’s syndicates offered the US excess of loss reinsurance.41, 42  In the 
1960s the US constituted the majority of international business at Lloyd’s thereby not spreading 
the risk effectively as it was mostly concentrated at Lloyd’s (Werner, 2007: 25) so that when the 
natural disasters struck American soil, especially Hurricane Betsy, Lloyd’s was badly affected, 
having to pay out millions in claims (Kelley, 1995: 5).  Lloyd’s share in the losses from all the 
catastrophes suffered in the 1980s was a lot higher than the share Lloyd’s usually had on 
catastrophe risks.  Lloyd’s had exposed itself to a significantly larger portion of the risks than it 
normally would through excess of loss reinsurance.  “The abnormally high share reflected a 
heightened exposure to risk that was intimately connected with the “spirals” that existed in the 
London excess of loss (XL) insurance market at the time” (Bain, 1998: 3). 
 
The main aim of reinsurance is to disperse risk and to spread the risk to a wide range of insurers, 
and not to concentrate it with only a few, which is what occurred in the LMX market 
                                                 
41 Reinsurance is a form of insurance for primary insurers and is used as a mechanism for primary insurers to spread 
their risk (Stettler, Eugster & Kuhn, 2005: 21).  An insurer can only keep a certain amount of the risk himself 
depending on the amount of capital resources the insurer has.  Those capital resources have to be adequate to 
support claims.  If the risk is in excess of what the capital reserves can support i.e. when a claim arises it will not be 
sufficient to cover the loss, then reinsurance must be sought.  Reinsurance for catastrophe risks usually takes the 
form of an excess of loss basis where reinsurance is brought in layers.  Thereby many insurers have a share in the 
loss to prevent one insurer from having to pay the entire claim.  Excess of loss reinsurance helps spread the risks 
amongst many insurers, reinsurers and retrocessionaires (Bain, 1995: 2). 
42 Reinsurance on an excess-of-loss basis was started by Cuthbert Heath after the 1906 San Francisco earthquake.  
After WWI Lloyd’s had turned to mainly focusing on reinsurance of high level risks (Raphael, 1995: 219) and by 
1960 Lloyd’s was known as the “foremost international reinsurance centre” (Werner, 2007: 10).  Today Lloyd’s is 
the largest, most important and most specialized reinsurance market (Stewart, 1984: 1; Davison, 1987: 12; Catlin, 
Harrison, James et al, 1998: 36).  By 1987, over 50% of business underwritten at Lloyd’s was reinsurance business 
(Davison, 1987: 12). 
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(Rasmussen, Owen & Smith, 1997: 4).  Lloyd’s did not reinsure the risks with other markets but 
reinsured these inside Lloyd’s.  Consequently, the risk was in fact not spread leading to the spiral 
problem (Rasmussen, Owen & Smith, 1997: 9).  Lloyd’s syndicates purchased and sold 
reinsurance at the same time resulting in what became known as the LMX spiral. 
 
The London Market is made up of Lloyd’s syndicates as well as other London insurance 
companies which deal mainly with insuring Lloyd’s type of business (Lyons, Ball, Carroll et al, 
1988: 2); however the majority of the London market consists of Lloyd’s syndicates (Coutts, 
Craighead, Duncan et al, 1984: 3).  Risks are usually spread from the few insurers who take on 
the risk to the many reinsurers who are willing to take on portions of the risk and have the 
financial capacity to do so through worldwide reinsurance policies (Bain, 1998: 3).  When an 
insurer reinsures a loss, it normally only pays up to its retention/deductible level and no more 
since the remainder will be recovered from the reinsurer.  However, with claim spirals (also 
known as claim circles), the risk is not adequately spread leading to reinsurers insuring each 
other on an excess of loss basis.
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  In an insurance spiral, however, the insurer is liable to pay for 
his portion of the loss and ends up being the reinsurer on the same loss, thereby having to pay 
more than what his retention level allows for.  If a loss exceeds an LMX insured’s retention level 
the excess loss is then paid by the retrocessionare.  However, in a LMX spiral the insured 
himself has a share in his retrocessionaires cover and has to pay a portion of his own excess 
loss
44
 (Cover, 1991b: 54; Stettler, Eugster & Kuhn, 2005).  “This situation is likely to occur 
when reinsurers seek to protect their own positions by purchasing XL reinsurance cover, and at 
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 Craighead (1993: 314); Finger (1996: 18); Kabele (2000: 5); Sphere Drake Insurance Ltd v Anr v Euro 
International Underwriting Ltd [2003] EWHC 1636 (Comm): 167. 
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 An illustrative example of a spiral (Sphere Drake Insurance Ltd v Anr v Euro International Underwriting Ltd: 
175): Each syndicate accepts 20% of a risk i.e. there are 5 syndicates involved in insuring the same risk.  Syndicate 
A takes 20%, syndicate B takes 20% right through to syndicate E who takes the last 20% of the risk.  However, in 
addition to having 20% of the risk, syndicate B reinsures a portion of A’s 20% on an excess of loss reinsurance 
contract, syndicate C reinsures a portion of B’s 20% on an excess of loss reinsurance contract, syndicate D reinsures 
a portion of C’s 20% on an excess of loss reinsurance contract, syndicate E reinsures a portion of D’s 20% on an 
excess of loss reinsurance contract and syndicate A reinsures a portion of E’s 20% on an excess of loss reinsurance 
contract.  Each syndicate is another syndicate’s reinsurer.  When a loss occurs – insurer A has to pay 20% of the 
loss, but has reinsured a portion of that 20% with B forcing B to pay on his excess of loss policy with A.  However, 
while B is paying on his excess of loss policy for A, he also has his 20% of the risk to pay.  He has in turn insured a 
portion of it with C through an excess of loss policy.  C must then pay on this excess of loss policy for B as well as 
his 20% share of the risk.  However, he in turn has an excess of loss policy with D.  D must then pay on this excess 
of loss policy for C as well as his 20% share of the risk.  He in turn has an excess of loss policy with E.  E must then 
pay on this excess of loss policy for D as well as his 20% share of the risk.  He then turns to his excess of loss policy 
with A. 
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the same time write XL reinsurance policies for other reinsurers who [unbeknown] are liable to 
be affected by the same loss events” (Bain, 1998: 5).  In this way the portions of the loss are 
passed on from insurer to insurer climbing the reinsurance layers of excess of loss policies until 
one reinsurer runs out of cover.  When the top of the spiral is reached the insured’s cover has 
been exhausted and the original loss reverts back to the insured since no more reinsurance is 
available.  On large risks it often takes years for the loss to make its way through the spiral 
(Cover, 1991b: 54; Bain, 1998: 6; Stettler, Eugster & Kuhn, 2005). 
 
Lloyd’s syndicates used these reinsurance spirals in the 1980s where they were the primary 
insurer of the risks as well as the reinsurer for another syndicate who had taken a portion of the 
same risk.  Thereby indirectly being the insurer as well as the reinsurer for the same risk.  
Lloyd’s syndicates provided reinsurance as well as retrocession for each other and when a loss 
occurred it was passed backwards and forwards between syndicates as to who should pay what 
portion of the risk.  Lloyd’s encouraged its syndicates to reinsure with each other and to reinsure 
only approximately 20% of the risk with international markets (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 
194).  However, there was an understanding at Lloyd’s amongst the syndicates that participated 
in the spirals that if the loss reaches the higher reinsurance levels, the premium for that risk will 
be increased in the following year and that increase in the premium would be used to make up 
for the loss suffered previously (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995, 199).  The spiral in the LMX 
market led to Lloyd’s accepting more exposure than its capital base could support (Craighead, 
1993: 314; Cover, 1991b: 54; Stettler, Eugster & Kuhn, 2005). 
 
Initially Lloyd’s did not recognize this potential problem and the LMX market was able to make 
large profits as long as no catastrophe claims were made.  These profits, made in the 1980s when 
no catastrophes occurred, lured Names to join syndicates with the prospect of sharing in these 
profits.  Between 1982 and 1988 Lloyd’s capital base had significantly expanded much of it 
coming from the LMX syndicates who attracted these new Names by advertising their past 
profits (Cover, 1991a: 24).  “This hectic expansion of the highest risk syndicates sucked in large 
numbers of new Names who, when the LMX bubble burst, discovered they had been ruined” 
(Raphael, 1995: 223).  The case of Society of London v Henderson and others (2005) EWHC 850 
(Comm) QBD alleged that the LMX spiral was created deliberately as a means of transferring 
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the loss-making business to reinsurers who wrote cover at the higher levels of an excess of loss 
policy and away from the Lloyd’s underwriters.  It was held, however, that LMX spirals were 
not created deliberately or dishonestly.  By 1992 LMX spirals had almost ceased to exist (Cover, 
1992: 53; Alston, 1993b: 16) and by 1994 Alston (1994b: 16) stated with confidence that the 
LMX spiral was a thing of the past. 
 
Many of the above mentioned natural disasters triggered these excess of loss reinsurance policies 
for catastrophe cover.  A trigger is needed to activate this cover – the primary loss has to occur 
through a single event that causes widespread damage i.e. windstorm, hurricane or tsunami 
(Kabele, 2000: 2; Stettler, Eugster & Kuhn, 2005: 124).  That is exactly what the natural 
disasters of the 1980s did. 
 
Bain (1998: 15) lists a number of reasons as to why Lloyd’s participated in insurance spirals: 
 Lloyd’s was the main market at that time for reinsurance as other markets preferred not to 
participate so the risks had nowhere else to go except to stay in the London market.  
Reinsurance for an LMX underwriter can be best found in the LMX market itself – LMX 
on LMX cover (Lyons, et al, 1988). 
 Underwriters preferred to have small levels of retention and made extensive use of 
reinsurance. 
 Underwriters estimate the PML (probable maximum loss) of their insurance portfolios to 
determine how much reinsurance they need on their accounts (Bain, 1998: 3).  Regarding 
catastrophe risks the PML will be less than the calculated total aggregated loss as the 
probability of a catastrophe causing all the policyholders in the underwriters account to 
claim is small.  If the underwriter’s portfolio is diversified (i.e. having worldwide risks) 
then the PML can be made even less since a catastrophe will most likely not affect all 
policyholders at the same time.  There is a possibility that the underwriter has calculated 
the PML incorrectly and when a loss occurs has insufficient reinsurance cover (Bain, 
1998: 4).  Some syndicates did in fact miscalculated their PMLs and became involved in 
the LMX without fully understanding how spiral worked or understood the concept of an 
insurance spiral but where of the opinion that higher excess of loss layers would be risk 
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free and accepted to be reinsurers on those layers thinking no claims would really reach 
them. 
 Underwriters calculated their PMLs and then started accepting business that led to an 
increase in that syndicates PML without getting the corresponding increase in reinsurance 
that is needed.  Leading to the underwriter not having enough reinsurance cover. 
 The premium that reinsurers would receive for upper layers were completely 
inappropriate for the level of risk they were actually taking on.  The premium was very 
low and did not compensate for the level of risk.  Many reinsurers would retrocede their 
risk to the London market which would gladly accept it at the attractive price (low 
premium but very little possibility of them ever having to pay any losses) thereby 
exposing the market to catastrophe risks (Bain, 1998: 16).  “It was clearly believed by 
some underwriters that the highest layers of cover were beyond the reach of any likely 
loss events” (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 200).  However, the disasters of Hurricane 
Alicia (1983) and Piper Alpha cut through to the top layers of the spiral with great speed. 
 
“These features may be regarded as proximate causes of the Lloyd’s insurance spirals” (Bain, 
1998: 16).  Many Lloyd’s syndicates would retrocede other syndicates catastrophe risks.  “The 
end result, when the catastrophes occurred, was losses on a scale that threatened the continued 
existence of Lloyd’s” (Bain, 1998: 16). 
 
The formation of the LMX market was sped up by the devastation wrought by Hurricane Betsy 
in 1965 and by Hurricane Alicia in 1983 (Lyons et al, 1988: 49).  Underwriters would normally 
only reinsure specific contracts that were high risk while keeping the lower risks on their own 
books.  They did not reinsure their entire book of business since the probability of everyone on 
the book claiming at the same time was minimal.  Hurricane Betsy changed that way of thinking 
as it caused widespread damage equating up to $10 billion (this value being calculated in 1995) 
with many policyholders claiming from Lloyd’s all at the same time.  This led to Lloyd’s 
reinsuring their entire account and not just certain contracts that seemed risky.  “Lloyd’s 
relaxation of its reinsurance rules undoubtedly encouraged the growth of the spiral market” 
(Raphael, 1995: 221). 
 
64 
 
In May 1988, a paper was presented at a reinsurance conference in London by John Emney who 
was the chief underwriter of Charter Re at the time, showing that if a large catastrophe were to 
occur the spiral at Lloyd’s would unwind until the protection of all involved, either through 
reinsurance or retrocession, would be depleted completely since all the syndicate were each 
other’s reinsurers and retrocessionaires and the spiral would just keep going up until the very top 
was reached where no more cover was available (Raphael, 1995: 223).  Many of the heaviest hit 
syndicates in a spiral could appear profitable long after a disaster strikes since the loss first goes 
to the lead underwriter who disperses it amongst the other insurers, then it goes through to the 
reinsurers and finally to the retrocessionares.  This process can take years to complete and will 
only be realized by the syndicate involved in the retrocession years after the actual disaster 
(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 201). 
 
This was the first time that the public was informed of the dangers inherent in the LMX market 
since it was involved in a spiral which could bankrupt many participants if it were ever put into 
motion by a claim.  Two months later the Piper Alpha disaster occurred.  Piper Alpha cost 
Lloyd’s £900 million but created claims up to £15 billion from 43 000 policies as the spiral kept 
going up the layers until the very top was reached (Raphael, 1995: 222). 
 
The bursting of the LMX bubble had devastating consequences on Lloyd’s and by July 1992 
Lloyd’s had suffered losses easily up to £2 billion (Raphael, 1995: 224).  Names were not 
informed about the risks they would be financing but where only told about the glory, prestige 
and integrity of Lloyd’s (Raphael, 1995: 226).  Names that asked to be put into conservative 
syndicates were misled and were put onto high risk spiral syndicates without their consent.  
Many Names, who were on several spiral syndicates, went insolvent trying to pay for the losses
45
 
and were not even informed about spirals and the LMX market (Raphael, 1995: 228).  One Name 
states “we have been ruined by their (Lloyd’s) failure to regulate the market” (Raphael, 1995, 
229). 
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 4000 Names that were on 5 of the LMX syndicates, suffered losses of hundreds of thousands of pounds each 
while one couple was liable for over 1 million pounds.   
65 
 
The syndicates at Lloyd’s that were involved in the LMX market that suffered huge losses in 
1989 boosted the allegations that the Lloyd’s market was manipulated in favour of the insiders 
(i.e. the underwriters, brokers, internal Names and members) at the expense and to the detriment 
of the external Names who provided Lloyd’s with the majority of its capital (Raphael, 1995: 
235).  This was damaging to the reputation of Lloyd’s.  Christopher Thomas-Everard, on the 
brink of insolvency after being placed on a number of LMX syndicates, researched this 
allegation and found that insiders at Lloyd’s were “over-represented on the best syndicates and 
under-represented on the worst” (Raphael, 1995: 235).  Very few Lloyd’s Internal Names were 
placed on spiral syndicates.  “More than 90% of the losses on the seven worst affected LMX 
syndicates in 1989 had fallen on external Names because the professionals had carefully avoided 
them” (Raphael, 1995: 235). 
 
The explanation for the favouritism shown to internal Names was that some successfully 
profitable syndicates deliberately chose more internal Names rather than External Names to be 
on their syndicates.  Christopher Thomas-Everard requested to be placed on the more profitable 
syndicates and was told that they are only open for internal Names indicating that internal Names 
received preferential treatment at Lloyd’s (Raphael, 1995: 236).  The newer Names were put 
onto the more risky and more dangerous syndicates.  To be placed on a specialty syndicate or 
one with a good reputation, a Name has to have good contacts inside Lloyd’s.  Some syndicates 
had a 10 year waiting period and working Names were able to get ahead in the queue through the 
connections they had established over a long period of time (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 22). 
 
When asked why the LMX syndicates contained a majority of external Names, Lloyd’s declared 
that many external Names joined those syndicates on their own volition when the LMX 
syndicates were making high profits during a brief period and this attracted external Names.  Sir 
Peter Green (1924 - 1996), the Chairman of Lloyd’s at the time, stated that “they were all so 
starry eyed and just waiting for the cheques to roll in.  I don’t think half the time they listened to 
what they were being told” (Raphael, 1995: 237). 
 
Sir David Walker, an independent member of the Lloyd’s council, was asked to make an inquiry 
into reinsurance at Lloyd’s focusing on the LMX market paying particular attention to the 
66 
 
accusation that internal Names benefited at the expense of the external Names (Bannister, 1995: 
9).  The report showed that during the period of 1983 – 1990, Names who worked at Lloyd’s 
made a profit of $150 000 while Names from North America made a loss of $50 000 during the 
same period (Luessenhop & Martin, 1995: 23).  Even with these results the Walker committee
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published its report in 1992 stating that no evidence could be found to support the allegation of a 
conspiracy at Lloyd’s in favour of internal Names to the detriment of external Names.  However, 
the inquiry did mention that insiders were privy to additional information that was not available 
to the external Names simply because they were directly involved in the business of insurance.  
It also found that the standards of professionalism, care and fiduciary duties of a couple of 
members at Lloyd’s were below standard.  It concludes that the regulatory framework at Lloyd’s 
was not sufficiently adequate to effectively oversee the performance and level of risks 
undertaken by underwriters and did not make sure that underwriters were able to pay for the 
losses they might sustain.  This was the case with the LMX syndicates (Raphael, 1995: 238). 
 
The Walker committee recommended that annual reports should be published outlining the 
profits made and the losses incurred by internal Names contrasted with external Names.  A 
further recommendation was that underwriters should explain the full risk that the Names were 
being exposed to.  Also, Lloyd’s should start actively regulating the market as opposed to 
passively watching what happens by paying attention to the risks the Names were being exposed 
to and making sure not to expose Names to extremely risky situations (Raphael, 1995: 239).  
Lloyd’s as a society had failed to monitor the risk underwriters were exposing their Names to.  
However, “Sir David succeeded in silencing the most serious accusations of corruption in the 
market.  But for ruined Names his report was scant comfort” (Raphael, 1995: 240). 
 
4.2.5. Personal Stop Loss (PSL) reinsurance 
 
This is another type of reinsurance that was required to pay many losses at Lloyd’s.  This 
reinsurance is a measure by which Names can reinsure their own exposure.  The reinsurer would 
pay above a predetermined deductible up to the capped maximum amount of its liability.  The 
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Names who wanted to buy PSL reinsurance were mostly those that knew they were on risky 
portfolios and wanted a measure of protection.  The stop-loss insurers indemnify the insured “for 
the amount by which an ascertained net underwriting loss exceeds the amount stated as excess in 
the schedule” (Bracher, 1993: 29).  Derek Walker is an example of an underwriter who offered 
this type of cover.  This led to many underwriters who offered such cover suffering large losses 
as the Names on risky syndicates began claiming from their policies (Luessenhop & Mayer, 
1995: 215; Newton, 1989a: 6). 
 
4.2.6. Allegations of fraud and negligence at Lloyd’s 
 
As it became clear that Lloyd’s faced financial difficulties and some Names would be ruined by 
calls being made, so allegations of fraud, negligence and incompetence intensified.  Lloyd’s was 
built on trust.  Trust that brokers would provide adequate information to the underwriters of the 
risk to be insured and in return the underwriter would pay all valid claims (Luessenhop & Mayer, 
1995: 120).  However, in desperation many Names, underwriters and agents turned to desperate 
methods to keep their money.  It was alleged that some underwriters would defraud their Names 
by taking their money for personal gain and some agents no longer acted in the best interests of 
their clients but in their own interest of self preservation.  “Lloyd’s recent history is an 
outrageous disgrace with greed, bad management, incompetence and catastrophes bringing the 
market to its knees” (Raphael, 1995: 14).  It was uncertain whether Lloyd’s would survive the 
allegations of fraud in addition to the already detrimental effect of asbestos, pollution and natural 
disasters all occurring at the same time. 
 
Individuals and syndicates which stand out in the history of Lloyd’s with respect to fraud and 
other allegations include Richard Outhwaite, Stephen Merrett, Tony Gooda, Patrick Fagan, Sasse 
syndicate, Howden group, PCW syndicate, Sir Peter Green, Christopher Moran, Oakeley 
Vaughan, Murray Lawrence and Ronald Verrall.  Some of the well known underwriters that were 
alleged to have been involved in the Lloyd’s scandal and had allegedly made large profits out of 
the reinsurance policies in 1989 were David Coleridge, Murray Lawrence, Bryan Kellett, 
Richard Hazell and Stephen Merrett.  Lloyd’s firmly denied all accusations (Raphael, 1995: 
306). 
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4.2.6.1. Richard Outhwaite 
 
Richard Henry Moffit Outhwaite was one of the cleverest underwriters at Lloyd’s who would 
insure anything at the right premium and accepted unusual risks at a high premium (Raphael, 
1995: 160).  He had many Names, many of whom had a high standing in London, in his 
syndicate and had a reputation for making money for his Names.  His syndicate focused on ‘run-
off’ insurance (Raphael, 1995: 161). 
 
By the end of 1981 underwriters who were exposed to asbestos claims were already suffering 
under the weight of the incoming claims.  Underwriters started seeking mechanisms to show the 
auditors that they had adequate reserves for the asbestos claims, still leaving all external Names 
ignorant of the fate of their investment.  A broker, Winchester Bowring Ltd, formulated a 
reinsurance package for such underwriters as a means to generate profits for his business 
(Raphael, 1995: 166).  This reinsurance policy took the form of a run-off policy insuring all 
previous years’ losses above the first layer of £25 million.  Richard Outhwaite was the 
underwriter for this policy.  Outhwaite knew that the claims were going to be astronomical yet he 
still offered this type of insurance.  The logic behind offering this run-off cover was that these 
astronomically high claims would only manifest themselves many years into the future, giving 
him the time to make the required profits needed through returns on investment income.  
However, the claims proved to be even larger than the profits he was able to make through high 
premiums and investment income (Raphael, 1995: 167).  Outhwaite thought that the business of 
run-off polices seemed to be a good risk at the time – he was sadly mistaken.  Later Outhwaite 
declared that he was uninformed about asbestos, knowing very little about it when he offered his 
policies (Raphael, 1995: 170; Finger, 1996: 18).  Although, many believed he knew the risks 
involved but was too arrogant in thinking that they will not affect him.  “The policies turned out 
to be the most disastrous insurance deals ever underwritten at Lloyd’s” (Raphael, 1995: 167).  
Outhwaite’s Names had to pay over 100% of the value of their investments for claims made 
within 5 years of offering the cover and up to 600% by 1994 (Raphael, 1995: 167). 
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Lloyd’s declared that he had been negligent in failing to investigate the risks of the policy he 
offered and had breached his duty to his Names to always act in their best interests.  Some asked 
themselves the question why would a man as clever as Outhwaite do something so stupid? It did 
not seem like him (Raphael, 1995: 172).  A conspiracy of concealing information was suspected 
where a few people knew information but did not relay it to the rest of Lloyd’s (Raphael, 1995, 
173).  The AWP was suspected of having additional knowledge about the asbestos crisis and, 
keeping that knowledge a secret transferred their syndicates’ liabilities to Outhwaite as soon as 
possible. 
 
Another charge levied at Outhwaite and many senior underwriters was the intentional act of not 
informing Names of the seriousness of asbestos.  Many senior underwriters decided to transfer 
the asbestos claims of 1979 to future years so that they did not have to be accounted for in the 
correct year, allowing syndicates to appear solvent and stay in operation.  This was just a way of 
delaying the inevitable – syndicates would have to pay the actual claims sooner or later.  The 
disadvantage for the new Names who joined Lloyd’s after 1979 was not knowing that many 
asbestos claims had been transferred to future years and they would be the one’s liable for those 
claims.  These claims should have been accounted for before they joined Lloyd’s.  The principles 
of duty of disclosure and utmost good faith were completely disregarded.  The Names were not 
advised. 
 
Richard Outhwaite raised the lack of material disclosure defence relating to some run-off 
policies he had underwritten i.e. that external Names had not been informed of the large asbestos 
and pollution claims to come, to avoid making payments on some of these run-off policies.  In so 
doing he succeeded in avoiding unlimited liability on those policies, saving his Names millions 
in claims that they no longer had to pay. 
 
In 1988, 987 Names out of the total of 1 614 Names on his syndicate formed a group, the 
Outhwaite Action Group, and brought a legal action against Richard Outhwaite (Raphael, 1995: 
179).  The case went to court in October 1991 with the Outhwaite Action Group suing for $150 
million in damages.  However since each member’s agent is required to have Professional 
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Indemnity insurance
47
 such as an errors and omissions (E&O) policy, indirectly the Outhwaite 
Action Group was suing and recovering from the E&O insurers.  This policy insures a 
professional for any mistakes that he makes in his workplace and since the member’s agents 
made a mistake in placing the Names on Outhwaite’s syndicate that insurer will be liable to pay.  
The reason why the Outhwaite Action Group targeted the members’ agents was that “the 
members’ agents themselves had few capital reserves – the only deep pockets were the E&O 
insurers” (Raphael, 1995: 180).  E&O policies at Lloyd’s were on a claims made basis for 
periods of 12 month at a time.  The problem at Lloyd’s however was that “E & O cover was 
provided within the very market it was intended to protect” (Society of Lloyd's v. Jaffray, 2000).  
In 1992 the requirement of compulsory E&O cover for managing agents was changed allowing 
them to operate without such insurance for it was becoming too expensive (Luessenhop & 
Mayer, 1995: 91). 
 
The question that the courts had to answer was “were members’ agents responsible in law for the 
actions of an underwriter over whom they had virtually no control?” (Raphael, 1995: 180).  The 
plaintiff’s lawyers charged Outhwaite with 3 charges: (1) lack of asbestos knowledge and the 
lack of research into the dangers, (2) his carelessness in taking on so many dangerous risks and 
placing such a heavy burden on his Names and, (3) the failure to keep accurate records of the 
claims, profits and premiums (Raphael, 1995: 181).  The E&O insurers, who were the 
defendants, had the following defence: (1) he had as much knowledge as the market and no one 
in the market foresaw the astronomical amount of claims and, (2) he wrote business on his run-
off polices the same way as reasonable and competent underwriters in the same line of business 
did at that time (Raphael, 1995: 182).  The plaintiff had one expert witness, Heinz Ulrich Von 
Eicken (former executive manager of Munich Re), that overshadowed anything said by the 
defence by stating that anyone who insures such risks is assumed to know a great deal about the 
subject and it is absurd to write such risks without any research. 
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 Professional indemnity insurance is “an insurance which indemnifies the insured professional against pecuniary 
loss arising out of the professional's negligent act, error or omission which causes loss to be suffered by his or her 
client or a third party” (Hooker & Pryor, 1987: 38). 
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After the court adjourned for a week in which to come to a decision, the parties entered into 
negotiations with each other and a settlement was reached to pay £116 million, a victory for the 
Names (Raphael, 1995: 185).  The settlement implied that negligence had been proven.  The 
message that this case sent to the public and everyone involved with Lloyd’s was that anyone 
who sued had a good chance of recovering a good portion of their losses.  This example was 
followed by many Names suing their syndicates (Raphael, 1995: 186).  “A direct consequence of 
the Outhwaite settlement was the collapse of the professional indemnity market at Lloyd’s” 
(Raphael, 1995: 187) as no E&O insurer would insure underwriters and managers at Lloyd’s for 
fear of the lawsuits against them.  Even Lloyd’s E&O underwriters had no faith in their fellow 
members and would not insure them. 
 
This settlement led Richard Outhwaite to lose many Names but he still maintained that he had 
not acted with negligence by writing run-off policies.  After this disaster, Outhwaite was certain 
that there was no hope for unlimited liability at Lloyd’s anymore by stating that “we will never 
get any significant new capital in Lloyd’s unless the basis of membership is a limited one in both 
time and money” (Raphael, 1995: 187).  To a large measure this prediction proved to be correct. 
 
4.2.6.2. Stephen Merrett 
 
Stephen Merrett joined Lloyd’s in 1963, became a Name by 1965 and an underwriter by 1971 
(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 177).  He became one of the most influential underwriters at 
Lloyd’s. 
 
In 1979 he wrote limited reinsurance on general liability policies before the year 1970 for a 
syndicate that was slightly involved in asbestos risks.  He also formed the Syndicate 421 that 
dealt primarily with excess of loss cover (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 178).  He reinsured other 
syndicates years of account that had been closed for some time usually 1975 and before.  He was 
involved in run off cover together with Outhwaite.  He admitted in 1984 that the true possibilities 
of large claims were never properly considered when signing these reinsurance policies.  
Retroceding the Fireman’s Fund, together with the Outhwaite syndicate, is one such example 
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(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 179).  He withdrew his Names from the Outhwaite syndicates in 
1984 (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995, 181). 
 
In order for his syndicate Merrett 418 to appear profitable Merrett reduced the proportion of the 
premium carried forward to the next year through the RITC every year thereby reducing the 
reserve kept for claims each year.  This fuelled the allegations of gross negligence against him 
(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995, 249).  Syndicate 418 started out as a marine syndicate but later 
branched out into reinsuring asbestos, toxic waste pollution risks and malpractice risks from 
other syndicates run by Merrett (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995, 30; Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995, 
66).  Merrett 418 was unable to close its 1985 year of account at the end of its three year 
accounting period in 1988 since the auditors were unable to accurately calculate the premium 
(RITC) that would have to be paid to the 1986 year for taking on the risks of the 1985 year 
(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995, 34). 
 
However, he resigned as deputy chairman of Lloyd's in September 1993 after Lloyd’s put 
pressure on him to do so.
48
  His managing agency was liquidated and his syndicates passed to 
another underwriter.  One of his syndicates, syndicate 418 for the year of 1985 was seen as one 
of the biggest losers at Lloyd’s (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 27).  In 1993 Stephen Merrett 
attempted to start a new insurance company in Bermuda designed to keep him financially stable 
while the claims kept hitting his syndicates (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 30). 
 
The Business section of The Independent
49
 newspaper on November 1, 1995 wrote an article 
stating that Stephen Merrett, a former deputy chairman at Lloyd’s, was found by a court of law 
to have been negligent in failing to make proper account of the inherent risks of pollution and 
asbestos liabilities.  He was also found to have negligently and deliberately concealed important 
significant information from the Names on his syndicates.  The judge went further to state that 
the accounts found for the Merrett syndicates were mixed with falsifications of data found 
amongst half truths with the judge openly declared that Merrett was involved in cover-ups and 
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deceitful actions.  On February 4, 1996 The Independent published an apology to Stephen 
Merrett pointing out that he had not been criminally convicted of fraud.
50
 
 
Another article states that Stephen Merrett was accused of “negligence, incompetence and 
dereliction of duty”51 and fined £1 million in damages to be paid to the members of his 
syndicate.  He had made a deal with Lloyd’s in terms of which he would never work at Lloyd’s 
again or any subsidiary or company in the Lloyd’s market and in return Lloyd’s and its Names 
will not bring any further legal actions against him. 
 
4.2.6.3. Tony Gooda 
 
A well-known LMX syndicate to have bankrupted the majority of its Names was the Tony 
Gooda syndicate.  Tony Gooda managed the agents, enticed Names to join and was in 
partnership with Derek Walker as the main underwriter.  They managed the syndicates 164 and 
290 (Deeny and others v Gooda Walker Ltd and others and two other appeals, 1996, 43).  The 
Gooda syndicates were involved in the most tentative risks at Lloyd’s – insured hurricanes, 
shipwrecks as well as the reinsurance of other Gooda syndicates.  During profitable years the 
syndicates would reward their employees with large shares of the profits, only giving the bare 
minimum to the Names and in loss years they would continue to receive large salaries while at 
the same time making large cash calls on Names (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 87). 
 
The Gooda Walker syndicates focused on mainly two types of excess of loss policies: 
 Excess of loss cover on other reinsurers excess of loss policies (XL on XL) and, 
 ‘Whole account’ excess of loss cover for other syndicates after they have paid their 
deductible.  Gooda did not purchase any of his own excess of loss cover on such risks and 
exposed himself to limitless claims if the claim was above the deductible.  He did not cap 
this exposure in any way.  “The underwriter failed to appreciate that the whole account 
reinsurance policies that he was accepting could all become total losses in the event of a 
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moderate catastrophe entering the reinsurance spiral” (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 202).  
He suffered many large losses on this type of cover he provided. 
 
Gooda was showing a profit on all years of account up to 1989 when that year of account showed 
a loss of $380m.  However, he had been able to keep his syndicates showing a profit by using 
time and distance policies.  A time and distance policy is a mechanism to discount anticipated 
losses to their present value and that discount was taken as a profit for the current year i.e. a loss 
that is anticipated to occur in 5 years time of a value of R1m can be discounted back to the 
present year at a discounted value of R500 000 and not the future value of R1m.  Thereby 
showing a profit of R500 000 for the current year.  This tricky form of accounting led people to 
believe that the syndicates were doing well hiding the troubles soon to surface (Luessenhop & 
Mayer, 1995: 204). 
 
In 1981 Walker was accused of fraudulent reinsurance transactions but was later acquitted.  Peter 
Green, Chairman of Lloyd’s at the time, warned Gooda to stay clear of Walker but was ignored.  
Walker was able to make profits out of the spiral style of reinsurance (Raphael, 1995: 243).  The 
Names were receiving 23% profit while Walker and Gooda were reaping the rewards of up to 
£300 000.  When the large claims affected this syndicate the majority of Names were liable for 
up to £1 million each and those without funds to cover these calls faced bankruptcy.  Walker was 
of the view that “one always knew there was a risk in the spiral, but one did not expect all the 
layers to blow.  No-one imagined it going so horribly wrong” (Raphael, 1995: 244; Napier, 
2010).  Walker took the view that he did warn the Names on his syndicate about the dangers of 
the risks they were getting involved in.  He stated that the number of natural disasters which 
occurred one after the other, starting with Hurricane Hugo, were the demise of his syndicate.  By 
1994 each Name on the Gooda syndicates had lost up to $1.5million (Luessenhop & Mayer, 
1995: 89). 
 
The Names, however, feel differently stating that Gooda had failed to exercise reasonable skill 
and care in his function as a underwriter by not informing the Names on his syndicate of the high 
risk they were involved in and caused many Names to suffer losses due to his negligence.  A 
Gooda Walker Action Group was formed and chaired by Michael Eunon McLarnon Deeny 
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which consisted of 3000 members who contributed to the legal costs of up to $10 million 
(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 98).  In the case of Deeny and others v Gooda Walker Ltd and 
others and two other appeals (1996, 5 Re IR 43) where it was stated that an unreported case in 
1994 held that “Gooda Walker and the members agents were liable for such damages as would 
place the Names in the same position as if the underwriting carried on their behalf by each 
syndicate had been competently performed" (Deeny and others v Gooda Walker Ltd and others 
and two other appeals, 1996, 5 Re IR 43) and awarded the Names damages up to £500m (Hotten, 
1995). 
 
The Gooda Walker syndicates had an E&O policy that covered the management of those 
syndicates for any negligence performed by the underwriters thereby causing the insurers on that 
policy to pay out (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 90). 
 
4.2.6.4. Patrick Fagan 
 
Patrick Fagan started underwriting at Lloyd’s in 1956 and became the main underwriter on 
Syndicate 540, 542 and 847 which specialized in excess of loss reinsurance.  Fagan was an 
underwriter on LMX syndicates (Raphael, 1995: 249) and later stated that “I do not think any of 
us appreciated the way the spiral would work and how incestuous it had actually become” 
(Raphael, 1995: 250).   He stopped writing on these syndicates in 1990.  Some of the losses that 
these three syndicates suffered include windstorms, Piper Alpha, Hurricane Hugo and Exxon 
Valdez.  The Feltrim underwriters did not predict the large scale of catastrophes and the claims 
quickly ate through the reinsurance cover that was available.  The Names on these syndicates 
alleged that the underwriters failed to apply established principles of excess of loss underwriting 
and failed to assess an adequate amount as a provision for catastrophe events and the judgment 
of Arbuthnott & Others v Feltrim Underwriting Agencies Limited & Others 1995 QBD 
Commercial court agreed.  That same case also held that the Feltrim underwriting syndicate was 
negligent in investing the Names’ money in highly risky reinsurance portfolios and catastrophe 
risks in the years of 1987, 1988 and 1989, awarded damages in favour of the Names.  The 
majority of the losses were due to two incompetent underwriters on that syndicate, namely 
Patrick Fagan and Robert Goften-Salmond (Hotten, 1995). 
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The biggest problem of underwriters on the LMX market was the incorrect logic that the higher 
the layer that you offer of an excess-of-loss policy, the less likely you will be hit.  This proved to 
be untrue with major catastrophes which suffered total losses into the billions, Piper Alpha and 
the majority of the hurricanes being examples, which eroded the lower layers at a breathtaking 
speed and attacking the higher layers immediately (Raphael, 1995: 250).  “A common criticism 
expressed in many of the LMX loss reports was the failure of managing agents to exercise 
adequate supervision over syndicate underwriters” (Raphael, 1995: 251).  “By any standards 
Lloyd’s failed in its duty to protect Names by neglecting to control the wilder excesses of the 
spiral” (Raphael, 1995: 252). 
 
4.2.6.5. Sasse Syndicate 
 
The Sasse scandal became public between 1978 and 1980 (Hodgson, 1986: 58).  The Sasse 
syndicate was run by Frederick ‘Tim’ Sasse and was involved in insurance policies that would 
pay out if a certain amount of tankers in the same tonnage category collided in a given year – this 
was referred to as tonner insurance and later became illegal at Lloyd’s as it was seen as a pure 
gambling contract (Hodgson, 1986: 255).  He also insured banks and computer companies 
against the possibility that lessees of computers would return them earlier than the end of the 
lease term if a competitor had produced a better computer
52
 (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 136).  
Essentially computers were insured against becoming obsolete.  IBM produced a cheaper and 
more powerful computer and many lessees exchanged their computers before the end of their 
lease agreements.  Computer companies then sought to claim on their policies form Lloyd’s.  
These claims nearly used up half of the profits that Lloyd’s had made during one year (Hodgson, 
1986: 39; Schallheim & McConnel, 1985: 1439, 1440; Stewart, 1984: 3). 
 
The Sasse syndicate wrote risks well above its maximum stamp capacity.  Sasse gave an 
American cover-holder by the name of Dennis Harrison binding authority in 1975 without first 
making sure that Harrison was a trustworthy and dependable man (Davison, 1987: 46; Hodgson, 
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1986: 249; Mance, Goldrein & Merkin, 2003).  The Sasse syndicate 762 started fraudulent 
operations in 1976 and Lloyd’s suspended Sasse in 1977.  The syndicate contained surplus line 
brokers involved in fraudulent insurance claims on property in New York’s South Bronx that had 
been largely over-insured (Hodgson, 1986: 247).  This was organised through Harrison with the 
binding authority he had received from Sasse (Davison, 1987: 46).  The syndicate was working 
with real estate speculators and the gangsters in New York to fraudulently create losses and then 
make a profit from the claims that followed (Flower & Jones, 1981: 179).  For example: the 
insurance policies that the Sasse syndicate offered were backdated to cover fires that occurred in 
previous years and would then immediately and deliberately set the buildings on fire to create a 
claim (Brady, 1983: 14). 
 
It was also suspected that Sasse had fraudulently falsified his accounts for the years 1974, 1975 
and 1976 on syndicate 762 to show a profit instead of an actual loss that was suffered in those 
years (Hodgson, 1986: 257; Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 2000: 74).  These fraudulent accounts 
were submitted to the Lloyd’s Policy Signing Office and certain documentation was withheld 
that showed an understatement of premium on the 1975 and 1977 year of accounts.  Lloyd’s was 
kept in the dark about the true financial position of syndicate 762 (Hodgson, 1986: 258). 
 
The Names only learned that their syndicate was in trouble in 1979 when cash calls started 
arriving and they refused to pay their share of the losses and sued Lloyd’s for breaching its duty 
of care to the Names and its duty to oversee the managing agents.  The Names, led by Paddy 
Davies, an aggrieved Name on the Sasse syndicate, sued the committee of Lloyd’s directly 
(Hodgson, 1986: 276).  The Names also alleged that Sasse and his agents were fraudulent and 
formed an association which manifested into what is known today as the Association of Lloyd’s 
Members.  The Names and Lloyd’s settled out of court in 1980 with the Names agreeing to pay 
only a third of the total losses and Lloyd’s paying the remainder.  Lloyd’s did not want the 
events of the Sasse syndicate to be made public
53
 (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 139, Davison, 
1987: 46; Hodgson, 1986: 287). 
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Frederick Sasse pleaded guilty and was permanently suspended from being an active underwriter 
but was allowed to continue at Lloyd’s as a non-working member (Hodgson, 1986: 370). 
 
4.2.6.6. Howden Group 
 
In January 1982 Alexander & Alexander, a well known American broker, purchased a successful 
Lloyd’s broker managing agency by the name of Howden Group for $300m.54  Howden Group 
became a subsidiary of Alexander and Alexander by the name of Alexander Howden Group 
limited.  It later changed its Name to Aon Group Limited (Barber, 2000: 2).  Howden Group was 
run by four men known as the Gang of Four– Ken Grob (chairman) also known as the 
‘Grobfather’ for being able to make people offers that they could not refuse,55 Ronald Comery, 
Jack Carpenter and Allan Page.  In addition there was a very close colleague by the name of Ian 
Posgate who was the main underwriter at Howden with a nickname of ‘Goldfinger’ because of 
the profit he made for his Names by collecting large premiums on large risks and not having to 
pay a claim very often.
56
  He was known as one of the most adventurous underwriters at Lloyd’s 
seeking out the most dangerous business where others do not dare to go (Hodgson, 1986: 79; 
Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 51).  He was not one to follow rules, often breaching market 
regulations and secretly reinsured his syndicates with offshore companies owned by himself and 
others (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 52).  He also accepted premiums above his maximum stamp 
capacity (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 143; Hodgson, 1986: 314). 
 
In January 1971, the committee of Lloyd’s finally decided to bring him to heal after finding out 
that he had taken money out of one of his syndicates for a house bridging loan and failed to keep 
a proper record in his underwriting accounts (Hodgson, 1986: 313).  The committee declared that 
he could only continue to work in the insurance market under supervision (Raphael, 1995: 98).  
He was only allowed to write for one managing agent with prior approval from the committee.  
The managing agent chosen for him was Ken Grob (Hodgson, 1986: 314). 
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A routine check was being made by accounting firm Deloitte’s of Howden Broker after the 
acquisition of Howden by Alexander & Alexander (Davison, 1987: 56), when the accounting 
firm discovered that over $55 million were missing from Howden and had been placed from the 
insurance syndicates at Lloyd’s to companies controlled by Grob and his three partners via fake 
reinsurance contracts (Hoefle, 1996: 28).  Ian Posgate was involved in all the dealings between 
Grob and his three partners, as he used Howden as a broker for 3/4s of his syndicate’s 
reinsurance business.  This money was being used for their own benefit – setting up trust funds 
under pseudo names to buy a Swiss private bank, works of art; to falsify the accounts of Howden 
making it look like they were extremely profitable on the stock exchange; and to pay Howden 
employees additional benefits (Raphael, 1995: 100; Hoefle, 1996: 28). 
 
Once Grob and his partners were discovered by Lloyd’s they agreed to return some of the 
money.  Alexander and Alexander made the fraud public knowledge which led to a three year 
investigation by the Department of Trade, and in 1985 Grob, Comery and Carpenter were 
expelled from Lloyd’s.  Charges against Page were suspended due to his failing health; and 
Posgate was suspended for 6 months and found guilty of discreditable conduct (Hoefle, 1996: 
28; Hodgson, 1986: 340).  Four years later, Posgate and Grob were acquitted of criminal charges 
brought against them. 
 
4.2.6.7. PCW syndicate 
 
The audit made on the Howden Group exposed another fraud at Lloyd’s.  While Deloitte’s 
focused on the accounts of Howden Group they noticed some other irregularities in these 
accounts.  Howden Group had placed Quota Share reinsurance for the PCW underwriting 
syndicates with companies that were secretly owned by PCW and they were making unnaturally 
high profits (Raphael, 1995: 105). 
 
The syndicate was started by Peter Cameron-Webb in the 1960s along with his partner Peter 
Dixon.  Minet, a leading Lloyd’s broker, bought PCW in 1973 with the chairman of Minet, John 
Wallrock, becoming the director of PCW (Raphael, 1995: 106; Hoefle, 1996: 29).  It was found 
by the audit that PCW was taking profits from its Names via fake reinsurance policies which the 
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underwriters of PCW secretly owned making personal profits at the expense of the Names 
(Hoefle, 1996: 29).  In November 1982 the reinsurance scheme was made public after an inquiry 
made by the Committee of Lloyd’s.  Dixon was immediately suspended and relieved of duties as 
director of other syndicates and weeks later Wallrock admitted being involved in the scheme 
arranged by Cameron-Webb and resigned as director of Minet and PCW.  Cameron-Webb 
resigned before any disciplinary action was brought against him (Hoefle, 1996: 29).  Three years 
of investigations by the Department of Trade revealed that Cameron-Webb, Wallrock and Dixon 
had pocketed over $50 million.  None of the men involved were tried in court since they all fled 
to the US before the warrants of arrest could be issued.  The Names of the PWC syndicates were 
left with losses up to $400m after the scandal (Hoefle, 1996: 29).  The PCW syndicate was 
placed in the care of Richard Beckett – a well known marine underwriter – to attempt to recover 
the money lost by the Names on this syndicate through fraud (Davison, 1987: 60). 
 
Peter Miller who succeeded Peter Green as chairman of Lloyd’s was originally involved in the 
legal profession, later becoming a broker and finally the chairman.  “Miller was lionized by 
everyone as the brilliant leader for the future who would easily correct any minor flaws that had 
survived Davison’s work” (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995, 155).  He was given the task of taking 
care of the PCW scandal estimating that the losses suffered by the Names were approximately 
$60m. 
 
Later a central fund by the name of Lioncover
57
 was set up to deal with the PCW run-off claims 
(Hoefle, 1996: 12; Bannister, 1995: 6) with £100 million set aside for the possibility of 
unforeseen future claims.  It turned out that even this fund was completely inadequate as the 
PCW syndicates were heavily involved in asbestos and pollution claims (Raphael, 1995: 259).  
The PCW syndicate finally stopped trading in July 1985 (Davison, 1987: 174). 
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4.2.6.8. Sir Peter Green 
 
Sir Peter Green pushed the idea through parliament that Lloyd’s should be exempted from the 
Financial Services Act and self-regulated through the Lloyd’s Act.  The Act would allow the 
people who understood the insurance business to run the market as opposed to government 
officials who lacked such knowledge.  He was awarded the Lloyd’s Medal for this contribution 
to Lloyd’s.  After his discreditable conduct his name was removed from the list of Lloyd’s men 
to receive such a medal (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 31). 
 
The PCW saga was even more disgraceful for Lloyd’s than originally thought since the chairman 
of Lloyd’s at the time, Sir Peter Green, was also involved in the scandal.  When the allegations 
of fraud on the PCW syndicate emerged, Sir Peter Green led an inquiry into the accusations on 
his own stating that no fraud was apparent (Hodgson, 1986).  Eight months later a cover up by 
Sir Peter Green was suspected regarding the PCW syndicate and in July 1986 the Department of 
Trade and Industry found him guilty of discreditable conduct (by being grossly negligent 
regarding the treatment of his Names) which led to his suspension from Lloyd’s (Hoefle, 1996: 
29). 
 
An article was published in 1987 stating that Sir Peter Green failed to inform his Names until 
1983 that he and his brother owned shares in the offshore company, Imperial which was used as 
a reinsurer for Mr. Green’s syndicate.  Mr. Green was fined £12 500 for this detrimental 
conduct.
58
 
 
The disgrace brought on by Sir Peter Green was handled by the new chief executive of Lloyd’s 
brought in by the Governor of England, Ian Hay Davison (Davison, 1984: 159; Frederick 
Thomas Poole and Others v Her Majesty’s Treasury [2006] EWHC 2731: 10), who, as from 
1983, made it a requirement that all members of Lloyd’s disclose their financial interests to their 
Names and the Society of Lloyd’s (Hoefle, 1996: 29).  This led to Sir Peter Green having to 
inform his Names regarding the fraudulent reinsurance programmes their money was involved 
in.  This admission led to an inquiry being made by the Inland Revenue followed closely by the 
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resignation of Sir Peter Green.  The Names were repaid $10.6m involved in his syndicates by the 
Society of Lloyd’s. 
 
4.2.6.9. Christopher Moran 
 
Underwriters are permitted by the Council of Lloyd’s to have their marine syndicates insure up 
to a maximum of 70% of non-marine risks if the marine business is unable to sustain the 
syndicate.  Christopher Moran was brought before a disciplinary committee, chaired by Stephen 
Merrett, for insuring over 70% of non-marine risks through his marine syndicate.  Stephen 
Merrett at the time however was guilty of the same misconduct having insured over 90% of non-
marine risks through his marine syndicate (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 66). 
 
Christopher Moran was a wealthy aviation broker who exposed his syndicate to intolerable 
financial risks and concealed these transactions from the auditor and was accused of but not 
convicted of fraud (Raphael, 1985: 90).  He was the first member of Lloyd’s to be expelled for 
life from the society in 1982, by the Chairman Sir Peter Green, on the grounds of discreditable 
conduct
59
 under the rules of the Lloyd’s Act of 1871 where an 80% vote was needed from the 
Names attending the meeting (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 143; Hodgson, 1986: 256). 
 
The Moran incident brought the realization to the committee of Lloyd’s that reform of the old 
rules and regulations were much needed (Raphael, 1985: 91).  This led to another investigation, 
chaired by Sir Henry Fisher held in 1980, and a proposal was made that Lloyd’s was in need of a 
new Lloyd’s Act which needed to change the existing committee to be made up of a wider range 
of individuals and no longer concentrated to members from Lloyd’s, and these new committee 
members were to be given regulating powers over the market (Raphael, 1985: 92). 
4.2.6.10. Oakeley Vaughan 
 
The Oakeley Vaughan syndicate had written aviation insurance in excess of its allowable 
limit/stamp capacity thereby exposing its Names to heavy losses and had hidden it through the 
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falsification of numbers on the books and fake filing with the Lloyd’s Policy Signing Office 
during the 1980s (Hoefle, 1996: 30). 
 
The syndicate had under declared the premium they were receiving from this aviation business to 
the Lloyd’s Policy Signing Office as well as delaying the recognition of claims for as many years 
as possible to make the syndicate appear profitable (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 140; Raphael, 
1995: 279).  Lloyd’s launched an inquiry into the dealings of the syndicate.  The syndicate 
immediately wrote to their Names stating that the inquiry was merely routine and there was 
nothing to be worried about.  However, more allegations of false accounting emerged and it was 
held that the agency had deliberately withheld valuable information from the auditors as well as 
the Signing Office, the management of the agency was wholly inept and the syndicate was 
actually insolvent (Raphael, 1995: 282).  Luessenhop & Mayer (1995: 140) state that “everything 
Oakeley Vaughan touched turned to junk”. 
 
The Names knew nothing of these findings as Lloyd’s did not publish the findings of the inquiry.  
The only information given to the Names, in September 1981, was that the directors of the 
agency were suspended for two years due to discreditable conduct.  The agency was liquidated in 
1988 (Raphael, 1995: 283).  The Names then faced extremely high losses and were angry as to 
why Lloyd’s allowed the agency to continue underwriting if it was so incompetent and why were 
the Names not informed.  The Names sued Lloyd’s for burying the knowledge it received about 
the syndicate without informing the Names.  Lloyd’s responded that it did not, in law, owe the 
Names a duty of care.  The Names then sued Lloyd’s directly and not the managing agents.  The 
Lloyd’s Act of 1982 precludes anyone from suing the council of Lloyd’s.  The case was 
dismissed in the High Court and in 1993 the House of Lords ruled in favour of Lloyd’s that it did 
not have a duty of care towards the Names (Raphael, 1995: 285; Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 
141).  The members’ agents however, do owe a duty of care to their Names and can be sued for 
negligent underwriting
60
 (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 252). 
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4.2.6.11. Murray Lawrence 
 
Walter Nicholas Murray Lawrence was the chairman at Lloyd’s in the late 1980s.  His public 
denial of the problems insurers were soon to face regarding asbestos claims and the lawsuits to 
follow made Names angry.  However, privately he reinsured his asbestos syndicate in 1982 while 
he was the chairman of the Lloyd’s audit committee (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 77).  Once his 
own risks were reinsured he advised other underwriting managers to do the same and make 
arrangements for ample reserves for future asbestos claims.  However, he failed to inform any of 
the Names of the asbestos claims to come. 
 
In 1995 a reporter from the Financial Times accused Lawrence of having knowledge about the 
billion dollar claims to hit Lloyd’s as early as the 1980s and not disclosing this information to 
existing Names.  In addition he was desperately recruiting new Names to increase capital at 
Lloyd’s to pay for the coming losses without sharing this information with them (Luessenhop & 
Mayer, 1995: 248).  Lloyd’s succeeded in recruiting many new Names as shown by an increase 
in Names from 7000 in the 1970s, 14 000 in the 1978 and up to 34 000 by the 1980s 
(McClintick, 2000: 42).  None of these Names were informed of the asbestos losses they were 
being assigned to. 
 
David Coleridge was the chairman of Lloyd’s for two years directly after Murray Lawrence and 
was left the task of informing the public of the large losses hitting Lloyd’s.  In 1991 he publically 
predicted that the losses from previous years were not going to be disastrous and stated that the 
market was becoming profitable again.  Later that year he announced that the big fuss made by 
Names was only due to the fact that they did not like to lose money and by 1994 he still held the 
same view that the Names entered into a risky business and should not complain if losses were 
made (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 78). 
 
David Coleridge believed that even with all the large looses flooding Lloyd’s, the institution of 
Lloyd’s itself was never in any danger of failure (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 79).  However, his 
actions proved that he did in fact fear for Lloyd’s since in 1992 he imposed a levy on all the 
Names at Lloyd’s to be paid over a period of three years as a tax on their premium income.  This 
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money was then placed into the Central Fund used to pay claims when the Names refused to 
respond to their cash calls (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 254). 
 
4.2.6.12. Ronald Verrall 
 
Ronald Verrall was an underwriter for David Rowland and received information that the leading 
asbestos manufacturer in America, Johns Manville Corporation, would soon declare bankruptcy 
due to the damaging effects of the substance.  He also knew that claims to hit Johns Manville 
Corporation would be so huge that even last resort reinsurers like Lloyd’s would be heavily 
affected.  Immediately after receiving this information Verrall began reinsuring the asbestos 
liability on David Rowland’s syndicate into other syndicates.  He concealed the asbestos problem 
from the reinsuring syndicate and its Names by falsely stating that he was reinsuring shipping 
cargo instead of asbestos liabilities.  Verrall’s syndicate was later found to be liable for non-
disclosure of material facts by an arbitration committee (McClintick, 2000: 45). 
 
Ronald Verrall was not the only underwriter to attempt to offload asbestos risks onto other 
syndicates before the bubble of asbestos claims burst.  Many syndicates were doing just that. 
 
4.2.6.13. Baby syndicates 
 
Luessenhop & Mayer (1995: 154) distinguish one type of syndicate at Lloyd’s know as the Staff 
syndicates, baby syndicate or preferred syndicate, where an underwriter would reinsure the safest 
risks that he had accepted with another syndicate.  It is not essential for the syndicate to take out 
reinsurance on such risks since the probability of a claim is very low.  However, this was used as 
a means to keep the profits of the good risks inside Lloyd’s by way of premium payments to 
another syndicate instead of being paid out as profits to the Names. 
 
Baby syndicates were used to continue the deception at Lloyd’s.  Baby syndicates were set up for 
the benefits of the insiders at Lloyd’s to move the profits of a syndicate to another parallel 
syndicate of which only the insiders were involved and in this way discriminating against 
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external Names (Finger, 1996: 18; Atkinson, 2000).  The insiders such as the underwriters, 
agency directors and their families were able to keep the profits going into the main syndicate for 
themselves by having the main syndicate reinsured through the baby syndicate (Fisher, Bewsey, 
Waters et al, 2003: 189).  When profits were coming into the main syndicate the baby syndicate 
were taking all the profits and if losses occurred they were paid by the members of the main 
syndicate and not the baby syndicate.  In 1980 there were over 90 baby syndicates (Hansard, 
1994).  In the case of Society of Lloyd’s v Henderson and others (2005) EWHC 850 (Comm) 
QBD it was alleged that Lloyd’s failed to prohibit or restrict the use of baby syndicates and did 
not ensure that managing agents informed the Names of the existence of such syndicates. 
 
Some baby syndicates consisted of only three members which would split the profits amongst 
themselves for personal gain (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 154).  Baby syndicates were banned 
through the passing of a bye-law in 1985 (Davison, 1987: 99). 
 
4.2.7. Accountants during this period 
 
A valid question asked by Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks (2000: 72): How did the accountants and 
the audits miss all the fraud that was taking place at Lloyd’s?  During the 1970s there were two 
types of audit requirements: The syndicate accounts audit and the solvency audit.
61
  The 
solvency audit was the method most relied upon and it was designed to protect the policyholders 
and not the Names.  The emphasis was on having an accurate RITC (Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 
2000: 72) therefore not enough attention was paid to the protection of Names. 
 
Another view is that accountants and auditors were in the forefront of the misconduct at Lloyd’s, 
even though they were never in the forefront of allegations.  The underwriters took money from 
insurance accounts for their own personal gain but it was the accountants who failed to detect or 
report this.  Auditors were reliant on Lloyd’s for a large portion of their fee income came from 
Lloyd’s.  Auditors were the bookkeepers for the syndicates.  Panel auditors handled the tax 
affairs of the Names that were on the syndicates that were audited and also advised managing 
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agents on ways to minimise the Names’ tax liabilities (Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 2000: 74).  
Davison (1987: 5) is of the opinion that the suspicious tax arrangements of the 1970s can only be 
attributed to the accountants. 
 
Many individuals at Lloyd’s did not understand how Lloyd’s functioned and would turn to 
accountants and lawyers for advice.  The members at Lloyd’s would find accountants who had 
the same point of view or go to accountants who would then give advice based on their own best 
interests and not that of Lloyd’s.  When questioned, the members of Lloyd’s would hide behind 
their faults stating that what they did was acceptable because an accountant or lawyer deemed it 
so.  “These legal and accounting advisers…corrupted Lloyd’s” (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 
125). 
 
Ian Hay Davison pointed out that it was falsely believed that the auditors performed an 
independent audit of the syndicates’ accounts.  This was not the case as the profits of a syndicate 
were determined by the RITC amount which is calculated by the underwriter.  The accountants 
merely accepted the RITC amount as being correctly calculated and did not challenge the end 
result.  The auditors did not audit Quota Share reinsurance agreements, nor did they aid in the 
year end adjustments.  All of this was left to the underwriter.  In this way it became quite easy 
for auditors to miss the fraud at its earliest stages (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 149; Gwilliam, 
Macve & Meeks, 2000: 73). 
 
The accounting and audit standards at Lloyd’s changed from what was used in the 1970s/1980s 
to what was used after the crisis period (Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 2000: 64).  New accounting 
and audit standards were introduced to diminish agency costs and combat the problem of conflict 
of interests.  Publication of syndicate accounts became mandatory and had to be in accordance 
with the UK Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAPs) with adaptations made for the 
unique accounting methods of Lloyd’s.  The auditors had to give a true and fair opinion on the 
accounts (Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 2000: 76) making it difficult for managing agents to 
exploit their principles, the Names (Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 2000: 81). 
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4.2.8. Tax avoidance 
 
During the period of 1950-1983 Lloyd’s enjoyed what many thought to be generous tax 
treatment by the government.  An individual who was a Name at Lloyd’s received tax 
advantages on their investments at Lloyd’s.  These higher returns were directly controlled by the 
agents of the syndicates (Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 2000: 79). 
 
The Inland Revenue Service (IRS) was of the opinion that the claims provisions charged to the 
income statements were too large resulting in excessive provisions being kept by syndicates.  
These provisions were thus seen as profits.  The IRS thus wanted to tax the remainder of the 
provisions leaving only a small provision to be kept for the payment of claims.  Ian Hay Davison 
noted that syndicates would then, instead of raising provisions, buy reinsurance overseas and 
thereby avoid paying the tax required.  The provisions that were in this fashion built-up abroad 
would earn investment income and would only be taxed if returned into the country.  Popular 
places to place reinsurance business were the Bermuda and Cayman Islands where interest can 
be earned tax free.  In this way syndicates built-up off-shore, off-balance sheet assets not subject 
to scrutiny.  If managers of syndicates owned the off-shore reinsurer the possibility of fraud is 
obvious.  The syndicates thus walked a fine line between acceptable tax avoidance and criminal 
tax evasion (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 154; Davison, 1987: 51). 
 
4.2.9. Ian Hay Davison 
 
In 1982, in response to the allegations of fraud and lapses in corporate governance, Sir Peter 
Green, the chairman of Lloyd’s, asked Ian Hay Davison to chair an inquiry into the audit 
requirements at Lloyd’s.62  Davison had the assistance of an accountant and a lawyer, both from 
outside of Lloyd’s as well as four members from Lloyd’s (Hodgson, 1986: 363).  At this time he 
was not yet working for Lloyd’s and was an accountant by profession (Davison, 1987: 5).  The 
Bank Governor, after finding out that Davison was heading an inquiry into Lloyd’s regarding 
                                                 
62
 In addition to this inquiry there have been various other inquiries and systems into Lloyd’s including the Walker 
inquiry, the Neill Report, the Fisher Report, the Roland Task Force and the Members Hardship Scheme.  A 
summary of each is provided in Appendix 2. 
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accounting and fraud, offered him the position of Chief Executor of Lloyd’s which he accepted.  
Davison started work at Lloyd’s on the 14th February 1983 and was required to provide three 
things for Lloyd’s (Davison, 1987: 68; Davison, 1985): 
 Continuity – members elected to be in the committee were changed annually 
 Management skills – since underwriters and brokers did not have good management 
skills 
 Impartiality in the application of the Lloyd’s rules. 
 
In addition to the three elements mentioned above, Davison was given the task of restoring 
public faith in Lloyd’s, the creation of a rule book by writing down the market rules to be used as 
a comprehensive legal guide to the regulation of the market (Davison, 1987: 70; Bannister, 1995: 
16) and to make sure that Lloyd’s was equipped with an adequate regulatory framework needed 
for the world’s largest insurance market (Davison, 1987: 71). 
 
4.2.9.1. Restoring public faith 
 
Journalists were of the opinion that Lloyd’s was shrouded in secrecy, only the elite were allowed 
to join Lloyd’s and there was the opinion that Lloyd’s would cover up any fraud allegations.  
Davison was tasked with creating a better relationship with the press to change these 
misconceptions.  He held monthly press conferences and offered as much information as possible 
about Lloyd’s.  The interest that the press had in Lloyd’s started to dwindle as a result of these 
conferences but flared up again after the PCW scandal in 1985 (Davison, 1987: 77).  To restore 
public opinion Davison published the annual returns of Lloyd’s to the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) showing that Lloyd’s did have financial reserves to deal with the problem.  The 
press was satisfied and interest in Lloyd’s waned (Davison, 1987: 78). 
 
A more permanent way to restore public opinion was for Lloyd’s to show that is was willingly 
going to take disciplinary measures against the individuals involved in the scandals and fraud.  
The new Act allowed for the creation of a Disciplinary Committee made up of members of 
Lloyd’s as well as an Appeal Tribunal made up of outsiders to deal effectively with all 
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allegations.  The committee had the power to expel, reprimand, suspend or fine the delinquent 
member (Davison, 1987: 79). 
 
4.2.9.2. The rule book 
 
Rules of the market were often only available as letters received from the chairman or the 
committee.  These letters were largely ignored.  “Letters are fine for guidance but do not form an 
effective basis for disciplinary action” (Davison, 1987: 91).  Market agreements that govern the 
operations of underwriters and brokers are also not adequate enough to produce reliable 
regulation (Davison, 1987: 91). 
 
The rule book included bye-laws, regulations, codes of conduct, guidance and explanatory notes, 
manuals and market letters all complied into one format.  The rule book focused on three critical 
things that needed to be addressed in the market: regulate the admission of new members, to 
govern the conduct of all members and to establish a quick and effective disciplinary mechanism 
(Davison, 1987: 93; Bannister, 1995: 16).  Once the rule book was published Davison set out to 
educate the underwriters to increase their understanding of the legislation through seminars 
ensuring that the members at Lloyd’s knew the duties of an agent, duties of directors and the 
effect that the legislation will have on their daily routine (Davison, 1987: 98; Davison, 1985: 4-
5). 
 
The main achievement made by Davison for Lloyd’s was to establish disclosure in the accounts 
of the syndicates and allowing them to be published to the external Names in an attempt to 
severely reduce the conflict of interest between Names and their agents (Davison, 1987: 6).  
Davison resigned from Lloyd’s in November 1985 as Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive, 
leaving Lloyd’s free to appoint a successor (Davison, 1987: 1). 
 
4.3. 1990’s - current 
 
In addition to the various inquiries and systems discussed in Appendix 4 Lloyd’s also took the 
drastic step of creating Equitas through its Reconstruction and Renewal program. 
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4.3.1. Reconstruction and Renewal program 
 
4.3.1.1. Lioncover 
 
In 1997 Lloyd’s syndicates and members that were involved with the PCW syndicate were 
reinsured to close with Syndicate 9001.  This syndicate retroceded the liabilities it incurred as a 
result of the PCW scandal to an insurance company by the name of Lioncover Insurance 
Company limited.  This company was set up by Lloyd’s as a subsidiary company and was 
financially supported by Lloyd’s (Stevenson, 2009).  Its primary purpose was to help in the run-
off of PCW and to bailout underwriters at Lloyd’s who were involved in the PCW syndicates 
(Raphael, 1995: 259; Anonymous, 1995: 29; Bannister, 1995: 16).  In 1997 Lioncover reinsured 
its liabilities with Equitas Reinsurance Limited and in 1999 it took over from Syndicate 9001 as 
the direct reinsurer to close of PCW Names (Stevenson, 2009).  By 2005, this subsidiary had to 
pay out over £525 million because of asbestos, environmental and health-hazard claims that were 
still coming in on the PCW syndicates (Mayerson, 2006). 
 
4.3.1.2. Centrewrite 
 
Claims flooded into Lloyd’s on a daily basis depleting the capital and reserves at an alarming 
rate.  At this rate Lloyd’s was running out of capital as the old Names stopped underwriting and 
not much new capital was entering since people were too scared to become a Name.  Lloyd’s 
answer to this crisis was to set up a reinsurance company by the name of Centrewrite.
63
  This 
insurance company provided a way out for Names belonging to open years of accounts by 
offering to buy their prior years liabilities at very high prices since the uncertainly regarding 
claims was high. 
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 Raphael (1995: 261); Luessenhop & Mayer (1995: 255); Newton (1992: 5). 
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Lloyd’s decided to split all open years into either the soft group or the hard group.  The soft 
group syndicates which could be closed quite easily allowing Centrewrite to do so immediately, 
whilst the hard group syndicates (affected by asbestos, pollution and other latent diseases) were 
to be reinsured into a limited company and receive all those syndicates reserves (Raphael, 1995: 
266).  This attempt at stabilizing the market was not very successful as many Names could not 
afford this reinsurance cover (Raphael, 1995: 261). 
 
4.3.1.3. Equitas 
 
To tackle the lack of capacity, as hardly any new Names were joining Lloyd’s it was agreed to 
accept limited liability corporate capital.  This clearly was needed to strengthen the Lloyd’s 
existing capital base.  However, corporations were not interested in investing capital in Lloyd’s 
as long as the open year accounts were still part of the risk (Raphael, 1995: 322).  Also, with the 
full implications of unlimited liability finally becoming clear it was apparent that the Names 
investing on high risk syndicates were in trouble.  Lloyd’s understood that the only way new 
capital would enter the market was if the asbestos and pollution claims as well as any open year 
accounts were completely separated from the reconstructed Lloyd’s insurance market.  Peter 
Middleton, the Chief Executive of Lloyd’s, was of the opinion that for Lloyd’s to survive a 
Reconstruction and Renewal (R&R) program would be required (Middleton, 1995: 16, 18).  
Lloyd’s accordingly implemented the R&R program to reverse the negative impact of the 
financial problems it faced in the 1980s and the trading losses suffered between 1988 and 1992.  
In so doing it laid down a strong foundation for the future success of Lloyd’s.64 A break with its 
past was needed. 
 
It was decided to reinsure all 1992 and prior liabilities into a newly formed company through this 
R&R program (Frederick Thomas Poole and Others v Her Majesty’s Treasury, 2006: 59).  This 
included all pre-1985 policies where all the claims and reserves before 1986 where placed on a 
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 Lane (1996: 1); Rasmussen, Owen & Smith (1997: 9); Catlin, Harrison, James et al (1998: 30); Noonan 
(1996:49); Major (1995: 3, 17). 
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limited liability basis.
65
  The year 1985 was included because that is where the bulk of the 
exposures such as asbestos and pollution lie at Lloyd’s (Hutter, 1995: 1).  NewCo, the name 
given to the newly formed company, was developed through this business plan and formed in 
1993 to reinsure all risks prior to 1992 especially those prior to 1985.  All liabilities prior to 1985 
were reinsured first and once this was complete the 1986 and post liabilities where then only 
reinsured (Bannister, 1995: 11).  This was completed by in 1996 (Anonymous, 1995a: 14; 
Anonymous, 1995b: 2; Major, 1995: 17; Fields, Klein & Myskowski, 1998: 176). 
 
These risks would all be reinsured with NewCo to shield Names against past liabilities.
66
  
NewCo had over £4bn in capital that Lloyd’s was able to pool together from the different 
syndicates at Lloyd’s.  This new company was regulated by the Department of Trade and 
Industry (Hutter, 1995: 13; Rowland, 1996: 11).  The aim of NewCo was to take-over the 
provisions of syndicates involved in long tailed risks and make calls on Names should additional 
capital be required and pay off each claim that slowly came into Lloyd’s (Luessenhop & Mayer, 
1995: 102).  It took over all the old year liabilities as a means to reassure new Names that they 
will not be placed on old year heavy liability losses if becoming a new Name (Alston, 1993c: 15; 
Cover, 1993b: 16).  The net result would be to ring-fence the old years and past liabilities.
67
  This 
was done to offer old Names finality. 
 
By the end of 1995 all old year accounts/polices were reinsured by NewCo and all the pollution 
and asbestos claims were isolated by this company (Raphael, 1995: 326; Hutter, 1995: 7).  
Lloyd’s changed the name of this company in September 1994 to Equitas with a 95% acceptance 
level of this settlement package
68
 by Names in 1996.
69
  The remaining 5% of Names who did not 
accept the settlement offer did not receive any benefits from the formation of Equitas and were 
pursued vigorously by Lloyd’s to pay their share of the claims (Anonymous, 1995: 19).  Equitas 
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does not constitute as a transfer of liabilities but operates as a reinsurance to close for syndicates 
that have years left open (Hutter, 1995: 11).  It has the same purpose as NewCo to reinsure non-
life syndicates’ liabilities during and prior to 1992 year of accounts at Lloyd’s (Rasmussen, 
Owen & Smith, 1997: 9; Rowland, 1996: 3).  Equitas supplied run off cover on these liabilities 
(Rasmussen, Owen & Smith, 1997: 9).  Equitas was established as a completely separate 
company from that of Lloyd’s (Major, 1995: 29). 
 
The premium received by Equitas was £11.2bn to reinsure all non life liabilities up to and 
including the 1992 year of account.  Equitas received its premium through syndicate assets, 
assets in the Central Fund of Lloyd’s, contributions made by brokers and payments made by 
Names (Benfield, 2006: 16). 
 
Originally liabilities that were already reinsured with Lioncover were excluded from the cover 
offered by Equitas however in 1997 Equitas extended its cover to include liabilities previously 
covered by Lioncover, Centrewrite and the Hardship Scheme i.e. all the society’s own 1992 and 
prior liabilities were also reinsured by Equitas (Benfield Group Limited, 2006: 16; Catlin, et al, 
1998: 81; Anonymous, 1995: 23-24, 28-29).  Through Equitas Lloyd’s was able to cut itself off 
completely from all the liabilities that nearly destroyed it i.e. pollution, natural catastrophes, 
asbestos and fraud litigation.  Equitas took on the entire burden of previous years leaving Lloyd’s 
free to start anew and only focus on the ongoing business (Benfield, 2006: 16).  Equitas is 
governed and regulated by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and is completely 
independent of Lloyd’s as from 1996.  This is viewed with relief by Lloyd’s since its track record 
of never failing to pay a valid claim will be left untarnished even if Equitas fails to pay claims, 
since Equitas is separate from that of Lloyd’s (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 271). 
 
The R&R program was created to build a new Lloyd’s completely separate for the ‘old’ Lloyd’s.  
Equitas can be seen as “a new central fund and a firebreak” to separate the new Lloyd’s from the 
old
70.  In summary Lloyd’s focused on the following four main elements while creating Equitas 
(Anonymous, 1995: 4, 28-36; Major, 1995: 3, 20-21, 30): 
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 Separating the past from the future – offering finality through Equitas, 
 Increase the role of corporate capital, 
 Create a new central fund – the current fund (CF-1) will be used in the R&R program and 
the money will be placed into Equitas.  A new central fund (CF-2) will then be created at 
Lloyd’s for all 1993 and subsequent years of account.   
 Implement a capital raising strategy. 
 
Figure 1: The Structure of Equitas 
 
 
 
The parent company is known as Equitas Holding limited as can be seen from the diagram above 
and it is owned by a flexible trust consisting of 7 trustees who act in the best interests of the 34 
000 reinsured Names (Benfield, 2006: 17).  The trustees, and not the reinsured Names, are the 
shareholders of Equitas and they do not receive any dividends on these shares, only having the 
voting rights carried by each share. 
 
Equitas is not allowed to underwrite any new business (Benfield, 2006: 16).  Its sole purpose is 
to deal with open accounts from Lloyd’s.  However, two of the companies in the Equitas group 
are allowed to conduct reinsurance business, namely the Equitas Reinsurance Group and Equitas 
limited.  Equitas Reinsurance Limited reinsured all the business written by Lloyd’s syndicates 
prior to 1992 and this entire reinsurance business was then ceded to Equitas limited (Benfield, 
2006: 17; Catlin et al, 1998: 81).  Equitas limited is the main operating company of Equitas 
Equitas Holdings 
Ltd 
Equitas 
Reinsurance Ltd 
Equitas 
Management 
Services Limited 
Equitas Policyholders 
Trustee Ltd 
Equitas Ltd 
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holdings and when people use the name ‘Equitas’ that is the company they are referring to 
(Benfield, 2006: 18).  Equitas limited deals with the policyholders, reinsurers and brokers 
directly. 
 
Equitas aimed to settle claims as soon as possible preferring to deal directly with policyholders 
rather than going through an intermediary.  If it is clear that the claim is valid Equitas pays 
without delay.  However, if there is some uncertainly whether the claim is valid, Equitas would 
ideally prefer to settle the claim with the claimant without any legal intervention (Benfield, 2006: 
18). 
4.3.1.3.1. Berkshire Hathaway 
 
The Berkshire Hathaway Corporation proposed to acquire Equitas in 2006 (Benfield, 2006: 3).  
This would end the long-tailed liability of Names reinsured by Equitas and completely eradicate 
any possibility of Lloyd’s being involved in any run-off problems on the policies (Veysey & 
Gonzalez, 2006 & Hosken, 2006: 57).  A deal was struck between Equitas and the National 
Indemnity Company, which is a member of the Berkshire Hathaway group, in which the 
National Indemnity Company reinsures all the liabilities of Equitas providing an additional $7bn 
to Equitas as reinsurance cover as well as taking on the staff and operations of Equitas and also 
dealing with any run-off on the Equitas liabilities (Benfield Group Limited, 2006: 4; Veysey & 
Gonzalez, 2006; Benfield Group Limited, 2007: 21). 
 
There were two phases to this acquisition.  Phase one consisted of the National Indemnity Group 
providing reinsurance cover of $ 5.7bn to Equitas with the staff, operations of Equitas and any 
run-off being transferred to the subsidiary.  Equitas was to transfer all its assets (less $319.2m 
that Equitas was to use for any miscellaneous expenses) and Lloyd’s was to also pay an amount 
of $133.6m to Berkshire Hathaway before the acquisition was to take place (Veysey & Gonzalez, 
2006).  Phase one was to be completed by March 2007 (Benfield Group Limited, 2007: 62) and 
was reported to be fully completed in December 2007 (Cover, 2007b: 6). 
 
The second phase needed approval from the UK High Court for the transfer of all liabilities of 
the reinsured Names to be made to the National Indemnity Company (Benfield, 2006: 4; Hosken, 
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2008b: 69).  If both phases were completed the Names would have had an additional USD7bn in 
reinsurance cover.  “While Equitas has made significant progress in the last decade the group 
faced many uncertainties and the USD5.7bn of additional cover significantly improves the 
financial position of the group” (Benfield, 2006: 4). 
 
For both phases to be completed several points needed to first be completed.  Firstly, permission 
needed to be received from the Financial Services Authority
71
 (FSA), the Equitas trustees and the 
members of Lloyd’s prior to 2007. 
 
On the 25 June 2009, Mr. Justice Blackburne in the UK High Court approved the statutory 
transfer of all 1992 and prior years non-life business from Lloyd’s to Equitas and as from the 30th 
June 2009 Equitas became responsible for all the obligations of the pre-1992 Lloyd’s business.  
Therefore, due to the authorization of this transfer, National indemnity provided reinsurance 
cover to Equitas of up to $7bn (Lyde & LLP, 2009). 
 
The Rating Agencies perceived Equitas to have a negative influence on Lloyd’s (Benfield, 2006, 
15), however in 1997 and again in 1998 Standard & Poor’s gave Lloyd’s a rating of A+ based on 
“its very strong business position and recent profitability, together with a strong capital base, 
strong prospective financial flexibility and strong regulatory management” (Catlin et al, 1998, 
37).  In the 21
st
 Century, Equitas is perceived as having a good effect on Lloyd’s as it received a 
rating of A by three rating agencies, A,M Best, Fitch Ratings and Standard & Poor’s in 2006 
(Benfield, 2006, 5; Veysey & Gonzalez, 2006).  Due to these better ratings afforded to Lloyd’s 
by the rating agencies, Lloyd’s had a good year in 2006 as confidence slowly returned to Lloyd’s 
(Benfield Group Limited, 2007, 60).  By 2010 the past no longer haunted Lloyd’s and it received 
consistent ratings of A+ from Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings as well as an A from AM 
Best (Anonymous, 2010a: 18). 
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4.3.2. Further Issues 
 
To tackle the high administrative costs problem Lloyd’s moved away from pen and paper, the 
systems of the previous century, and slowly introduced computers and electronic equipment.  
Many of the older underwriters did not wholly rely on the new centralised administration and 
still kept their own records of their transactions.  Record keeping of policies is now done 
electronically.  The start up costs for this huge change were large as equipment had to be set up 
in each underwriters box and connected to the central computer.
72
  However, in the long term 
costs should decrease. 
 
Further issues plaguing Lloyd’s was the European Commission in Brussels making an inquiry 
into whether Lloyd’s was compliant with E.U insurance legislation.  Also, the Department of 
Justice in America was doing a criminal investigation into Lloyd’s looking at fraud and 
conspiracy (McClintick, 2000: 41). 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
Despite countless inquiries, investigations and lawsuits “Houdini-like, Lloyd’s has escaped all 
substantive accountability for the actions that have ruined thousands of investors” as most of the 
lawsuits were settled before appearing at court (McClintick, 2000: 54).  However, Lloyd’s as a 
society has not remained unscathed.  Its reputation has been damaged. 
 
After the implementation of the Lloyd’s Act of 1982 Lloyd’s began to open up towards the 
public no longer insisting on being secretive.  The old Committee was replaced by a new Council 
representing internal as well as external Names.  Syndicate accounts are now available to the 
public for scrutiny and are audited to fall in line with generally accepted accounting standards.  
Reporters are becoming tolerated by Lloyd’s and the staff is more helpful in providing 
information (Hodgson, 1986: 366).  Divestment has occurred decreasing the incestuous nature of 
Lloyd’s.  Lloyd’s was turning over a new leaf. 
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Newton (1993, 6) estimated that by the year 2000 Lloyd’s would have only 150 syndicates – 45 
marine, 70 non marine, 15 motor, 10 aviation and 10 short-term.  In 2005 Lloyd’s had 62 
syndicates (Hosken, 2005: 61; Cover, 2005: 44).  By 2010 Lloyd’s consisted of 84 syndicates 
(Anonymous, 2010a: 20). 
 
The introduction of corporate capital was a fundamental change for Lloyd’s and by 1998 
corporate capital provided 60% of the capacity for Lloyd’s with a noticeable decrease in the 
number of unlimited liability individual Names with many Names having switched to limited 
liability (Cover, 1998a: 5).  By 1999 limited liability capital amounted to 73% of the markets 
capacity (Cover, 1999: 3).  Individual Names are slowly diminishing at Lloyd’s opening the way 
for corporate capital. 
 
Despite the turmoil Lloyd’s could still note that “Lloyd’s never has failed and never will fail to 
pay a valid claim, and whatever the size or nature of the insured losses you have suffered, the 
wealth of the English countryside will be mobilized to pay you” (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 
248).  Lloyd’s remains proud that in its 300 year history, even with all the hurdles it has faced, it 
has paid every single valid claim in full.
73
 
 
By 2008 Lloyd’s had fully recovered from the scandals, large losses and lawsuits of the 80s and 
90s through the help of Equitas, the introduction of corporate capital and the removal of 
unlimited liability.  Lloyd’s was able to pay all its claims and remain financially stable during the 
September 11 attacks at the World Trade Centre in New York as well as the large number of 
natural disasters (Hurricane Katrina for example) that occurred in 2004/2005.
74
  In 2008, during 
the worldwide financial downturn, Lloyd’s competitive position strengthened and Lloyd’s 
benefited from the market instability (Zinkewicz, 2009: 98).  “Lloyd’s of London competitive 
position strengthened in 2008, largely because of effective risk management oversight and 
relatively conservative investment allocation. The capital structure has proved resilient in the 
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face of the worldwide financial catastrophe and financial strength ratings remain strong and 
stable. As a result, Lloyd’s is well-positioned to benefit from current market dislocation.”75 
 
According to the Guy Carpenter report
76
 Lloyd’s reported a pre-tax profit of $3.5bn in 2008 
being the third best result in Lloyd’s history (Zinkewicz, 2009: 100).  By the end of 2009 
Lloyd’s had made a pre-tax profit of £3.868m (Anonymous, 2010b: 2; Wilson, 2010: 5).  By 
2010 Lloyd’s had 84 syndicates, 181 brokers and was active in 200 countries and territories77 
(Anonymous, 2010b: 18).  Lloyd’s is active in the protection of businesses against climate 
change and climate related disasters, is involved in the creation of new technologies and the 
insurance of such technologies, insurance against terrorism as well as giving cover for satellites 
and space-related risks.  In this way Lloyd’s is seen today as an innovator in insuring new, 
unusual and complex risks (Anonymous, 2010b).  A summary of important dates in the history 
of Lloyd’s can be found in Appendix 2. 
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5. Operation and structure of Lloyd’s 
 
Lloyd’s is an insurance market and not an insurance company where underwriters form 
syndicates which operate separately from each other
78
 i.e. Lloyd’s is an insurance market which 
acts as a facilitator for members to come together and conduct insurance business.  “It is in effect 
an association made up of a number of independent groups of underwriters actively competitive 
amongst each other” (S.C, 1943: 3).  The Corporation of Lloyd’s was created by an Act of 
Parliament in 1871 and owns the market place but does not take part in any insurance business 
leaving that solely to the members (Davison, 1987: 23; Kuvin, 1954: 408, 416; Fegan, 1919: 4).  
The corporation of Lloyd’s has some responsibilities that it fulfils for the benefit of the market as 
a whole.  These include the management of the performance of the market and the maintenance 
and development of the attractiveness of the Lloyd’s market (Anonymous, 2010b: 14). 
 
5.1. Reinsurance to Close 
 
At the end of every underwriting year of account Lloyd’s has what is known as ‘annual ventures’ 
or ‘trading ventures’ that are wound up (Raphael, 1995: 72; Bannister, 1995: 11).  This is unique 
to Lloyd’s.  A definition of an annual venture is provided by Hindley et al (2000: 6) stating that 
“the Lloyd’s annual venture system means that any Lloyd’s member provides capital for one 
underwriting year of account at a time”.  After being a Name at Lloyd’s for a period of one year 
the Name can decide whether he wants to continue at Lloyd’s for the following year or to 
discontinue his involvement at Lloyd’s.  Each new year of account “begins its life as a separate 
annual venture or ‘economic entity’, independent of all other years of account” (Hindley et al, 
2000: 6).  At the beginning of each year the syndicate has to get renewed financial backing to 
continue writing business from the individual Names as well as from recently added corporate 
Names (Rasmussen, Owen & Smith, 1997: 6). 
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 Rasmussen, Owen & Smith (1997: 6); Brown (1973: 4); Williams (1991: 28); S.C (1943: 5); Havenga (2001: 
147); Kuvin (1954: 406); Stewart (1984: 1); Cover (1993a: 26). 
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Lloyd’s used an accounting system where the calculations of profits or losses were only made 
three years after the end of the underwriting year of account
79
 and not annually like most 
corporations (McClintick, 2000: 47; Bannister, 1995: 3, 10).  The three year accounting period 
dates back as far as 1907 when it was first introduced at Lloyd’s (Hindley et al, 2000: 2).  This 
was done to provide a more accurate calculation of the actual profit/loss, allowing three years for 
all possible claims to be notified and evaluated. 
 
A definition of RITC is provided in Simpson, Hoffman & Charlwood (2004) where RITC is the 
“reinsurance effected by a syndicate, normally two years after the end of the relevant year of 
account, by which all the remaining liabilities of the syndicate are reinsured in exchange for a 
fixed premium”.  The Lloyd’s South African Trust Deed (LSATD) of 1999 provides another 
definition where a syndicate, on a future year of account, agrees to indemnify that same 
syndicate on the current year of account for all its known and unknown liabilities.  Once the 
syndicate has agreed to take on these liabilities (for a prearranged premium) the current year of 
account can be closed and the syndicate on the now closed year of account is no longer exposed 
to any liabilities that have or might still arise (LSATD, 1999: 7).  An example: policies from 
1985, (including the reinsurance from 1984) would be kept open for three years and will only be 
closed at the end of 1987 because of the three year accounting period used at Lloyd’s 
(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 65).  Once the 1985 year of account is reinsured to close in the 
beginning of the 1988 year of account, it is now closed.  The Names who are on risk for the 1985 
year of account are no longer liable for any claims that may arise for the 1985 year of account, 
unless the reinsurer is declared insolvent. 
 
A simplified way of looking at RITC is that at the end of the third year the liability to close is 
still uncertain and a provision could be raised, or better still, reinsurance purchased.  Once this is 
done the year can be closed and any future claims are paid for in full by future years of account 
(Hindley et al, 2000: 6; Williams, 1991a: 32; Bannister, 1995: 4).   
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In the 1980s, because of the long tailed liability nature of asbestos and pollution, many 
syndicates did not or could not purchase RITC.  They could not correctly estimate future claims 
which meant they could not correctly estimate the premium to be paid for the RITC and therefore 
could not close their year of account at the end of the third year and had to leave them open for 
longer (Hindley et al, 2000: 3).  If the provision cannot be adequately estimated that year has to 
remain open until such time as a RITC can be calculated.  Initially underwriters calculated the 
RITC to the best of their ability but today auditors as well as actuaries are used to assist in the 
calculation of the RITC using their knowledge and expertise to help the underwriter to arrive at 
the correct RITC.
80
 
 
A Name remains active in a syndicate for the duration of an open account i.e. a Name cannot 
withdraw or resign as a Name as long as one of his years of account remains open (Kelley, 1995: 
5; Bannister, 1995: 11).  This liability remains even after death and will be charged to the 
deceased’s estate leaving it impossible to settle the estate until the liability is paid in full to the 
creditors (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 38; Kelley, 1995: 3).  The volume of losses left many 
Names destitute and some even committed suicide in desperation without realising their families 
left behind will still be liable (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 17).  Over 34 Names had committed 
suicide in the years 1991 – 1993 because of unlimited liability and the large claims they were 
expected to pay (Lussenhop & Mayer, 1995: 36). 
 
Hindley et al (2000: 29) predicted that Lloyd’s would move away from the RITC and the annual 
venture method of underwriting in the near future stating that keeping each year of account 
separate from other years will no longer be needed.  A move was needed to an accident year 
basis which is very similar to the loss occurrence basis whereby the year where the accident/loss 
occurred is the year that will pay the claim irrespective of when the claim was actually made 
(Hindley et al, 2000).  Through the formation of Equitas Lloyd’s moved to annual accounting 
with an attempt to address the concerns raised regarding the three year accounting cycle 
(Anonymous, 1995: 3, 20; Major, 1995: 19).  As from the 1
st
 of January 2005 Lloyd’s moved 
away from traditional three year accounting period and changed to the annual accounting method 
as set up by the UK Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Cover, 2004a: 28; 
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 Society of Lloyd's v. Jaffray (2000); Catlin, Harrison & James (1998: 98); Hindley et al (2000: 1). 
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Hakong, 2003).  Lloyd’s is currently considering a move to the International Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) (Parry, 2007). 
 
5.2. Different aspects of Lloyd’s 
 
5.2.1. The Room, the box and the Waiters 
 
The main activities at Lloyd’s occur in the Room.  It is the centre of Lloyd’s where underwriters 
sit in rows of boxes conducting business and talking to brokers (Brown, 1973: 4; Havenga, 2001: 
148).  Active underwriters as well as his deputies (individuals who specialize in electronics or 
biotechnology who advise the underwriter on risks unknown to the underwriter relating to those 
subjects) and apprentices sit at a desk where all the underwriting occurs.  This is referred to as a 
‘box’.  There are six seats available at one box with three seats on either side of the desk.  The 
boxes run down the middle of the trading floor in pairs built low enough for underwriters to be 
able to see one another.  There is a book shelf that runs along each box containing reference 
books and loose leaf binders that are accessible to everyone on the floor.  A notebook computer 
connected to central data resources has been added to every seat in the box (Luessenhop & 
Mayer, 1995: 67; Hodgson, 1986: 25). 
 
Uniformed waiters were used to guard the entrance to Lloyd’s as well as to serve coffee in the 
premises.  Today waiters are still used to guard the doors of Lloyd’s, only allowing those with 
passes to enter the Room, and as a source of information.  They no longer serve coffee as it is 
forbidden to eat or drink at the box (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 69).  The waiters wear scarlet 
serge robes with a top hat acting as messengers and receptionists (Hodgson, 1986: 76). 
 
5.2.2. The Council of Lloyd’s 
 
The Council is the regulatory/governing body of Lloyd’s regulating the underwriters, the 
syndicates and the managing agents (Finger, 1996: 18; Ferguson, 1983: 60).  It is also referred to 
as the Society of Lloyd’s doing business through the Committee of Lloyd’s (Jacobson, 1998: 
470). 
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Figure 2: The council of Lloyd’s and the various committees of Lloyd’s that help the council 
smoothly run Lloyd’s.   
 
 
(Anonymous, 2009: 13). 
 
The council delegates tasks to these various committees to keep Lloyd’s running effectively.  
The council does not participate in the underwriting of risks and leaves that wholly to the 
underwriters themselves. 
 
5.2.3. Syndicates 
 
Syndicates were originally formed when a group of merchants came together and selected one 
member giving him the authority to accept or reject business on the other syndicate members’ 
behalf.  Each member was still individually liable, but was not involved in the choosing of the 
risks to insure (Rasmussen, Owen & Smith, 1997: 10).  A syndicate is not a company nor is it a 
legal entity and has no legal standing (Davison, 1987: 112; LSATD, 1999: 8).  It was formed 
mainly for an administrative convenience only (Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 2000: 64) and where 
all the insurance and reinsurance business is written. 
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There were substantial barriers to overcome to gain entry to a syndicate and Names could not 
choose in which syndicate they wanted to be placed on (Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 2000: 78).  
Being placed on the ‘best’ syndicates which have a high reward at a low level of risk was seen as 
“a matter of grace and favor” (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 108). 
 
As Lloyd’s started accepting more specialised and unique risks the size of the syndicates 
expanded to make sure that each syndicate had enough Names to cover these uncommon risks 
(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 62).  Syndicates consist of an active underwriter
81
 and his Names 
since the capital needed is supplied by such Names
82
 as well as managing agents that make sure 
the syndicate operates smoothly.  Corporate limited liability members joined Lloyd’s in 1994 and 
became involved with syndicates ensuring more capital was available for payment of claims. 
 
Lloyd’s divided their risks into four categories: marine, non-marine, motor and aviation with 
each syndicate specializing in one of the four categories, however, as from the 1
st
 January 1991 
this rule was relaxed over time and now syndicates insure risks across all four categories.
83
 
 
5.2.3.1. The solvency test 
 
The implementation of the solvency audit is attributed to Cuthbert Heath in 1908.  Each Name 
has to provide the Committee with a statement signed by an accountant as proof that the Name 
has sufficient assets to cover his risks.  This statement has to be produced annually.  The audit 
focuses on whether a syndicate has sufficient reserves for outstanding claims.  If claims have 
increased in the previous year then more reserves are required for that particular line of business 
in the following year.  The solvency returns for each syndicate are combined to show each 
Names level of exposure to risk (Davison, 1987: 38).  A panel of auditors was created consisting 
only of Lloyd’s approved auditors.  In the 1970s the panel was a minor element in the 
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 An active underwriter means “ in relation to a syndicate, the person at or deemed by the Council o Committee [of 
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functioning of Lloyd’s.  However, after the crisis discussed above Lloyd’s puts a much larger 
emphasis on the panel of auditors.  “The solvency audit requirements continued to dominate the 
prescribed approach to accounting and audit at Lloyd’s at least until the reforms of 1982-86” 
(Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 2000: 67).  This solvency audit, however, was not seen as a full and 
detailed audit and later became known as a mere solvency test. 
 
5.2.3.2. Syndicate accounts 
 
The council of Lloyd’s lays out the minimum information that a syndicate has to disclose in their 
accounts as well as the accounting standards that the syndicate has to follow.  Normal accounting 
principles from the Companies Act of 1967 are used which pay particular attention to the 
disclosure of information with certain changes made that are unique to Lloyd’s alone. 
 
Syndicates must account for each underwriting year which is kept open for three years (the three 
year accounting period).  At the end of year one and year two a balance sheet is drawn up 
showing the premiums and claims up to date.  Only at the end of year three, when the account is 
to close are any outstanding claims predicted and profits calculated.  Once this is done either a 
provision is raised or RITC is purchased.  If profits are made, these are then distributed to the 
Names and if a loss is made cash calls are sent out to Names.  If the underwriter is unable to 
accurately predict the RITC the account would remain open for another year (Davison, 1987: 
100; Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 2000: 66).  The main reason why syndicate accounts were 
recorded is to check the syndicate’s solvency on a regular basis as a protection mechanism for 
the Names (Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 2000: 67). 
 
The audit of syndicate accounts required the following as a minimum from each syndicate 
(Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 2000: 67): Firstly, a certificate illustrating the adequate keeping of 
the books, secondly, it must be shown that the balance sheet and the underwriting accounts must 
match up with the books, and lastly, investments and cash balances must be verified.  In addition 
a syndicate is encouraged to provide additional information that would allow the audit to be 
more accurate. 
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As indicated above, in 1984 these syndicate accounts were made available to the public 
(therefore to the Names) for the first time (Davison, 1987: 104).  The accounts have to “give a 
true and fair view of the results for the closed year” in accordance with the Companies Act of 
1967 (Davison, 1987: 110).  The Names have no involvement in the appointment of the auditors, 
which was left entirely to the managing agents (Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 2000: 69), subject to 
the approval of Lloyd’s as shown previously. 
 
5.2.4. Lloyd’s Name 
 
The investors of syndicates are called Names and provide the risk capital needed for the 
operations of Lloyd’s.84  All that is required from the Name is to show he is in possession of the 
capital; (Hodgson, 1986: 106) and sometimes a deposit is required to be paid by the Name as a 
percentage of his underwriting capacity (Davison, 1987: 28; Finger, 1996: 6).  This is the 
concept of uncalled capital whereby the underwriter only asks the Name to contribute from their 
capital when a loss occurs and money is needed to pay a claim (Davison, 1987: 182). 
 
An individual could only become a Name with a recommendation from someone already at 
Lloyd’s i.e. an introduction form an insider was needed, and it became known as a privilege to 
become a Name and to be elected to join this elite membership group of gentlemen in London 
(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 22; Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 2000: 78).  The admission process 
of becoming a Name takes up to a year thereby allowing the Name ample time to be absolutely 
certain about joining Lloyd’s (Davison, 1987: 125). 
 
Up until 1945, Names of Lloyd’s were individuals working at Lloyd’s, however as from 1945 
Lloyd’s started accepting people outside of Lloyd’s as Names (Davison, 1987: 28).  A distinction 
was made between two types of Names:
85
 
(1) Working Names – individuals who also work in the market as brokers, underwriters or 
agents, and  
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(2) External/ outside Names who are merely silent investors not part of Lloyd’s in any other 
way.  Such a Name must carry on business at Lloyd’s through an underwriting agent 
(Deeny and others v Gooda Walker Ltd and others and two other appeals, 1996, 46) and 
this relationship follows the principles of an agency agreement as set out in the Lloyd’s 
by-laws.  External Names are not exposed to how Lloyd’s functions and must trust their 
underwriter in his professionalism to protect their interests (Steward, 1984: 2). 
 
Before an individual can become a Name a Means Test has to be passed making sure the 
individual has the required minimum capital in his personal account (Brown, 1973: 48).  Names 
keep their assets and only pledge them in the case of a risk (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 16).  
The Names are charged an annual fee as well as a commission on their profits made to be paid to 
the managing director for participation in a syndicate and they receive a cheque with their 
premium income in June of each year after the initial three years from date of admission has 
passed (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995, 16; Raphael, 1995). 
 
In the past each Name was a natural person i.e. companies or corporations could not become 
Names, and invested his personal account with Lloyd’s.  However, because of the crisis 
corporations can now invest in Lloyd’s as shown above.  A Name is only responsible for the 
claims that his personal account suffers and not that of fellow Names i.e. Names had several 
liability
86
 and not joint and several liability.
87
  Members of a Lloyd’s syndicate, are not joint and 
severally liable as the policy wording has the following included “each for himself and not for 
another” (Kuvin, 1954: 416). 
 
The Names place their entire private fortune at risk on the insurance market on an unlimited 
basis.
88
  With limited liability the insured knows the maximum limit they will be asked to pay 
(Carr & Mathewson, 1988: 769).  Once this limit has been reached the Name shall not receive 
any further calls for money and is only liable to pay up to the limit amount i.e. his personal 
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account is only at risk up to the limit.  “Each investor has a guaranteed maximum on the loss he 
will bear” (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1985: 97).  Unlimited liability, on the other hand, has no such 
limit thereby exposing the Name’s entire fortune in the event of a large risk.  The Name would 
be required to pay his share of a loss irrespective of the amount of that loss exposing the Name to 
bankruptcy if the loss is larger than his personal account and the Name takes the risk of losing 
his entire wealth (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1985: 101; Frederick Thomas Poole and Others v Her 
Majesty’s Treasury, 2006: 5). 
 
Every individual who wanted to become a Name had to come to London and attend a Rotta 
Committee and was asked whether they understood the concept of unlimited liability (Raphael, 
1995: 63; Alston, 1991b: 7; Bannister, 1995:16).  If the Names lacked understanding the concept 
was explained and they were assured that Lloyd’s was financial sound and were required to sign 
a declaration confirming their understanding of unlimited liability (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 
17; Alston, 1991b: 7). 
 
After the fraud and large claims of the 1980s Names were given the option of choosing to have 
their fortune exposed to limited or unlimited liability (Winton, 1993: 506).  In 1992 Lloyd’s 
announced that it was shifting from unlimited liability to limited liability of its Names 
(Grundfest, 1992: 420; Raphael, 1995:188).  Each syndicate has several hundreds if not 
thousands of Names and in 1987 Lloyd’s consisted of just over 32 000 Names (Davison, 1987: 
28; Winton, 1993: 506).  In 1997 the unlimited Names capacity had fallen by more than 23% 
with individuals choosing the safer option of limited liability (Hosken, 2007a: 69).  Limited 
liability for corporations, known as corporate members, was introduced into Lloyd’s in 1994 in 
an attempt to receive more capital (HM Treasury, 2008: 4).  Lloyd’s allowed corporations to 
become Names at Lloyd’s on a limited liability basis only (Rasmussen, Owen & Smith, 1997: 8).  
They were initially only allowed to participate on 24 spread vehicles and 1 dedicated vehicle.  A 
spread vehicle meant that the corporation was allowed to participate on a number of different 
syndicates (Anonymous, 2009: 144) while a dedicated vehicle allowed for participation on one 
or more syndicates however they had to be managed by the same managing agent.  The term 
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dedicated vehicle is also known as an aligned member.
89
  In 1997 regulation changed allowing 
corporations to buy managing agencies which allowed corporate members to be involved in up to 
28 dedicated vehicles (Rasmussen, Owen & Smith, 1997: 8).  By 2000 the corporation accounted 
for 80% of Lloyd’s capital (McClintick, 2000: 57).  Since 2003 Lloyd’s no longer admits new 
individual members (HM Treasury, 2008: 5).  By 2004 unlimited liability Names supplied only 
12.5% of the market’s capacity with the remaining 87.5% being supplied by limited liability 
corporate vehicles (Cover, 2004b: 71).  In 2009 there were 773 individual members and 1238 
corporate whilst in 2010 the number of individual members had decreased to 700 and the number 
of corporate members increasing to 1443 members.
90
  It is clear from Figure 3 below that as a 
result of the crisis the character of Lloyd’s has changed forever. 
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Figure 3: Illustration of the decrease in the number of individual members (both limited 
and unlimited liability) over a period of 10 years. 
 
 
(Anonymous, 2009: 9). 
 
Unlimited liability as well as individual membership is slowly disappearing (Raphael, 1995: 
371). 
 
The Name had complete faith in the underwriter.  A small safeguard available to the Name is 
reinsurance, where the Name can reinsure some of the risks it has invested in with another 
syndicate or outside insurer (Raphael, 1995: 70).  An example would be a personal stop loss 
policy with an aggregate limit (Davison, 1987: 39; Hodgson, 1986: 109). 
 
A Name can request which syndicate to invest in.  However, many choose to rely on the 
judgement of their members agents for the best syndicate as most external Names do not have 
knowledge of the market.  Once the syndicates have been chosen each Name receives an 
overview of their syndicates performance from their members agents.  The underwriter is the 
only one with adequate knowledge of the risks that the syndicate is involved in and only keep 
‘skeleton cards’ of what risks they have insured (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 25, 48).  However, 
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it is the broker who has absolutely full knowledge of which risks are insured at which syndicates 
since the slips, policies signed and records of claims are all kept by the brokers as Lloyd’s does 
not have enough available space for all the paper work.  The brokers keep all records on behalf 
of Lloyd’s (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 26). 
 
Once a Name has decided on the syndicate in which he would like to invest in, the managing 
agent will draw up a contract stating how many lines the Name is willing to invest in.  Lloyd’s 
usually divides the risk into lines of £10 000.  The underwriter can then accept premiums up to 
the maximum amount of the lines that the Name has taken.  For Example:  A Name has decided 
to accept 3 lines.  Therefore he has invested £30 000 of his capital at that particular syndicate.  
An underwriter can only accept premiums on behalf of that Name up to the £30 000 limit so that 
the Name is compensated only up to the amount of capital he has invested.  The profits that the 
Name can make are limited by the maximum premium income that Name can receive 
(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 132; Hodgson, 1986: 106).  However, up until 1992 Names were 
still exposed to unlimited liability and would have to pay their percentage share of the risk 
regardless of the value of the loss (Davison, 1987: 28). 
 
5.2.5. Lloyd’s Underwriters 
 
An underwriter is the core of Lloyd’s.  He chooses which risks to accept, what percentage of that 
risk to insure and at what premium (Raphael, 1995: 64; Flower & Jones, 1981: 176).  With the 
acceptance of the premium comes the obligation to pay valid claims (Hodgson, 1986: 100).  He 
has to recognise dangerous risks, have extended knowledge in the risks he insures and be 
confident in the risks he chooses (Raphael, 1995: 66).  An underwriter is only allowed to transact 
business on the floor of Lloyd’s, may only accept business from a Lloyd’s broker and has to send 
each policy he signs to receive the stamp of Lloyd’s.  However, the underwriter is not concerned 
with the collection of premiums, the payment of claims or issuing a policy.  The underwriter 
merely assumes the risk and the rest (i.e. the administrative work  associated with creating new 
business – signing by the Lloyd’s policy office, delivering policy to insured etc.) is handled by 
the broker (Hansard, 1966, col. 3088).  On the payment of a valid claim the underwriter does not 
pay the policyholder directly but pays via the Lloyd’s broker who then in turn pays the 
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policyholder.  An underwriter has a deputy and clerks who take note of the risks accepted and the 
claims settled.  All that is required from the underwriter is to sign the slip and note what 
percentage of the risk they are willing to accept.  The corporation of Lloyd’s then deals with 
checking the signature and settling claims (Davison, 1987: 24). 
 
The underwriter has three main roles (Davison, 1987: 25): to accept risk – on agreed conditions 
and premium, to settle claims, and to find appropriate reinsurance for his books.  Davison (1987: 
25) also states that the underwriter has a secondary role of managing the fund where the 
premiums are kept to meet claims.  However, this function is usually delegated to the 
underwriting agent. 
 
The underwriter works for the Names on his syndicate and signs polices on their behalf, 
historically the signature was placed underneath the written description of the risk, hence the 
name underwriter (Esquires, 1868: 177; S.C, 1943: 5; Panama-Pacific Exposition, 1915: 14).  
His signature, usually in the form of a rubber stamp containing his syndicate’s logo is known as a 
‘stamp’.  ‘Stamp capacity’ is known as the maximum amount of risk that any one syndicate can 
accept in a year, measured as the premium income (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 60).  The 
maximum premium income is measured by the capital of the Names and an underwriter is not 
allowed to accept any risks above his Names overall premium income limit.  Further capital is 
needed if the limit is exceeded.  As indicated above it was a disciplinary offence to exceed 
allowable limits.  An underwriting agent has to keep track of the risks his underwriter is 
accepting to make sure that it is not above the premium income limit (Davison, 1987: 134).  The 
underwriter must sign all policies unless the policy is overseas and then it is signed by his agents 
who have been given binding authority by the managing agent (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 68). 
 
The lead underwriter is the first underwriter from Lloyd’s to accept a specific portion of the risk 
and, together with the broker, agrees on the premium for that risk.  He is usually an expert in that 
particular kind of risk, setting the rate for that business and the underwriters who follow the lead 
usually accept a further portion of that risk at that same rate.
91
  The distinct market barriers 
which separate marine, non-marine, motor and aviation syndicates are no longer maintained.  
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Lloyd’s underwriters can specialise within the different types of insurance e.g. products liability, 
war risks, excess of loss reinsurance etc.  The specialised underwriters will be expected to 
become the lead underwriters on the risks that they are specialised in, setting terms and 
premiums with other underwriters only following once the lead underwriter has signed.  With his 
signature, the underwriter has the authority to commit his entire syndicate to the risk (Davison, 
1987: 25). 
 
Initially underwriters at Lloyd’s did not have any formal training on how to be an underwriter 
but learned the trade from their predecessors in the Box (Davison, 1987: 25).  To become an 
underwriter at Lloyd’s takes many years of practical experience and is achieved through the 
process of an apprenticeship.
92
  The individual starts off as an apprentice and after some years of 
practical experience and a process of examination is promoted to junior underwriter also known 
as an assistant or trainee underwriter.  This is then followed by more practical experience and 
further examination to become a class underwriter (also referred to as class or deputy 
underwriter) as a professional career.  Once the individual becomes an expert in their field and 
earns a market certificate, they become a lead or senior underwriter and in turn train new 
apprentices joining Lloyd’s.  Currently Lloyd’s has its own training centre.  Some of the 
examinations that the individual would have to take would be: firstly, to qualify as an Associate 
of the Chartered Insurance Institute (ACII).  This qualification is offered only by the Chartered 
Insurance Institute (CII) of London which is a prerequisite for anyone wanting to advance in the 
insurance industry.
93
  Secondly, once the ACII has been received, the underwriter has 15 months 
from joining Lloyd’s to complete the Lloyd’s Introductory Test (LIT) offered by the Lloyd’s 
training centre which is the “basic test of competence and understanding that must be completed 
by anyone transacting business at Lloyd’s” (Catlin et al, 1998: 65).  In January 1992 Lloyd’s 
introduced a new compulsory market qualification for active underwriters by the name of the 
Lloyd’s Market Certificate (LMC).  Each active underwriter must either write this examination 
or prove that he/she is exempt from the examination.  All underwriters that had been active prior 
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to 31
st
 December 1991 are exempt from this new examination (Cover, 1989b: 28).  Other 
qualifications are offered by the training centre but are not mandatory (Catlin et al, 1998: 62). 
 
5.2.6. Lloyd’s underwriting agents 
 
In 1904 the underwriting agent was introduced into Lloyd’s with each underwriter only being 
allowed to have one underwriting agent.  Until 1914 syndicates consisted of a small number of 
underwriters and each underwriter handled his own affairs and personally communicated with 
his Names.  By 1930 the underwriting agents’ main function was to act as an intermediary 
between the Names and the underwriter (Davison, 1987: 26).  An underwriting agent is also 
known as a combined agent as he does two things i.e. manage syndicates and looks after 
members’ underwriting portfolios (Newton, 1989b: 16).  An underwriting member who is not an 
underwriting agent himself can only underwrite risks through an underwriting agent.
94
 
 
The underwriting agent has two main duties (Davison, 1987: 26): 
 To manage the syndicates, focusing on the following key issues: (i) underwriting of risks, 
(ii) reinsuring risks, (iii) settling of valid claims and (iv) the management of the premium 
trust funds. 
 The underwriting agent employs the underwriter and entrusts the first three of the above 
mentioned tasks to them, thereby limiting himself to the management of the premium 
trust fund and the handling of members’ affairs. 
 
The underwriting agent also has to handle the members’ affairs at Lloyd’s.  This duty consists of: 
firstly, finding capable individuals to become members, secondly, taking them through the 
admission process of becoming a member, thirdly, helping them choose the most suitable 
syndicate bearing in mind the individuals interests and experience, fourthly, managing the 
personal reserve that each new member must give to the agent in the event of an underwriting 
loss so that funds are available to pay claims, and lastly settle any tax liabilities with respect to 
the Names membership of Lloyd’s. 
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Underwriting agents are compensated by their Names through a monthly salary as well as a 
profit commission on any underwriting profits made and on any “earnings performance of the 
syndicate funds” (Davison, 1987: 27). 
 
There are two types of underwriting agents which are the managing agent and the members’ 
agent.  A comparison of the two is set-out in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Comparison between a managing agent and a members’ agent 
 
 Managing agent Members agent 
Definition: “An underwriting agent which has 
permission from Lloyd’s to manage a 
syndicate and carry on underwriting 
and other functions for a member.”95 
“An underwriting agent which has 
permission from Lloyd’s to be appointed 
by a member to provide services and 
perform duties of the same kind and nature 
as those set out in the standard members’ 
agent’s agreement. These services and 
duties include advising the member on 
which syndicates he should participate, the 
level of participation on such syndicates 
and liaising with the member’s managing 
agents.”96 
Duties: To control the syndicates – “manage 
the operations of one or more 
syndicates” (Bannister, 1995: 17) and 
arranges the business written at 
Lloyd’s (Bain, 2006: 4; HM Treasury, 
2008: 6). 
To advise member on the right portfolio 
selection of different syndicates based on 
the individuals approach and attitude to 
risk.  Only looks after a Names portfolio 
and does not manage syndicates (Newton, 
1989b: 16). 
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 Managing agent Members agent 
 
Employs the active underwriters who 
are then able to enter into insurance 
contracts on behalf of the Names.
97
 
 
Deals with the accounts including 
organizing a panel of auditors 
(Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 2000: 
78). 
 
Arranging the reinsurance of 
underwriting contracts.
98
 
 
The investment of premiums. 
 
Making sure there are adequate 
reserves for the payment of claims.
99
 
 
The general administrative tasks of 
the syndicate (Hodgson, 1986: 28). 
 
To act in the best interest of the member. 
 
Any reports received from the managing 
agent that contain material information as 
well as any information pertaining to 
syndicates the member is involved in must 
be punctually given to the member.
100
 
 
Have the responsibility of recruiting 
Names and handling the relationship 
between Names and the corporation of 
Lloyd’s (Bain, 2006: 5). 
Other: Through the implementation of 
Divestment via the Lloyd’s Act of 
1982, a person who is a managing 
agent or is associated with a managing 
With the introduction of limited corporate 
liability most Names now continue to trade 
at Lloyd’s through a Members’ Agent 
Pooling Arrangement (MAPA) which acts 
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 Deeny and others v Gooda Walker Ltd and others and two other appeals (1996: 46); Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks 
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 Managing agent Members agent 
agent is not allowed to simultaneously 
act as a Lloyd’s brokers.101  If a 
Lloyd’s broker is associated with a 
managing agent at the commencement 
of the 1982 Act, the Act provides the 
broker with 5 years in which to divest 
himself from the managing agent
102
 
(Cover, 2001: 62). 
 
Paid through an underwriting 
commission that is deducted from the 
Names’ accounts for his services 
(Hodgson, 1986: 104). 
as a unit trust where each Name has 
limited line of business in many different 
syndicates “whereby a number of 
members combine pool some or all of their 
underwriting capacity thus enabling them 
to participate in a wider range of 
syndicates than would otherwise be the 
case
103
 (Raphael, 1995: 368; Catlin et al, 
1998: 100). 
 
The advantage of such an agent is that he 
always had the best interests of the Name 
when choosing a syndicate as his principle 
responsibility is his Name (Luessenhop & 
Mayer, 1995: 25). 
 
However, the disadvantage was that the 
members’ agent could not approach a 
syndicate directly and had to go via a 
managing agent
104
 which meant that his 
Names would be given lesser priority than 
the Names from the managing agents.  An 
advantage to this is that the specialist, who 
is only interested in the best arrangement 
for his Name, will inform the Name 
immediately if a syndicate is losing profits 
and will have no scruples in changing 
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 Managing agent Members agent 
syndicates if the need arises, whereas a 
managing agent will put his Names on his 
syndicate and will not inform his Names at 
the optimal time for leaving the syndicate 
in an attempt to make his syndicate 
profitable again (Davison, 1987: 27). 
 
5.2.7. An underwriting manager 
 
An underwriting manager is an individual who may underwrite or issue a short term insurance 
policy through authority he has received from a Lloyd’s underwriter and who is authorised to 
carry on short term insurance business in another country i.e. South Africa.  An underwriting 
manager is then deemed to be an agent of the Lloyd’s underwriter.  What is today known as an 
underwriting manager used to be called an underwriting agent, in practice the terms are 
interchangeable (Cover, 2002d: 40).  Any acts performed by the underwriting manager will be 
binding on the Lloyd’s underwriter.  An underwriting manager may not deal directly with the 
public and has to make use of a broker to reach the insured (Cover, 2002d: 41).  The 
underwriting manager has the authority to do the following on behalf of the Lloyd’s underwriter 
(Cover, 2002c: 40): 
 Accept, bind and quote terms and conditions, 
 Adjust, settle, compromise and agree on claims, 
 Provide services that would normally have been provided by the Lloyd’s underwriter if 
the underwriting manager was not there. 
The South African Underwriting Managers Association (SAUMA) was introduced in 2002 and 
welcomed by Lloyd’s South Africa (Cover, 2002c: 44). 
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5.2.8. Lloyd’s Brokers 
 
The only way to contact a Lloyd’s underwriter and to be insured at Lloyd’s is through a Lloyd’s 
broker.
105
  The public does not have direct access to Lloyd’s.106  A Lloyd’s broker is not 
restricted to placing risks at Lloyd’s and is allowed to choose any insurance market in the world.  
A Lloyd’s broker has to know which risks are best insured at Lloyd’s or which other markets 
would be more suitable and exploit that knowledge to give the client the best possible insurance 
cover (Rasmussen, Owen & Smith, 1997: 4).  An underwriter is solely dependent on the broker 
for business as he does not have his own agents to bring insurance business to him (Luessenhop 
& Mayer, 1995: 110).  Lloyd’s brokers play an important role in developing the agency system at 
Lloyd’s. 
 
The duties of a broker can be summarised into four categories (Rasmussen, Owen & Smith 
(1997: 2) : 
 A business producer: He has to find potential insured’s, define the insured’s needs; seek 
the best terms, price and financial security from the array of underwriters including those 
at Lloyd’s.  The broker must convince the underwriter to accept the risk at the required 
price (Davison, 1987: 23).  The broker is still seen as the “marketing arm of Lloyd’s” 
(Davison, 1987: 24) who brings in business for the underwriter. 
 An administrator: Prepare the policy, making sure the correct Lloyd’s policy is used to be 
approved by underwriter and insured.  The broker has to act as a go-between when 
premiums or claims need to be paid between the underwriter and the insured (Davison, 
1987: 23).  This reduces the administrative burden of the individual syndicates. 
 A mediator: The broker must keep the insured informed of any changes or developments 
in the market and to negotiate appropriate renewal conditions.  In the case of a dispute 
between the underwriter and the insured, the broker can act as a mediator to assist the 
parties to reach a settlement without having to resort to expensive litigation. 
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 A regulator: Brokers sit on regulatory committees at Lloyd’s and are represented on the 
council of Lloyd’s.  Brokers are required to conform to their code of conduct. 
 
Before the risk is handed over for the underwriter to either accept or decline the risk, the broker 
puts all relevant information on a ‘slip’ containing the nature of the risk, the terms and conditions 
and the premium to be paid.
107
  A broker, on behalf of the insured, approaches an underwriter 
sitting in his Box in the Room with the risk written on the slip (Steward, 1984: 2).  Brokers 
usually wait in line before the box and approach the underwriter one by one.  The broker is in 
direct contact with the underwriter and they discuss the risk face-to-face allowing the broker to 
get his intentions clearly across without any misunderstandings or ambiguity (Rasmussen, Owen 
& Smith, 1997: 3; Kelley, 1995: 2).  The risk is then contemporaneously accepted or rejected.  
As discussed earlier, once the lead underwriter has signed the slip others follow, much quicker, 
placing confidence in the lead until the slip is filled (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 68).  A slip is 
personally signed by each underwriter; after which it goes to the Lloyd’s Policy Signing Office 
and recorded on a computer (Hodgson, 1986: 11).  In the year 2010 Lloyd’s attempted, on a trial 
basis, the use of iPads instead of the traditional slip in an attempt to reduce the large amount of 
paper being generated.
108
 
 
The lead underwriter will set the premium and often take the largest percentage of the risk, 
stamping the policy with his syndicate’s stamp and initialling the slip.  Other underwriters will 
take smaller portions of the risk until the entire risk is underwritten (Steward, 1984: 2; Hodgson, 
1986: 11).  Once the entire risk has been placed, the broker leaves Lloyd’s with a loose-leaf 
notebook where he attaches a cover letter as a front page containing the description of the risk 
and the premium.  The rest of the pages contain a number of slips that have been stamped by the 
underwriters (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 72).  He then collects the premium from the insured 
who is now the policyholder.  The broker will deduct a commission from the premium for 
himself and forward the rest of the premium to the underwriter.  It is interesting to note that the 
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broker, not the insured, is directly liable for the premium to the underwriter (Law Commission & 
the Scottish Law Commission, 2010: vi). 
 
When a claim is made the broker must notify the lead underwriter on the slip of the claim as well 
as notifying the Lloyd’s claims office.  The Lloyd’s claim office then notifies the other 
underwriters of the amounts they are liable for (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 72).  There is a 
complication when it comes to claims.  The broker is the agent of the insured; Lloyd’s however, 
may require the broker to appoint a loss adjuster.  In so doing the broker becomes the agent of 
Lloyd’s.  In law, the broker cannot be the agent of both as it places the broker in a position of 
conflict (Westgarth, 1984: 45). 
 
The broker also has a further role as a communicator (Rasmussen, Owen & Smith, 1997: 5).  In 
an insurance contract the principle of the duty of disclosure applies whereby both parties to the 
contract (insured and insurer) have to disclose all material facts regarding the risk being insured 
(Westgarth, 1984: 37).  Many individuals buying insurance are not aware of this principle in 
insurance law and therefore it becomes the duty of the broker to inform the policyholder to 
disclose all material facts that may influence the insurer’s decision in accepting the risk and 
setting the premium. 
 
Some of the aspects of the brokers role as communicator include the following: firstly, brokers 
need to communicate the security offered by Lloyds’ to the public in an attempt to bring 
confidence back to Lloyd’s after the crisis discussed above, secondly, the broker should continue 
the close face-to-face relationship between brokers and underwriters for clear understanding of 
what is expected from both parties, thirdly, the broker must communicate any information he has 
on the risk being insured to the underwriter as well as the insured.  This can easily be done 
electronically, and finally, the broker must keep abreast on the changes and developments in the 
world including politics, competitors and other markets. 
 
A broker is required to be a specialist in the regulation of the insurance market in which he 
works to be able to quickly adapt to any regulatory changes as they arise (Rasmussen, Owen & 
Smith, 1997: 6). 
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All Lloyd’s agents are required by law to have errors and omissions (E&O) insurance cover so 
that in the event of an insured suing his broker, the broker has the means to pay a claim of 
damages (Davison, 1987: 39; Gibson, 1988: 4).  However, the E&O insurance has changed and 
excludes cover for fraud or dishonesty of directors of insurance brokers (Gibson, 1988: 6). 
 
5.2.8.1. Regulation of Lloyd’s brokers 
 
Anyone who is an insurance broker in the UK, including Lloyd’s brokers, is subject to the 
Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act of 1977 (IBRA).  To increase the security for policyholders 
the concept of the Insurance Broking Account (IBA) was introduced in this Act whereby brokers 
have to keep all the money they received for insurance purposes separate from their private 
funds.  This account has to have an amount equal to at least the predetermined minimum margin 
of solvency at all times and can never be in deficit (Gibson, 1988: 4). 
 
The Lloyd’s Act of 1982 acknowledged and defined a Lloyd’s brokers for the first time.109  
Schedule 2 of the Act allows the council of Lloyd’s to regulate the admission of a Lloyd’s broker 
into Lloyd’s as well as the broking business the broker is allowed to do in the Room (Davison, 
1987: 165).  A Lloyd’s broker signs a contract with the Society of Lloyd’s and once the Society 
is satisfied that the broker has met the minimum standards of solvency, the broker is able to 
provide audited accounts to Lloyd’s and supply any information to the Society when requested to 
do so (Davison, 1987, 166). 
 
The Lloyd’s Council enacted the Lloyd’s Brokers By-law No. 5 which came into force on the 1st 
of August 1988.  This regulation was made to improve the standard at which Lloyd’s brokers, 
with binding authority, accepted business on behalf of Lloyd’s.  According to this By-law all 
brokers have to be registered if they wish to remain acting as Lloyd’s brokers.  A three year 
transitional period was laid down in which to register (Gibson, 1988: 4, 6). 
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5.2.9. Security underpinning the Lloyd’s policy 
 
“The security of a Lloyd’s policy depends on the ability of each Name who has subscribed to 
that policy to meet his obligations under the policy as and when they fall due” (Davison, 1987: 
36).  The Society of Lloyd’s signs a policy on behalf of the underwriter and guarantees that 
lawful claims will be paid.  The corporation has certain measures in place to make sure that all 
claims can be paid. 
 
Firstly, premiums are placed into the premiums trust fund as stated by the Insurance Companies 
Act 1948 and can only be used in the payment of claims.
110
  The premiums paid belong to the 
Names but are credited to a trust account that has been opened on the behalf of each Name.  The 
total amount of premiums that a Name may accept is dependent on the quantum of the initial 
deposit paid by the Name into Lloyd’s (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 18).  Money in the premium 
trust fund can only be invested in short term investments.  After three years the underwriter will 
subtract a provision from the accumulated premiums (after payment of valid claims) for the first 
year and, if purchasing reinsurance, will calculate a RITC premium.  Any money left in the 
account is a profit and can be divided amongst the Names.  The profit is distributed to each 
Name in proportion to their share of the syndicate’s total premium (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 
19).  If the syndicate is involved in complex risks or any uncertainties are present regarding 
future claims, the account is left open until the closing reserve can be calculated accurately in the 
case of unlimited liability Names (Davison, 1987: 36). 
 
If the premiums are inadequate to pay claims, the second option is calls on the deposits and 
personal reserves of Names.
111
  Each Name is required to place a deposit with Lloyd’s on a pro 
rata basis with his premium income limit.  Also, Names are required to leave personal reserves 
with their agents that have been accumulated from past profits and earnings.  A deposit could 
consist of securities, bank guaranteed securities or a letter of credit from a bank (Luessenhop & 
Mayer, 1995: 118; Hodgson, 1986: 107).  If the deposit or the reserve is used to pay for claims 
owed by the Name, that Name will be asked to either stop underwriting or reduce his 
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underwriting until he is able to top up his reserve and deposit amounts back to the original 
amount. 
 
If the deposits and personal reserves of the Name prove inadequate to pay for all claims, the third 
option available is the Names certified means.  Before becoming a Name, an individual must 
show a certified accountants certificate stating that he has independent means/ money of at least 
£100 000.  This has to exclude the value of his house (Kelley, 1995: 2).  Each Name has to pass 
this test upon admission into Lloyd’s.  Once this has been completed a Names net worth is never 
audited leaving Lloyd’s uncertain as to how much the Name will actually be able to pay 
(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 15).  Lloyd’s can call a Name to pay his losses up to his entire net 
worth (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 118).  A Name is allowed to accept a premium income of up 
to 2 ½ times his certified means.  Calls on Names are becoming obsolete with the introduction of 
limited corporate capital. 
 
If the premiums and capital of unlimited liability Names are insufficient then Lloyd’s can turn to 
the Lloyd’s Central Reserve Fund.112  The Harrison scandal in 1923 led to the creation of the 
Central Fund in 1927 (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 120; Brown, 1973: 43).  This fund was 
originally set up to deal with the event of a member/Name becoming insolvent and being unable 
to meet his liabilities (Newton, 1992: 4).  Each Name would pay an annual subscription of 0.5% 
of his premium income into this fund (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 118).  For this fund to pay a 
claim the Name must be declared in default and all his resources already having been seized and 
sold (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 119; Davison, 1987: 37).  The Central Fund was put in place 
as a protection mechanism for policyholders and not as a scapegoat for Names.  If a Name does 
not have the required funds, the Central Fund will pay but the Name will be forced to stop any 
further underwriting until such time as the Name can pay its claims.  The Society of Lloyd’s has 
the right to sue the Name for the cost of the claim that had to be paid out of the Central Fund 
(Davison, 1987: 182).  Through the R&R program a new central fund was established at 
Lloyd’s113 (Anonymous, 1995, 3). 
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The final resource available to pay a claim is the determination of Lloyd’s never to default in the 
payment of any claim.  Lloyd’s would bankrupt many Names in order to pay every single claim 
(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 119).  These lines of defence (Davison, 1987) are available to 
make sure that each claim is paid from every Lloyd’s policy. 
 
Further mechanisms in place to make sure each Name remains solvent and able to pay claims 
include the continuous evaluation of premium income as well as the rigorous annual Lloyd’s 
audit which was referred to as the annual solvency test (Davison, 1987: 38 & Frederick Thomas 
Poole and Others v Her Majesty’s Treasury, 2006: 25).  An auditor has to sign a solvency 
certificate for each Name declaring that the Name has sufficient assets to continue underwriting.  
Names that do not have a solvency certificate are declared to be in default and the central fund is 
then used to pay for that Name’s claims. 
 
As mentioned previously, each Lloyd’s policy has to go through the LPSO to receive a rubber 
stamp of the Lloyd’s trademark anchor so that it can be identified as an insurance policy from 
Lloyd’s.114  Originally, this was often a long and tedious process since each policy was 
individually drafted and custom made and had to be read through entirely to make sure 
everything was in accordance with Lloyd’s style.  This was changed in 1994 with the 
introduction of standard form policies keeping the policies identical and only changing the 
variable data such as the details of the policyholder.  Each year that policy would be reinstated 
for a further year to reduce the time spent on making new policies every year (Luessenhop & 
Mayer, 1995: 49).  With technology the underwriting room at Lloyd’s is filled with computers in 
every box with access to the LPSO which acts as the clearinghouse of Lloyd’s (Luessenhop & 
Mayer, 1995: 50). 
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5.2.9.1. Capacity 
 
This is the term used to describe the total premium that Lloyd’s is allowed to accept.  Regarding 
a member capacity, it is the maximum amount of insurance premiums that a particular member 
can accept.  Regarding an entire syndicate, it is the aggregate of every members capacity 
involved in that particular syndicate (Rasmussen, Owen & Smith, 1997: 7; Anonymous, 2009: 
143). 
 
5.3. Regulation of Lloyd’s 
 
In the UK insurance business is governed by the Insurance Companies Act of 1982 whereby all 
regulations of the Act must be followed for an insurance company to be lawfully recognized as 
such by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).  The main purpose of the provisions of the 
Act is to act as a safeguard for policyholders in case an insurance company is unable to pay a 
claim because of insolvency or fraud (Davison, 1987: 30). 
 
There are three exceptions to the rule that all insurance companies must be authorized by the DTI 
- Trade Union strike funds, registered friendly societies and Lloyd’s.  However, Lloyd’s is only 
partially exempt from this legislation.  This exemption does allow Lloyd’s to be self-governed 
and self-regulated but the policyholder must still be protected by the regulations in the Act 
(Daykin & Cresswell, 2000: 6; Ferguson, 1983: 56).  The Act provides three requirements that a 
Lloyd’s underwriter must follow in safeguarding a policyholder: firstly, all premiums received 
must be held in a trust deed and can only be used to pay valid claims, secondly, all underwriters 
must have their books of accounts audited annually and receive a certificate from the auditor 
testifying to the underwriter’s solvency and lastly, the Council of Lloyd’s is also to file an annual 
return outlining the insurance business that the members at Lloyd’s are involved in (Davison, 
1987: 30). 
 
Regulation of Lloyd’s is used as a mechanism to provide some protection for policyholder and 
members.  If a claim arises, the policyholder is assured that he will get paid, if a dispute arises 
between two parties a mechanism is in place to settle the problem and disciplinary actions are 
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available if needed (Catlin et al, 1998: 71).  Lloyd’s is self regulated through its own separate 
legal provisions envisaged by the Lloyd’s Acts.  The Trust Deed of 1811 was the first formal set 
of rules and regulations at Lloyd’s and governed the society till 1871.  In 1871 Lloyd’s received 
its own private members Act of parliament, the Lloyd’s Act of 1871, laying down the 
fundamental rules at Lloyd’s focusing strongly on ensuring the continuous solvency of its 
members.  The provisions of the Lloyd’s Act of 1871 were aimed at regulating a small society 
and were inadequate and too burdensome once Lloyd’s had grown into over 20 000 members 
(Davison, 1987: 31).  The Lloyd’s Act of 1871 was then later amended in 1888 (later wholly 
repealed), 1911, 1925 (later wholly repealed), 1952 and finally the Lloyd’s Act of 1982.  These 
Acts will be discussed in detail. 
 
5.3.1. Lloyd’s Act of 1871 
 
The Committee of Lloyd’s applied for an Act of Parliament for incorporation in November 1870 
and it was passed into law on the 25th May 1871 (Wright & Fayle, 1929: 379; Raynes, 1950: 
325).  The Lloyd’s Act of 1871 is “an Act for incorporating the members of the Establishment or 
society formerly held at Lloyd’s Coffee House in the Royal Exchange in the City of London, for 
the effecting of Marine Insurance, and generally known as Lloyd’s.”115  The Act of Incorporation 
was modelled as closely as possible on the old constitution and gave the society the “statutory 
powers to make its own By-Laws” (Wright & Fayle, 1929: 379).  The Lloyd’s Act of 1871 is still 
today the most important document in the history of Lloyd’s and “it defined its objective, 
arranged for a proper system of by-laws, and fixed the election, the authority, and the duties of 
the Committee” (Gibb, 1957: 139).  This Act defined the functions that the society was required 
to do and gave the society various powers in which to accomplish its tasks. 
 
S10 of the Act outlines the objects of the society: 
 
“The carrying on by members of the Society of the business of insurance of every 
description including guarantee business; 
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The advancement and protection of the interests of Members of the Society in connection 
with the business carried on by them as Members of the Society and in respect of 
shipping and cargoes and freight and other insurable property or insurable 
interests or otherwise; 
The collection publication and diffusion of intelligence and information; 
The doing of all things incidental or conducive to the fulfilment of the objects of the 
Society”.116 
 
The fundamental rules of the society were laid out in the Schedule to the Lloyd’s Act of 1871 
(Ferguson, 1983: 57).  The schedule pointed out that there must be a division between 
underwriting and non-underwriting members with non-underwriting members having no power 
to underwrite any risks in their own name nor having any delegative authority to ask someone to 
write on their behalf.  All underwriting must occur in the underwriting Room and an insurance 
account cannot be opened for anyone who is not a member or subscriber at Lloyd’s. 
 
Some main features of the Act are the following (Gibb, 1957: 143): Firstly, it made Lloyd’s a 
legal entity only focusing on marine insurance, secondly, it legalised the by-laws, thirdly, this 
Act gave the committee proper power to discipline its members i.e. laid down rules for the 
actions a member can be expelled for i.e. bankruptcy, fraud and discreditable conduct (Raphael, 
1995: 48; Ferguson, 1983: 57), but at the same time took great length to make sure that the 
committee can only deal reasonably and justifiably with the members and never prejudice them 
unfairly.  If a member of the society violates any fundamental rule made by the society or is 
found guilty of any discreditable conduct, he may be excluded from membership via a 4/5ths 
majority vote in favour of such exclusion in a meeting specifically convened by the society for 
the disciplinary purpose (Ferguson, 1983: 57).  However, two arbitrators are needed to take into 
account all circumstances before declaring a member guilty of violating any rules or of 
discreditable conduct.
117
  Fourthly, the Act emphasized that one of the objectives of Lloyd’s was 
to collect, publish and spread shipping intelligence and lastly, the Act stated that only Lloyd’s 
underwriting members could sign the Lloyd’s policy (no outsider’s signature will be valid) and 
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not any individual who was not part of the society to use or copy any policy of Lloyds bearing 
the mark of an anchor or to replicate such mark.  The anchor was used as a sign of the validity of 
the policy that it was in fact a Lloyd’s policy (Hodgson, 1986: 60). 
 
The incorporation of Lloyd’s did not make the society of Lloyd’s responsible for the 
underwriters’ losses in any way and individual underwriters were still liable for the losses in 
their personal capacity with the deposit system acting as a cushion for heavy losses
118
 (Raynes, 
1950: 325). 
 
Other aspects of the Act include: this Act annuls all previous deeds of association making this 
Act the only applicable statute.
119
  However, it allows for any agreements, bonds and contracts 
made for the management of Lloyd’s by the Committee to remain in force after the passing of 
this Act.
120
  Property and any other rights belonging to the Committee were legally transferred 
and vested in the society.
121
  Any legal action brought against or started by the Committee to be 
continued by the society.
122
  All debts owed to the Committee to be paid directly to the 
society.
123
  All employees were to remain and work for the society.
124
  The society retained the 
power to undertake the recovery of any wreckage of a marine vessel.
125
 
 
5.3.2. Lloyd’s Act of 1911 
 
This Act extended and amended the Lloyd’s Act of 1871 and conferred additional powers onto 
the society of Lloyd’s.  The Act of 1871 only referred to marine insurance at Lloyd’s, this Act 
took into account that Lloyd’s is also involved in non-marine insurance and extended the Act to 
incorporate such insurance and extended the powers of the society to encompass non-marine 
insurance (Anonymous, 1912a: 645).  “The objects of the society are extended to include the 
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carrying on the business of every description including guarantee business by Members of the 
society.
126”  The word ‘marine’ shall be replaced with the word ‘insurance’ throughout the 
Lloyd’s Act of 1871.127  The society was also given the statutory authority to act as a Trustee 
over any moneys deposited or any guarantee furnished by a member to act as a security for their 
liabilities regarding the risks that member has underwritten.
128
  The society has control over the 
capital of Lloyd’s to be used for the daily runnings of Lloyd’s.129  The Committee must publish 
the effect of any resolution passed by them in the Room at Lloyd’s.130 
 
Regarding disciplinary issues with members the Committees powers were further extended by 
this Act.  The Committee has power to temporarily suspend members if they have been found to 
be guilty of discreditable conduct and they must immediately cease underwriting.  The member 
then has 7 days in which to appeal the suspension at a General Meeting of the society.  The 
decision made at the meeting is final.
131
  The committee of Lloyd’s was given the power to expel 
a member up to a period of 2 years for discreditable conduct in the scope and course of being an 
underwriter.  This section was however repealed by the Lloyd’s Act of 1982 allowing the 
provision to be in force only until such time as a disciplinary committee was established to take 
over all disciplinary issues at Lloyd’s.132 
 
5.3.3. Lloyd’s Act of 1951 
 
Lloyd’s had expanded over the years with additional members entering Lloyd’s leading to the 
increase in the society’s activities.  This Act conferred even more powers onto the society.  
Lloyd’s needed to build or find new premises for the accommodation of its members as it had 
outgrown its current location.  This Act gave the Committee the power to borrow money and 
secure any interest on any property in order to acquire new land or to further develop currently 
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owned land.  Money could also be borrowed for decorative furniture, maintaining, altering and 
improving buildings.
133
 
 
5.3.4. Lloyd’s Act of 1982 
 
All the fraud, negligence and corruption mentioned in earlier chapters, led to the formation of the 
Lloyd’s Act of 1982 (Hoefle, 1996: 30).  The Lloyd’s Bill was introduced into parliament in 
November 1980 (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 147).  Sir Peter Green lobbied hard for the bill to 
be accepted but it was a Name, Lord Marcus Kimball, who knew the influential people in 
parliament and the passing of the bill can be attributed to his involvement (Luessenhop & Mayer, 
1995: 148; Hodgson, 1986). 
 
The Lloyd’s Act was passed in 1982 and established brand new rules and regulations revamping 
the organization of Lloyd’s.  This Act codified the practice of self regulation (Kelley, 1995: 3).  
The Act gave the council the power to regulate the market but not the obligation to do so: 
 
“The Council shall have the management and superintendence of the affairs of the Society and 
the power to regulate and direct the business of insurance at Lloyd’s and it may lawfully exercise 
all the powers of the Society.”134 
 
The only body that the council of Lloyd’s is answerable to is the DTI (Catlin et al, 1973: 71; 
Major, 1995: 10) “thus was the first rule of effective self-regulation – that the self-regulator must 
be forced to justify its actions to a governmental body on demand – was violated from the 
beginning” (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 149).  Also, another rule of self regulation was violated 
by allowing the “panel of auditors chosen by Lloyd’s to work under codes and conditions set by 
the council, not by their own self-regulatory association of accountants” (Luessenhop & Mayer, 
1995: 149). 
 
This new Act has five main provisions:
135
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1. A new council of Lloyd’s was established consisting of 27 members – 16 working 
members of Lloyd’s,136 8 external inactive members of Lloyd’s137 and 3 nominated 
members which cannot be members of Lloyd’s appointed by the council with the 
approval of the Governor of the Bank of England.
138
  The power of regulating the market 
was to be placed with this council.  The council was given the power to create by-laws 
for the management of the society as well as for the discipline of its members.
139
  Ian Hay 
Davison, as Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive, increased the external nominated 
members to four individuals, on the 14th February 1983.  The old committee of 16 
working members of Lloyd’s is still present but their power has diminished as the new 
council has taken over most of their duties.  The council delegates tasks to the old 
committee giving them authority over certain specific areas (e.g. the authority of 
admitting members, brokers and agents into Lloyd’s and the annual solvency test) at 
Lloyd’s as opposed to the blanket authority they once enjoyed over Lloyd’s as a whole 
(Davison, 1987: 66).  The old committee focuses on the day-to-day affairs and has no 
control over the finances of Lloyd’s or any investigations made into Lloyd’s.  The new 
committee’s focus is on long term planning (Ferguson, 1983: 62). 
 
2. The new council solely retains the power to create by-laws without having to call a 
general meeting of all members as in the 1871 Act.  An example of a new by-law to be 
implemented would be the requirement that all agents and brokers reregister with Lloyd’s 
and become subject to stricter standards (Davison, 1987: 47).  The council also has the 
power to amend or revoke any by-laws already in force.
140
 
 
3. The creation of a disciplinary committee which can consist of any members at Lloyd’s 
and not only those on the council.
141
  This committee has the power to expel, suspend, 
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fine, punish or criticize any member of Lloyd’s.  The reports of this committee may be 
published.  The council has to form an Appeal Tribunal to hear any appeals
142
 where the 
member can appeal the decision and the council does have the right of leniency and is 
able to alter the choice in punishment. 
 
4. The Act requires divestments.  Divestment was strongly looked at as well as the 
separation of the Names agents and the managing agents to reduce the conflicts of 
interests even further.  A person who is a managing agent [Lloyd’s broker] or is 
associated with a managing agent [Lloyd’s broker] is not allowed to simultaneously act 
as a Lloyd’s broker [managing agent].143  If a Lloyd’s broker [managing agent] is 
associated with a managing agent [Lloyd’s broker] at the commencement of the 1982 
Act, the Act provides the Lloyd’s broker [managing agent] with 5 years in which to 
divest himself from the managing agent [Lloyd’s broker].144  The associations between 
brokers and underwriters came to an end in July 1987.  Divestment forced managing 
agents to be independently managed (Taylor, 2006).  If a Lloyd’s broker [managing 
agent] becomes associated with a managing agent [Lloyd’s broker] after the 
commencement of the 1982 Act he is given a period of six months where he can 
simultaneously be a broker and a managing agent after which he must chose one or the 
other.
145
 
 
5. As a result of the number of lawsuits being brought against Lloyd’s after the fraud and 
natural disasters of the 1980s this Act created a provision where any individual wishing 
to sue Lloyd’s has to sue the entity responsible for the damages personally (i.e. the 
underwriter, Lloyd’s broker or the member directly) as the society itself is exempt from 
any liability in damages caused by any underwriting business done at Lloyd’s.146  Lloyd’s 
does not owe its Names a duty of good faith or fair dealing (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 
42).  This section was put in place to stop Names suing Lloyd’s as an organization.  The 
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Act also protects the society from lawsuits brought by insiders against the society 
itself.
147
 
 
Other relevant sections in the final Lloyd’s Act: the Council must elect from the working 
members a Chairman and two deputy Chairmen of Lloyd’s on an annual basis,148 and the 
Council does have the authority to delegate certain duties to the Committee except for the 
creation of certain regulations and the carrying out of duties laid down in the Lloyd’s Acts.149 
 
Lloyd’s has two vital relationships that it deals with.  The first relationship is between Lloyd’s 
and its policyholders which is directly supervised by the Board of Trade, later known as the DTI.  
The DTI pays particular attention to the solvency test set out in the Insurance Companies Act of 
1982.  The Bank of England also plays a supervisory role regarding city markets and therefore 
Lloyd’s.  The second relationship is between Lloyd’s members and their agents which is self-
regulated by Lloyd’s.  However, the DTI and the Bank of England still have an interest to make 
sure that Lloyd’s is efficient and prompt in excising these self regulatory powers (Davison, 1987: 
33). 
 
Lloyd’s Brokers are covered by the Lloyd’s Act of 1982 as well as the Insurance Brokers 
Registration Council (IBRC) formed by the Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act of 1977.  This 
Act limits the use of the term ‘Insurance Broker’ to only cover registered organizations and the 
Act is only applicable to such organizations.  Lloyd’s brokers comprise the biggest share of 
brokers in the British Insurance Brokers Association (BIBA) which is the body of brokers 
registered under the Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act of 1977 (Davison, 1987: 32). 
 
The Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act of 1977 lays down the minimum standards that an 
organization has to comply with to be seen as an insurance broker regarding its size and financial 
strength.  Lloyd’s brokers are however exempt from the more stringent rules of this Act since 
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they are already governed in those areas by the Lloyd’s Act of 1982 (Davison, 1987: 32; Catlin 
et al, 1998: 72). 
 
Substantial deregulation occurred in London during the 1980s known as the ‘Big Bang’ which 
was a move from restrictive practices to become more competitive in the London securities 
market.  This deregulation was followed by re-regulation of the financial services industry 
through the Financial Services Act of 1986 which moved away from self-regulation (Kelley, 
1995: 3).  Lloyd’s was exempt from the Financial Services Act and continued to be regulated by 
the Lloyd’s Act of 1982. 
 
5.3.4.1. LRO to amend the Lloyd’s Act of 1982 
 
A Legislative Reform Order (LRO) was published in 2008 by the Treasury which proposed 
certain amendments to the Lloyd’s Act of 1982.  Of the proposed reforms,150 two will be 
examined (McGovern, 2008: 2; HM Treasury, 2008): 
1. Section 8(3) Lloyd’s Act 1982 which states that underwriters can only accept insurance 
business from an accredited Lloyd’s broker is to be repealed as it is outdated (HM 
Treasury, 2008: 9, 13, 35).  It is a statutory restriction that no other insurance markets or 
insurers face.  Lloyd’s will have the power to make by-laws as to how managing agents 
are to deal with other brokers, making sure such brokers comply with appropriate 
standards.  A broker can continue to refer to itself as a Lloyd’s broker to indicate its 
familiarity and specialist knowledge of Lloyd’s operations as it will now receive 
competition from other insurance intermediaries (HM Treasury, 2008: 36, 38, 40-42, 65). 
2. The repeal of the divestment provisions (S10-12 of the Act) since these are statutory 
provisions that no other competitor has to deal with.  Other regulation has emerged since 
1982 that deals with the conflict of interests between managing agents and brokers and it 
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no longer has to form part of the Lloyd’s Act.  However it was proposed that a disclosure 
method be used, applying to managing agents to disclose any association with brokers, to 
monitor potential conflict of interests (HM Treasury, 2008: 9, 13, 45, 65). 
 
Lloyd’s was willing to accept all reforms (McGovern, 2008: 4) and the LRO was approved in 
November 2008.
151
 
 
5.3.5. Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
 
In 1997 the government felt that the insurance market required a wide reform of its regulatory 
structure and included Lloyd’s in this reform.  The DTI’s responsibilities were thus transferred to 
Her Majesty’s Treasury and later, in the year 2000, to the FSA (Catlin et al, 1998: 72). 
 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 
Lloyd’s consists of the following groups of individuals (Davison, 1987: 28): the brokers who 
bring policyholders to insure their risks at Lloyd’s, the active underwriters who write the risk and 
price it accordingly, the underwriting agents who manage the underwriters and bring the Names 
to invest in the syndicates, the Names themselves who expose their personal fortune on an 
unlimited basis to provide Lloyd’s with capital to insure risks, the staff employed by the society 
of Lloyd’s who provide support services and the Council who govern the Society of Lloyd’s.  
The support services include: collecting shipping intelligence, running the agency system abroad, 
running the signing policy office, running the claims handling office, and lastly self regulation of 
the market by monitoring the underwriting agents and brokers, admitting new members and 
looking after reserve funds and deposits. 
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Figure 4: A graphical representation to summarise the structure of Lloyd’s  
 
 
(Anonymous, 2009: 8; Anonymous, 2010b: 7). 
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6. Lloyd’s in South Africa 
 
6.1. An overview of the South African insurance market 
 
The development of the insurance market is naturally tied to the development of the country.  
During the period when the insurance market was forming, South Africa experienced a number 
of important events in its history.  Employees of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) arrived at 
the Cape in April 1652 to establish a victualing as well as a medical station for its passing fleets 
to India and the East (Hagedorn-Hansen, 2011; Pakenham, 1979: xxi).  The VOC granted 
freedom to some of its employees to farm and settle at the Cape, providing the genesis of the 
white population, the Afrikaner, at the Cape.  Early in 1713 Dutch ships brought the small pox 
virus to the Cape which wiped out much of the indigenous Hottentot population.  The Dutch 
were replaced by the British government in 1795 when a fleet was sent to take the Cape into 
protective custody in the face of the growing European wars.  From 1662 till 1795 the Cape was 
largely rural and agricultural which had very little need for insurance and it is not surprising that 
there was no South African insurance market.  Things began to change with the arrival of the 
British in 1795 who left for a short period after a measure of peace prevailed in Europe, in terms 
of the treaty of Amiens, and for a short while the Cape was handed back to the Dutch.  During 
this period an extensive survey was carried out to assess the economic potential of the Cape.  The 
report was negative about the prospects.  The survey noted that no indigenous insurance market 
existed and generally was not very optimistic about the economic future of the Cape.  The British 
returned expelling the Dutch from the Cape and the Cape was slowly placed on a more secure 
commercial foundation aided by the arrival of the 1820 settlers from the UK.  Shortly thereafter 
on the 14
th
 March 1831 the first indigenous insurance company the South African Fire and Life 
Assurance Company was established at the instigation of Thomas Le Breton (Le Breton, 1832) a 
British immigrant. 
 
A significant upheaval occurred from 1838 onwards with Die Groot Trek (The Great Migration) 
when the indigenous Cape Afrikaans speaking white people migrated away from the Cape and 
from the English Government rule by moving eastwards and inland away from the Cape.  In the 
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process they formed other Republics in the Orange Free State, Natal and Transvaal.  Thereby, in 
their view, eliminating the British control over themselves, however this was not to be.  The 
discovery firstly of diamonds in the Northern Cape and Orange Free State resulting in the 
development of the diamond fields and secondly the discovery of gold and the development of 
the gold fields in the Transvaal ensured the intensified British involvement.  The diamonds and 
gold resulted in a massive influx of foreigners (Pakenham, 1979: xxi - xxii). 
 
The British accordingly followed the Afrikaners inland and claimed right of government over 
them which resulted in a series of skirmishes and wars between the British and the Afrikaners.  
The first Anglo-Boer War ended with the Battle of Majuba in 1880 which was a resounding 
victory for the Afrikaners. The first war made the Second Boer war inevitable.  In the end the 
British simply could not be defeated by what were essentially farmers and very much part-time 
soldiers.  The second Anglo-Boer war took place between 1899 and 1902 with a decisive victory 
for the British (Vivian, 2007: 680).  The defeat and victory as it turned out was short-lived for 
both parties.  With a massive influx of English people, a consequence of the gold rush, it was 
generally thought at the time that if the popular vote was granted exclusively to whites, the 
English would outnumber the Afrikaners and thus dominate South Africa.  The Second Anglo-
Boer War was fought ostensibly to grant the vote of the foreigners, referred to as the Uitlanders.  
However, numerically the new arrivals, the English, never outnumbered the Afrikaners and the 
popular vote placed the Afrikaners and not the English in the dominate position.  The dominate 
position of the Afrikaner was achieved with the 1948 general election which was won by the 
National Party (NP), a position they would hold until the vote was extended to all in 1994.  The 
English won the war but lost effective control through the ballot box.  The converse is equally 
true; the Afrikaners lost the war but won control through numbers of votes. 
 
In 1910 the different colonies united to form the Union between the Cape, Orange Free State, 
Natal and Transvaal (Vivian, 1995: 36).  By then South Africa was the largest Gold producer in 
the world with growing secondary industries springing up to support the mining industry which 
formed the mainstay of the economy.  In 1961 the Union gained its independence from the 
British and became known as the Republic of South Africa.  The Afrikaner Nationalist Party 
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remained in power until 1994 when it lost the election to the ANC, the first black majority 
government, and the ANC is still today the ruling party (Vivian, 2007: 681). 
 
The Afrikaners trekking from the Cape in 1838 were mainly farmers and remained such when 
they settled in Natal, Orange Free State and the Transvaal.  As farmers they were largely rural.  
Commerce, an urban activity was mainly carried out by persons of English origin, the influx 
from the diamond and gold rush.  In 1900 Afrikaners controlled a significant portion of 
commerce.  The rural area is synonymous with poverty.  As the white Afrikaner farming 
population expanded, the population exceeded the numbers which could be supported on the 
farms resulting in migration of unskilled Afrikaners to towns and cities.  This manifested itself 
into what was called the poor white problem.  Fortunately with the passing of time the economy 
expanded sufficiently to absorb the slowly increasing white Afrikaner population which became 
increasingly skilled.  The economy never expanded sufficiently to be able to absorb the rapidly 
increasing black population. Similarly, matching economic growth and population did not take 
place in the rest of Africa and Africa as a whole descended increasingly into poverty. 
 
Insurance played a particularly important role in the upliftment of Afrikaners.  The Afrikaners, 
aware of their disadvantaged position, formed two of South Africa’s now largest insurance 
companies, Santam and Sanlam with the specific purpose of mobilizing Afrikaner savings to 
promote economic growth out of which they would be lifted out of poverty. 
 
With the expansion of the economy so commerce grew including the insurance market.  Towards 
the end of the 20
th
 century the South African life insurance market accounted for 95% of the 
premiums received in the whole of Africa.  The South African property and casualty market 
accounted for 57% of premiums in Africa.  Looking more broadly, South Africans spend more 
per GDP purchasing life insurance when compared to any other country in the world.  It must be 
noted that contractual savings are included in South African life insurance (Vivian, 2007: 679). 
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6.2. Development of the insurance industry 
 
The early history of South Africa’s insurance market is not well documented nevertheless 
attempts have been made to do so.
152
  The first record of insurance being made available in South 
Africa occurred on the 6
th
 August 1806 when a UK company, the Phoenix, granted power of 
attorney to two agents in South Africa to transact business on its behalf (Spyrou, 1995: 325; 
Vivian, 2007).  In the first instance, as in the case of the Phoenix, the insurance market 
developed via overseas companies being represented by agents in South Africa.  The first agents 
of the Phoenix were John Houghton and Alexander MacDonald.  The company advertised in 
South Africa on the 18
th
 October 1808.
153
  This advent of the Phoenix, offering insurance in SA, 
can be referred to as the birth of the South African insurance market.
154
 
 
In 1826 another two overseas insurance companies offered insurance in South Africa.  On the 1
st
 
February 1826, the South African Commercial Advertiser, published in Cape Town advertised 
that the United Empire and Continental Life Assurance Association based in London had opened 
a branch at the Cape of Good Hope.  Two weeks later, 15
th
 February 1826, another advertisement 
appeared that yet another English company, The Alliance British and Foreign Life and Fire 
Assurance Co was offering its business in South Africa.
155
 
 
There were not only companies from the UK but also from various parts of the world and as time 
progressed these companies sent full time representatives to South Africa to look after their 
businesses.  The next step in the developmental process was when the foreign companies 
established branch offices in South Africa.  As will be seen Lloyd’s of London followed a 
similar pattern, although, it only opened an office in South Africa in 1998. 
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6.3. Indigenous companies 
 
The first insurance company native to South Africa was only established on the 14
th
 March 1831 
in Cape Town by the name of the South African Fire and Life Assurance Company
156
´
157
.  An 
English gentleman by the name of Thomas Le Breton came to South Africa in September 1830.  
While staying in his lodgings in the Cape of Good Hope he regularly dined with an unnamed 
colonial gentleman, an Indian mathematician and an Indian with an immense knowledge of daily 
events.  One of the conversations held at the table was the creation of a new establishment by the 
name of The Civil Servants’ Fund.  The Fund, however, was soon dissolved ruining many 
families who had placed money into the Fund as a means to provide personal security.  This led 
Thomas Le Breton to establish the Life Assurance Company
158
 which would replace the Civil 
Servant’ Fund (Le Breton, 1832: 4; Vivian, 1996: 149).  Le Breton trusted the information he 
received regarding longevity from medical professionals and that the age of 42 at the Cape was 
regarded as being a very long life.  Le Breton, however, had many friends who were older than 
42 and still healthy and strong.  He spent 3 months visiting surrounding cemeteries calculating 
the age at which the individuals had died (Le Breton, 1832: 6).  Afterwards, in March 1831, he 
held a meeting with his Dutch and English friends at his home to discuss the formation of the 
Life Assurance Company.  A General Meeting was held on the 14
th
 of March where the capital 
required to begin the venture as well as the deposits needed were discussed.  It was agreed to 
form the company and the Directors were nominated as well as the medical inspectors, auditors 
and a secretary.  After an unfortunate misunderstanding Thomas Le Breton was appointed as the 
first secretary.
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Fire insurance was also included in the coverage offered by the South African Life Assurance 
Company.  The first policy was issued on the 20
th
 April 1831 (Le Breton, 1832: 8).  The 
company became known as the South African Fire and Life Assurance Company (Le Breton, 
1832: 10; Hirsch, 1962: 25).  Le Breton later resigned as Secretary and became a Director (Le 
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Breton, 1832: 14; Vivian, 1996: 151).  The company only insured people below the age of 50.  
Anyone older than 50 had a much higher probability of dying much sooner and was therefore 
uninsurable.  This rule was not set in stone as there is record of a gentleman being insured at the 
age of 51 (Le Breton, 1832: 16).  However, when Le Breton tried to insure his own life with his 
company his proposal was declined given the reason that he was above the cut-off age of 50 
years (Le Breton, 1832: 17).  This decision caused ill-feelings between Le Breton and other 
directors as Le Breton felt that this was a “hasty, injudicious and ill-timed” decision as he was 
the founder of the company and should not be refused (Le Breton, 1832: 18).  The Assurance 
Company was willing to give Le Breton a pension that would be paid to his wife upon his death.  
However, he declined the pension offer as it showed that his wife would have to be dependent on 
the company for her support (Le Breton, 1832: 20). 
 
Le Breton retired from the South African Assurance Company soon after his declined proposal 
on the 30
th
 May 1832.
160
  Le Breton approached Messrs, Nisbet and Dickson who were the 
agents for the Alliance Insurance Company to insure his life for £500 (Hirsch, 1962: 25; Vivian, 
1996: 152; Le Breton, 1832: 23).  After a conclusive medical examination his life was insured 
for one year (Le Breton, 1832: 25).  Thomas Le Breton died insolvent two years later on 10 June 
1834 (Vivian, 1996: 153).  The original grave stone has been located but no longer reflects his 
name. 
 
The two main Life Assurance companies during the 1830s were the Alliance and the South 
African Fire and Life Assurance Company and healthy competition was evident between the 
two.  By March 1832 the South African Fire and Life Assurance Company was expanding with 
the inclusion of three agents to bring business into the company.  The South African Fire and 
Life Assurance Company held its 5
th
 annual general meeting in May 1835 showing that the 
business was still doing well (Hirsch, 1962: 39).  In December 1835 yet another insurance 
company began trading in South Africa, the Cape of Good Hope Fire Insurance Co, providing 
even more competition for the established two insurance companies by offering lower fire rates 
(Hirsch, 1962: 41; Vivian, 1995: 19).  These three Insurance companies were the main insurers 
up until 1838. 
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The insurance industry started with life and fire insurance in South Africa.  Other forms of 
insurance such as accident and marine were slower to develop.  Marine insurance started in the 
Cape as early as the 1800s by the British settlers.  In August 1838 the Cape of Good Hope Fire 
Insurance Co formed a branch of their business to focus solely on marine insurance, the Cape of 
Good Hope Marine Insurance Company.  “It was the first purely South African Office to transact 
marine business” (Hirsch, 1962: 43).  Another local company was established in 1844, the 
Equitable Fire and Life Assurance Trust Co (Hirsch, 1963, 19) which then branched into marine 
insurance in 1849 through the Equitable Marine Co (Spyrou, 1955: 328).  In 1853 ships began to 
make regular journeys between South Africa, England, Australia and India improving 
communication and allowing for more businesses to extend their reach to overseas countries.  
This led to more insurance companies starting up in the Cape providing more competition for the 
already existing handful of insurers (Hirsch, 1963: 22).  Local marine companies faced severe 
competition from foreign marine insurance companies (Spyrou, 1955: 328).  In this same year, 
1853, the Guardian Assurance and Trust Co. of Port Elizabeth was formed.  This company only 
branched into marine insurance in 1857.  In 1856 another insurance company, the Commercial 
Marine and Fire Assurance Co, appeared in the Cape. 
 
Table 2: A summary of the slow establishment of marine insurance companies in South 
Africa.   
 
Arrival in SA Name of Company Line of Business Foreign/local 
1808 Phoenix Fire insurance Company Fire Foreign 
1826 United Empire and Continental Life 
Assurance Association 
Life Foreign 
1826 The Alliance British and Foreign Life 
and Fire Assurance Company 
Fire and Life Foreign 
1831 South African Fire and Life Assurance 
Company 
Fire and Life Local 
1835 Cape of Good Hope Fire Insurance 
Company 
Fire Local 
1838 Cape of Good Hope Marine Insurance Marine Local 
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Arrival in SA Name of Company Line of Business Foreign/local 
Company 
1844 Equitable Fire and Life Assurance Trust 
Company 
Fire and Life Local 
1849 Equitable Marine  Marine Local 
1856 The Commercial Marine and Fire 
Assurance Co 
Marine and Fire Foreign 
1857 Guardian Assurance and Trust Co 
branched into Marine 
Marine Foreign 
1874 Colonial Assurance Co Marine Local 
 
The discovery of diamonds in 1869 as well as the opening of the Witwatersrand gold fields in 
1886 created an influx of foreign insurance companies into South Africa from Australia, 
America and Britain.
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Accident insurance developed much later after life and fire insurance was already popular.  No 
accident insurance can be found to date further back than 1848 worldwide (Macintyre, 1898: 15).  
By the 1890s there was still no insurer focused on accident insurance in South Africa.  Accident 
insurance only came to South Africa around the mid-late 1890s.  The Commercial Assurance 
Company in Cape Town can be accredited with being the first South African insurer to offer 
accident insurance (Vivian, 1995: 21).  Other insurers which followed suit were the Southern, 
African United, Ocean and Imperial (Macintyre, 1898: 20).  Sickness insurance and Fidelity 
Guarantee insurance were regarded as recent developments in 1898.  The Southern was the only 
insurance company transacting in Sickness insurance while the African United held the 
monopoly for Fidelity Guarantee insurance (Macintyre, 1898: 25). 
 
Over time some insurance companies left and new ones where formed.  There were 8 insurance 
companies by 1898 that offered marine insurance over and above fire and life.  These were the 
Alliance Marine, the British and Foreign, the Maritime, the Commercial Union, the South 
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British, the New Zealand, the Colonial and the Equitable.  Only the Colonial and the Equitable 
were native to South Africa (Macintyre, 1898: 25; Spyrou, 1955: 328). 
 
6.4. Lloyd’s in South Africa 
 
6.4.1. Early Beginnings 
 
As noted above Hirsch (1909 & 1962) attempted to set-out the history of the South African 
insurance market but makes no mention of Lloyd’s.  If the first foreign insurer to transact 
business in South Africa was in 1808 one can accept that Lloyd’s had not yet appointed 
insurance agents with binding authority in South Africa prior to that year.  If Lloyd’s was 
represented in South Africa, Hirsch, who was involved in the industry and well connected, would 
have included Lloyd’s in his survey of the market. 
 
Initially, as discussed above, when Lloyd’s was first formed it only dealt with marine insurance.  
The UK Lloyd’s Act of 1871 focused on marine insurance with no mention of non-marine 
insurance.  Lloyd’s was involved only in marine insurance until 1885 where the first non-marine 
syndicate was introduced in Lloyd’s visionary, Cuthbert Heath.162  It is thus unlikely that Lloyd’s 
would have been involved in the South African market before this date and if it was it would 
have been in marine insurance.  The South African market on the other hand started with life and 
fire insurance and only began offering marine insurance in 1838 when the Cape of Good Hope 
Marine Insurance Company, the first marine company, was formed.  Given that Lloyd’s only 
offered marine insurance up until 1885 it could be assumed that Lloyd’s would not have been 
involved in the South African insurance market prior to the introduction of marine insurance in 
South Africa in 1838, since it did not deal with life or fire insurance.  No record of a South 
African marine (shipping) company could be found.  It can be assumed that the demand for 
marine (hull) insurance in South Africa was low. 
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The detailed record of the South African insurance, banking market and shipping and 
commercial affairs was published in 1898 as The South African Red Book (Macintyre, 1898: 31).  
This book provides a list of the number of insurance companies in South Africa, with emphasis 
being in the Cape.  In 1898 there were approximately 53 insurance companies with only 6 being 
indigenous South African companies.  The others were foreign insurers which extended their 
business of insurance from abroad to operate in South Africa.  However, the native South 
African insurers secured more business than all the foreign insurers which were competing 
against them (Macintyre, 1898, 27).  As in the case of Hirsch, no mention is made of Lloyd’s in 
the South African Red Book.  South African, Australian, Scottish and English insurance 
companies are all mentioned but not Lloyd’s of London.  This could be that since Lloyd’s is not 
a company but operates via agents or brokers it accordingly would not have been included in the 
list of companies. The business was simply placed via agents or brokers directly to London, a 
matter which was of concern for authorities’ right up to the 1970s. 
 
The first record of communication between Lloyd’s and South Africa dates to 20 January 1823163 
where Commodore Nourse, the Commander-in-Chief at the Cape, wrote a letter to the 
Committee of Lloyd’s regarding the possible erection of a Lighthouse upon the rock called 
“Noah’s Ark” at the entrance to Simon’s bay (McCall, 1903: 245).  Commodore Nourse had 
initially approached the governor of the Cape Colony, Lord Charles Somerset, with a proposal to 
erect the Lighthouse.  Lord Charles Somerset favoured the idea, however did not have sufficient 
funds to pay engineers to build the Lighthouse and sent a letter recommending the construction 
to Lord William Lennox Bathurst, Vicutalling Commissioner for the Royal Navy.  Commodore 
Nourse felt that the British government would, even with the recommendation from Lord Charles 
Somerset and Lord Bathurst, refuse to fund the construction of the Lighthouse and then 
approached Lloyd’s of London to provide the money needed.  After consulting an engineer it 
was established the estimated cost would be roughly £500.  According to an extract from Lloyd’s 
List from 1819 to November 1822, 16 ships had either been lost or suffered damage around the 
Cape Colony (McCall, 1903: 255).  The building of the Lighthouse was in the best interest of 
Lloyd’s, reducing the number of accidents and losses suffered at the hands of “Noah’s Ark” 
(McCall, 1903: 246, 247).  Commodore Nourse communicated with Lloyd’s asking for help in 
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protecting further ships using Simon’s Bay port.  This is evidence of an interaction between 
South Africa and Lloyd’s.  There is, however, no evidence of him being a Lloyd’s Agent or 
supplying information to Lloyd’s on ship movements.164 
 
The first record of Lloyd’s operation in South Africa dates to the 17 July 1850 when George 
Christopher Cato was appointed as a Lloyd’s Agent for Lloyd’s of London in Natal (Russell, 
1899: 83; Goetzsche, 1967: 89; Krüger: 1972, 126).  George Cato was born in 1814 in London 
and moved to the Cape with his family in 1826 and then to Algoa Bay where he worked in the 
salt beef export trade and soon became the manager while still in his teens.  In 1838, the same 
year in which the great trek started, his employer extended his trading activities to Natal sending 
Cato South to Port Natal with a cargo of merchandise.  Port Natal (now Durban) held a great 
appeal to Cato and after winding up his affairs in Algoa Bay he moved there with his family in 
March 1839.  He opened the first trading establishment in Durban, a general trading business, 
which became the centre of the settlement’s civilization as he built up a good trade with the 
hunters and farmers.  He was given the task of laying out the original plan of a town along the 
north-east beach of an estuary forming the port of Natal.  He had slowly begun to strengthen his 
standing in the then small community.  The Boers had arrived and declared Natal to be a Boer 
Republic, however, in May 1842 Captain T.C. Smith arrived at the port of Natal and replaced the 
flag of the Republic of Natalia with the British Flag essentially annexing the Republic for the 
British Crown.  This led to a clash between the British and the Boers.  The Boers were led by 
Commandant-General Pretorius.  Cato fought for the British and was captured and taken prisoner 
by the Boers.  He was finally released in June and he re-established himself in Port Natal still 
under the control of Major Smith by extending his business interests (Goetzsche, 1967: 13, 14, 
17, 20, 27, 31, 43, 50). 
 
Cato was held in high esteem for his heroic deeds during the war and was regarded as a leading 
figure in the growing European community.  On May 12 1843 a proclamation was issued and the 
British annexed the port of Natal.  The Honourable H. Cloete was appointed as Her Majesty’s 
Commissioner to Natal and an uneasy peace emerged between the British and the Boers.  Cato 
was appointed a Justice of the Peace in 1846.  Harbour facilities were still primitive at this stage 
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and improvements where only made in 1848.  Cato was active at the port serving as a landing 
agent by helping cargo get to the port from ships anchored at sea.  On 19 March 1847 Cato was 
appointed Consular Agent for the USA at Port Natal.  His high standing in society and 
involvement in the Port of Natal led to him being appointed as an agent for Lloyd’s on July 17 
1850 which office he held till 1890 after which he could no longer perform his duties due to ill-
health. 
 
His duties as a Lloyd’s Agent included hoisting the Lloyd’s flag (a large blue and white banner 
bearing the words ‘Lloyd’s’).  This was a signal to the occupants of the town that their mail had 
arrived.  In his capacity as a Lloyd’s Agent he was appointed to the Harbour Board of 
Commissioners in 1852 (Russell, 1899: 83; Goetzsche, 1967: 53, 56, 58, 60, 89, 90, 97; Krüger, 
1972: 126).  In September 1863 strong winds brought tragedy as a number of ships where 
shipwrecked trying to enter the Port of Natal.  As a Lloyd’s Agent Cato was instrumental in the 
building of a lighthouse, in January 1867, at Port Natal to make it easier for vessels to enter the 
port (Goetzsche, 1967: 173 - 175).  He remained a member of the Harbour Commissioners Board 
until 1890 and “it was the Board which laid the foundation of the harbour as it is known today, 
and no small measure of its progress is due to George Cato who, throughout his long association 
with Durban, devoted himself assiduously to the affairs of the port” (Goetzsche, 1967: 201). 
 
In addition to being a Lloyd’s Agent Cato was also one of the original directors of the Natal 
Bank established on April 1, 1854 and later, August 5, 1854, became the first Mayor of Durban 
which he served for two years till 1856.  His wife passed away in 1886 and with such a grievous 
loss his health started to deteriorate rapidly and he passed away on July 9, 1893 at the age of 79 
(Goetzsche, 1967: 105, 143, 206 - 207). 
 
A communication dated the 14
th
 December 1868 was found where the Colonial Office of Natal 
wrote a letter to G.C. Cato, Lloyd’s Agent in Durban, regarding the news that the largest ship, 
the Sultana, had entered the Durban harbour successfully.  The letter is reproduced hereunder. 
 
 
 
152 
 
“Colonial Office Natal 
14
th
 December 1868 
Sir, 
I have the honor (sic) to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12
th
 instant in which you 
state that the “Sultana” of 1000 tons burden the largest ship which had ever entered our harbor 
(sic) and crossed the far three days before the spring tides.  His Excellency feels much 
gratification at the receipt of this intelligence and thinks it would be advisable that it should be 
published both here and in England. 
Lloyd’s Agent  
Durban 
 
With reference to your observations regarding the “Tug” his Excellency has appointed a 
commission consisting of yourself, the port captain and the civil engineer to examine and report 
upon the state of the vessel. 
 
   The honorable… 
    Your obedient servant, 
      The Colonial Secretary” (Erskine, 1868). 
 
It can thus be accepted that Lloyd’s had at least one Lloyd’s Agent in South Africa by the year 
1850.  It is possible an agent was appointed for the Cape port but no record has been found.  This 
agent may not have sold insurance as there is no evidence of George Cato having the authority to 
accept insurance business.  He was an agent appointed to look after Lloyd’s interests and keep it 
informed about ship movements and any other shipping intelligence. 
 
With the discovery of diamonds and gold and the development of the economy it can be accepted 
that insurance became a more integral part of the country’s commercial activity. 
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After Colonel Sir Henry Hozier
165
 pioneered wireless telegraphy at Lloyd’s in 1851 it was only a 
matter of time before Lloyd’s would get involved in wireless technology abroad.  This led to 
Lloyd’s having an involvement in the early establishment of wireless technology in South Africa 
(Baker, 1998: 5).  Edward Alfred Jennings, born in London, worked in the post office in the 
Cape Colony and later moved to Port Elizabeth, discovered wireless technology independently 
from others in the UK or USA.  In 1898 Jennings made experimental transmissions between the 
Bird Island Lighthouse and the mainland.  In the same year, Marquis of Graham visited South 
Africa for this experiment on behalf of Lloyd’s looking into how it could benefit safe travel at 
sea and “an agreement was reached between the Cape Government and Lloyd’s of London to 
establish wireless technology between Dassen Island and Robben Island, as well as between Bird 
Island and Port Elizabeth” (Baker, 1998: 6).  This wireless technology was used in the second 
Anglo-Boer war. 
 
By the year 1900 the Lloyd’s Patriotic Fund166 had established a Transvaal War Relief Fund for 
disabled men in South Africa indicating that Lloyd’s was indeed active and had grown in 
influence by 1900.  The number of men assisted in South Africa by this fund was 2199 in 1900, 
1854 in 1901, 2963 in 1902 and 1584 in 1903, many of the men being helped were also helped in 
subsequent years so some overlapping did occur (De Rougemont, 1904). 
 
An article published on the 15
th
 June 1904 recognises Lloyd’s technical expertise when it noted 
that: “Amongst the proposals to be brought before the present Congress of Chambers of 
Commerce are the recommendations for the general adoption of Lloyd’s form of Average Bond” 
(Anonymous, 1904a: 2).  Lloyd’s was clearly a significant force by the 1900s since efforts were 
made to bring it within the tax net, something which had long before befallen other foreign 
insurance companies operating in South Africa.  An article was written regarding governmental 
influence over the fire insurance industry noting that, in 1887, an Act was passed that all fire 
insurance companies who do not have an office in the Cape Colony were to make a deposit of 
£10 000.  Only foreign insurance companies were required to make this deposit and nothing was 
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required from local companies assuming that these had assets in the country.  In addition to the 
deposit foreign companies were obligated to pay a tax on their premium income.  The article 
then goes on to complain that “this taxation of fire business is now being placed at Lloyd’s in 
London, these underwriters paying nothing to the Cape Government for license or income tax, 
making no deposit, and requiring no stamps on their policies” (Anonymous, 1905: 106).  By 
1905 the Lloyd’s business in South Africa was sufficiently significant to trouble local companies 
as Lloyd’s was not liable for taxation, or needed to be licensed for the making of the deposit.  
Clearly this state of affairs could not endure forever. 
 
In January 1907, two years later, an article asserting that Lloyd’s covers many strange risks and 
will insure nearly everything at an appropriate premium (Anonymous, 1907: 8).  Many other 
articles exist in South African insurance magazines with discussions on Lloyd’s activities in 
London and the US
167
 however very few exist regarding its activities in South Africa.
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No specific documentary evidence has been found indicating when Lloyd’s in fact first started 
transacting insurance business in South Africa but from the snippets of information discussed 
above it can be seen that South Africa did have open communication channels with Lloyd’s as 
early as 1823 in Simon’s Bay as well as a Lloyd’s Agent, for gathering shipping intelligence, if 
nothing else, appointed in Port Natal was already present in South Africa as early as 1850.  Since 
the Cape Port was inexistence long before the Natal Port, having been established in 1652, it is 
more than possible that an agent had been appointed for the Cape Town port but this 
documentary evidence has not been found. 
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It is also clear that Lloyd’s as an insurer was well established in South Africa by the 1900s 
sufficiently so to trouble other companies who did not necessarily understand the modus 
operandi of Lloyd’s.  However, looking at the tone of the various articles, a sense of familiarity 
is portrayed about Lloyd’s as if Lloyd’s was not a new concept to the insurance industry.  This 
infers that Lloyd’s was present and active in South Africa certainly by 1850 and by 1900 was 
well-known throughout the South African industry as an acceptor of insurance risks. 
 
The first detailed mention of South African property actually being insured by Lloyd’s appears 
on the 4
th
 July 1913 where it was noted that Park Station as well as the Star offices in 
Johannesburg were insured against civil commotion risk at 10:30am for £17 000 at a premium of 
12s. 6d (Anonymous, 1913d: 1094).  Johannesburg was subject to considerable civil unrest 
during that period, which became known as the Rand Revolt, with marshal law being declared 
several times and the army being deployed to put down the unrest.  Judging by a further article 
insurance companies were unwilling to offer cover for civil commotion and due to an increase in 
civil unrest in South Africa around 1914 many turned to Lloyd’s for such cover (Anonymous, 
1914e: 1346).  Lloyd’s continues to provide cover against riots, mainly political riot risks, and it 
remains a significant source of their business (One Lime Street, 1993: 27; One Lime Street, 1996: 
12).  In February 1914 a Mr. Arthur Bray, Chairman of Bray, Gibbs and Co. Ltd, and 
representing Lloyd’s of London, was expected to visit South Africa (Anonymous, 1914b: 1236).  
Lloyd’s was sufficiently prominent by 1914 so that visits by Lloyd’s individuals to South Africa 
were noteworthy enough to justify a public announcement. 
 
6.4.2. Insurance Act of 1923 
 
As indicated Lloyd’s did not fall under legislation governing foreign insurers operating in South 
Africa, especially with respect to taxation, and this exclusion was a matter of debate with the 
other insurers operating in South Africa.  Lloyd’s was perceived as having an unfair advantage 
especially by commentators that may not have had a good understanding of Lloyd’s.  It is not 
surprising thus that the legislature showed an interest in Lloyd’s. 
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Before the Insurance Act of 1923 each province in South Africa had their own legislation 
regarding insurance.  Insurance companies had to be registered and licensed to carry on 
insurance business in every province and deposit money with the provincial treasury in each 
province.  All the various Acts
169
 were mainly focused on life insurance with very little being 
said about the then modern developments such as accident or marine insurance (Hansard, 1923: 
207).  It was realised that having different laws focusing only on life insurance was a very 
cumbersome process.  A Bill was introduced in 1915, published in the Gazette in 1918 and the 
Insurance Act No. 37 of 1923 was passed to consolidate the legislation of the individual 
provinces into one single Act encompassing all types of insurance business.  The Insurance Act 
of 1923 was modelled on the English Act of 1909 which applies to Life, accident, fire, 
employer’s liability and bond investment business (Hansard, 1923: 207; Spyrou, 1955: 330; 
Benfield, 1997: 574). 
 
Prior to the passing of the Insurance Act of 1923 Lloyd’s in South Africa was not regulated in 
terms of local legislation.  Unlike other foreign insurers they did not lodge a deposit or require a 
licence to operate and all premiums received went straight to London (Anonymous, 1905: 106).  
This situation did not sit well with other insurers who felt the playing field was not level.  As a 
consequence of not being part of the South African regulatory framework very little was known 
about the activities of Lloyd’s in the market. 
 
Lloyd’s is mentioned in the South African Hansard Parliamentary debates in April and June of 
1923.  The provisions of the Insurance Act of 1923 did not apply to Lloyd’s except for section 44 
and section 45 of the 1923 Act.  Intermediaries on behalf of or producing business into Lloyd’s 
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were therefore not included in the Insurance Act of 1923 except for these two sections if they 
chose to operate in South Africa (Hansard, 1923: col. 208). 
 
The Insurance Bill was on its way to being passed but for the Lloyd’s provisions which created a 
difference in opinions (Hansard, 1923: col. 395; Mills & Linton, 1923b: 1).  Not everyone was in 
favour of Section 44 as some individuals moved for the deletion of the clause while others 
lobbied for alterations.  Some members were against the operation of Lloyd’s in South Africa as 
it was felt that insurance should be placed with local insurance companies through local agents 
and in the event of a dispute could be sued under South African law.  Lloyd’s could not be sued 
in South Africa since all policies were issued by the members of Lloyd’s and not the corporation 
itself and members were under the jurisdiction of the English courts only.  Further arguments 
were that Lloyd’s members can conduct any line of business in South Africa without being 
subjected to other requirements of the Bill (Mills & Linton, 1923b: 24) and the inclusion of this 
section would allow Lloyd’s to compete with all other insurance companies in South Africa 
(foreign or local) which would be against the intended purpose of the Bill to protect 
policyholders and to provide an equitable framework for all companies. 
 
Counter arguments for the section to remain included: firstly, that without this specific provision 
Lloyd’s would not be able to trade in South Africa and the local market would lose expertise, 
capacity and competition that the market needed.  Freedom of trade is very important and 
allowing people to insure with Lloyd’s is part of that freedom.  Secondly, Lloyd’s can insure 
many large risks that other insurers would not (Mills & Linton, 1923b: 24; Anonymous, 1924b: 
15; Hansard, 1943, col. 4533). 
 
A decision had to be made based on what was most convenient for the country.  Lloyd’s offers 
insurance for many risks which no other insurance company offered and it would be convenient 
for the country to have Lloyd’s in South Africa where these difficult risks could be placed.  It 
was a benefit to have a world-renowned institution like Lloyd’s choosing to do business in South 
Africa as it was, and still is, an icon of absolute reliability.  All arguments had merit and serious 
consideration had to be given to both sides.  The prevalent opinion, however, was that the 
deletion of section 44 would rule out Lloyd’s, its agents and underwriters who now lived in 
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South Africa and this would not be good for the insurance industry (Hansard, 1923, col. 396; 
Mills & Linton, 1923b: 24). 
 
Initially Lloyd’s underwriters may not have been too worried about foreign legislation however 
they soon realised that this could be a matter of concern as many countries passed legislation 
requiring foreign insurance companies to provide a deposit.
170
  South Africa was one such 
country.  The first perceived problem, in South Africa, was that Lloyd’s could offer business 
without any clear security to pay claims should they arise, which would be covered if these 
agents lodged a deposit.  To solve this problem, s44 of the 1923 Insurance Act required each 
Lloyd’s Agent to lodge with the Treasury a deposit of £2000 (R4000).  A distinction was made 
in the Bill allowing the Lloyd’s underwriters to only pay a deposit of £2000 while insurance 
companies had to pay a deposit of £10 000.  This was criticized by some during the Hansard 
debates.  A prevalent view was that policyholders should receive as much protection as possible 
and an actuarial evaluation should be used to determine the amount of deposit required.  Some 
thought that Lloyd’s should be treated in a harsher manner when compared to local companies 
(Mills & Linton, 1923b: 24).  Other opinions ranged from Lloyd’s not receiving any preferential 
treatment (Hansard, 1923, col. 209), if Lloyd’s was allowed to remain in South Africa it would 
have to be on the same conditions as any other concern as well as the same requirements and 
restrictions to create fair competition (Hansard, 1923, col. 396). 
 
The second problem, the lack of financial disclosure from insurers, was solved by the 
requirement to lodge annual financial information with the Treasury.  Safeguards were put in 
place that all insurance companies must comply with i.e. giving full information about their 
financial position to the public.  It was important to have the same safeguards in the case of 
Lloyd’s of London (Hansard, 1923: col. 208). 
 
Looking at the Insurance Act of 1923 the Lloyd’s provisions did survive the scrutiny and debate 
they received in parliament.  After the Hansard discussions the following remained: 
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 For a more detailed discussion on foreign legislation refer to 4.1.17 above. 
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Chapter 2 Part (d) of the Act is for Insurances by Members of Lloyd’s and of similar 
Associations of Individual Underwriters.
171
  Section 44 sets out the requirements that have to be 
complied with by all Lloyd’s agents: 
 Within 6 months of commencing business, the insurer must deposit and keep depositing 
(as long as he transacts business) money or approved securities or both to the value of 
£2000 (R4000).  S8 – S12 of this Act shall apply to such deposits.172  The proposal of 
reducing the deposit from £5000 to £2000 was implemented (S.C, 1943, 2). 
 Person carrying out insurance business in the Union has to be licensed as provided by law 
and made the deposit in accordance with the point above.
173
 
 Must have an office in the Union with the address of such office to be provided to the 
Treasury.  If any legal proceedings were to take place involving the insurer this address 
will be used for communication purposes.
174
 
 Provide the Treasury, within 6 months after the expiry of each calendar year, a statement 
for each year in a prescribed format.  The insurer has to show premiums received for the 
year and the claims paid.
175
  Thus forcing Lloyd’s to make financial disclosure. 
 Failure to comply with these requirements shall lead to the insurer being guilty of an 
offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding £50 in respect of each 
transaction.
176
 
 
Section 45 of the Act was the supplementary provision which stated that: any company or 
individual transacting insurance business in the Union on behalf of Lloyd’s must obtain a license 
for each and every year from the receiver of revenue on the production of a certificate from the 
Treasury that the issue of license is authorized.  A payment of £50 was required for the license.  
If the company or individual only started transacting insurance business in August then a 
payment of £25 is required for that initial year followed by £50 in subsequent years.  The license 
expired on the 31
st
 of December of each year.  Section 45 also required Lloyd’s to have 
domicilium citandi (have to be domiciled in South Africa with a permanent address) in the 
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 Insurance Act No. 37 of 1923. 
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 S44(2) of Insurance Act No. 37 of 1923. 
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 S44(1). 
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 S44(3). 
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 S44(4). 
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 S44(5). 
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Union.  Statements of premiums that Lloyd’s receives from South African policyholders, any 
statements of claim payments made to South African policyholders and any statements of 
commissions paid out by Lloyd’s to South Africans must be lodged with the Treasury (Hansard, 
1923, col. 208). 
 
The passing of this specific legislation regulating Lloyd’s is a clear indication that Lloyd’s 
played a significantly important role in South Africa by the year 1923 to warrant the attention of 
the authorities including discussions in parliament and government expressing concern as to how 
Lloyd’s would affects the local insurance market. 
 
After the passing of the Insurance Act of 1923 more articles appeared about Lloyd’s in various 
South African insurance magazines the majority of the articles however, were regarding Lloyd’s 
in the US, Europe and the UK
177
 with very few on Lloyd’s in South Africa,178 Nairobi179and a 
singular article on Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania.
180
 
 
In 1923 Lloyd’s insured all of the buildings of the Johannesburg municipality.  They were able to 
secure these insurance contracts as they were able to quote lower rates than other insurers 
(Hansard, 1923: 396; Mills & Linton, 1923b: 24).  The local market was of the opinion that they 
could do so because of the uneven playing fields however new legislation had already levelled 
the playing fields. 
 
One article worth mentioning was published in September 1925 in the African Insurance Record 
stating that Mr A Hunter, a well known insurance expert in Cape Town had just secured agency 
for a group of underwriters at Lloyd’s and was transacting business for those underwriters 
(Anonymous, 1925c: 21).  By 1926 Lloyd’s was present in South Africa but did not dominate the 
market.  Life insurance had the highest premium annual income in the Union at £3 663 000, 
followed by fire at £605 000, Workmen’s compensation at £289 000, motor at £265 000, 
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personal accident at £102 000 with the representatives of a group of underwriters at Lloyd’s only 
receiving £15 000 (Anonymous, 1927: 1). 
 
6.4.3. Insurance Act of 1943 
 
Further changes were proposed which were contained in the 1943 Insurance Act.  This time the 
matter was referred to a Select Parliamentary Committee.  Lloyd’s thought the legislative 
proposals were sufficiently important to send a delegation to South Africa to appear before the 
Select Committee established to review the legislation.  The matter was discussed in Parliament 
and is reported in the Hansard.  The debate ended in the passing of the Lloyd’s provisions in the 
1943 Insurance Act.  Lloyd’s was licensed by the 1943 Insurance Act to carry on short term 
business in South Africa.  This was a unique position for Lloyd’s as it was, and still is, the only 
non-domiciled insurer to hold such a position (One Lime Street, 1993: 27; One Lime Street, 
1996: 12) and have its own provisions in South African legislation. 
 
A Bill was introduced in 1941 and the Insurance Act of 1923 was amended in 1943 (Hansard, 
1943: 4542; Spyrou, 1955: 331).  This Bill was as a consequence of the public which felt that the 
insurance industry needed to be better regulated and better controlled (Hansard, 1943: 4548).  As 
mentioned above, the Insurance Act of 1923 was based on the English principles of 1909 but had 
not taken into account the amendments done by England in Acts passed in 1933 or in 1935 
which have adapted the laws of 1909.  The South African Insurance Act did not take into account 
any of these changes.  “The underlying principle of (our insurance law) is that of the minimum of 
interference with the maximum of publicity” (Hansard, 1943: 4518) or freedom with publicity 
(Benfield, 1997: 568).  The insurance companies had complete freedom in return for submitting 
annual returns to the Treasury as well as having actuarial investigations at least every 5 years.  
However, this did not offer adequate protection for the policyholder as many did not read the 
annual financial reports and they were not easy to understand.  If an insurer does fall into 
financial distress there is nothing the Treasury can do unless the insurer has failed to comply 
with one of the requirements of the Act.  The Bill of 1943 was an attempt to correct these 
shortcomings and provide better protection for the policyholder (Hansard, 1943: 4519). 
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This Bill can be “described as the Bill of the two R’s, the Registrar and the Regulations” 
(Hansard, 1943: col. 4529).  It was suggested that an office of the Registrar of Insurance be 
created giving him the power to investigate the affairs of a registered insurer if the need should 
arise (Hansard, 1943: col. 4522).  The Registrar would have supreme power over matters under 
the Bill, one of which would be the power to appoint officials.  Since the government does not 
have the time or manpower to watch over the insurance industry, the formation of a Registrar is 
essential to oversee the regulation and smooth running of the industry.  The powers given to the 
Registrar have to be wide to allow him to efficiently fulfil his duties with a safeguard in place 
requiring the Registrar to have the approval of the minister for any action to be taken.  Some 
members agreed with the necessity for the creation of a Registrar but were uncomfortable with 
the wide scope of powers given therefore the decisions made by the Registrar must have the 
possibility of appeal to the Minister (Hansard, 1943: col. 4553, 4537). 
 
Consideration was given to the idea of creating two separate Acts i.e. one for short term 
insurance such as fire, accident marine etc and one for life insurance.  It was decided that it was 
too soon for such drastic changes as many provisions overlap between the two types of 
insurance.  It was recommended that such a decision be postponed for two or three years giving 
companies the opportunity to be properly domiciled in South Africa under this Bill and an 
experiment be conducted to see if the Bill is adequate for both short term and life insurance 
before any changes are made (Hansard, 1943: col. 4536).  Agreement was reached that now was 
not the time to do anything except bring in one comprehensive Bill to deal with insurance 
business as a whole (Hansard, 1943: col. 4545). 
 
In February 1943 the Select Committee (S.C.) naturally discussed the Insurance Bill before it 
was presented to parliament.  Lloyd’s sent two representatives from the UK to represent Lloyd’s 
views.  These were Messrs. T.L. Forbes and C.S. Hutchinson and their testimony was scrutinized 
by the Select Committee which recognised them as representatives of the Committee of Lloyd’s 
(S.C, 1943: viii).  This is the first evidence of Lloyd’s sending individuals to represent their 
views.  The following requirements were imposed: Firstly, the deposit made by each agent was 
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increased from £2 000 (R4 000) to £5 000 (R10 000).
181
  Secondly, in addition to the deposits 
made by the agents Lloyd’s as a society made a lump sum deposit of £30 000 (R60 000)182 which 
was unusual since the institution of Lloyd’s did not at that stage stand surety for individual 
syndicates.  It is specifically this problem which the Society of Lloyd’s tried to solve183.  Thirdly, 
s60 would impose a tax on Lloyd’s since up until this point Lloyd’s paid no tax in South Africa.  
The proposal was that Lloyd’s agents would to pay 2.5% of the aggregate premium income due 
to Lloyd’s to the Treasury.184 
 
During this meeting of the S.C. the Lloyd’s representatives conceded that Lloyd’s policies would 
be subject to South African jurisdiction with respect to payments under any South African 
Lloyd’s policies (S.C, 1943: 13).  A provision was inserted into the 1943 Bill allowing Lloyd’s 
to be sued in South Africa without the plaintiff having to go to England in the case of a dispute 
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 The two representatives sent by Lloyd’s had the following comment for the increase from R4000 to R10 000.  
Since, in 1943, there were already 8 Lloyd’s agents/brokers in South Africa (S.C, 1943: 3, 9), each broker would be 
paying a deposit of £10 000 leaving the Government with £80 000 as security.  However, the amount of £80 000 is 
not global and the whole amount could not be used if one underwriter defaults on his payment.  Each £10 000 
belongs to each broker working on behalf of one underwriter; if that underwriter defaults on payment only £10 000 
would be available for that particular underwriter.  In addition this requirement would make it difficult to increase 
the number of agents coming to South Africa if they were required to immediately pay £10 000 upon arrival 
(Hansard, 1943: col. 4526).  Asking each broker to deposit £10 000 would be discriminating against Lloyd’s brokers 
seeing as a local insurance company only had to pay one lump sum deposit of £30 000 irrespective of the number of 
agents or branches that company might have whereas Lloyd’s would be required to pay per agent (S.C, 1943: 4, 9, 
11).  The Lloyd’s representatives also pointed out that if there were to be only 2 brokers in South Africa accepting 
all of Lloyd’s business, Lloyd’s would still get the same amount of business as with 8 brokers but South Africa 
would only receive a deposit of £20 000.  This would be a disadvantage for South Africa (S.C, 1943: 2, 9). 
182
 A further amendment was proposed to change the once off deposit paid by Lloyd’s of £30 000 to £200 000.  
Lloyd’s should continue to exist in South Africa but must not be allowed to expand too much in detriment to local 
companies.  Lloyd’s should be allowed to offer specialised insurance that is not offered locally but should be 
restrained from directly competing in other areas of insurance that are offered by other companies.  The economic 
situation would be very uncertain after WWII and as much protection as possible should be given to policyholders.  
Local companies would be put on a more equal footing if Lloyd’s was required to keep as much security as they 
were (Hansard, 1943, col. 5322).  The Minister of Finance was of a different opinion as he felt that the current 
legislation was already making it substantially more difficult for Lloyd’s to exist in South Africa compared to local 
companies.  Lloyd’s Agents have to pay deposits of £2000 and the Society of Lloyd’s a deposit of £30 000.  More 
obstacles were not needed.  The amendment was put to a vote with a result of 57 votes against the amendment with 
32 votes for the amendment.  The amendment of increasing the deposit to £200 000 was therefore not enforced. 
183
 Refer to 4.1.17 above. 
184
 The idea of a premium tax was not new to South Africa as the Cape imposed a tax on foreign companies 63 years 
previously (Spyrou, 1955: 327).  Around 1880 foreign companies began expanding into fire insurance in South 
Africa.  In the beginning the foreign companies increased their premiums in order to make a profit and wanted the 
local companies to do the same.  Local companies refused and a “rate war” began (Spyrou, 1955: 327; MacIntyre, 
1898: 9).  Local government, to put a stop to this, imposed a tax on foreign companies’ premium income of 6d in the 
pound. 
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(Hansard, 1943: col. 4532).  These were matters that the Society of Lloyd’s had understood 
would be needed when transacting business in a foreign country. 
 
Section 60 allowed Lloyd’s underwriters to accept insurance business in South Africa (Gibson, 
1988: 4).  South African registered brokers approved by Lloyd’s were also required to comply 
with section 60 (Napier, 1988: 14).  Thereby through the Insurance Act of 1943 Lloyd’s was 
licensed to do business in South Africa (Cover, 1996c: 14). 
 
In 1943 the South African insurance market needed an additional outlet for some of the 
insurance risks it was facing.  Lloyd’s was needed to provide such insurance cover.  Insurance is 
an international business and South Africa is unable to keep all of its risks within its borders so 
the presence of Lloyd’s is still needed for reinsurance, large risks and the placing of special risks.  
Lloyd’s is able to provide healthy competition for South African insurers (Hansard, 1966: col. 
3086-3088). 
 
6.4.4. 1966 Amendments to the Short Term Insurance Act 
 
An objective behind the 1966 amendment were the events that followed after Rhodesia (now 
known as Zimbabwe) had unilaterally declared independence (UDI).  Because of this declaration 
of independence, as part of the economic sanctions levied against Rhodesia by the United 
Kingdom, Lloyd’s was prohibited from paying claims in Rhodesia despite having collected 
premiums and having a contractual obligation to do so.  This left Rhodesian policyholders with 
unpaid claims.
185
  Short- term insurance is exposed to political intervention as shown through 
Rhodesia and Lloyd’s (Dielmann, 1989: 12).  The South African government did not want to 
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 Southern Rhodesia, through the Rhodesian Front (RF) led by Ian Smith, wanted independence after the collapse 
of the Federation between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.  The British government, led by 
Mr. Wilson, refused to give Rhodesia independence until certain conditions were met.  Rhodesia had to show that 
the views freely supported by the population where that of the RF i.e. that the majority of the population wanted 
independence.  This was to be done through the implementation of majority rule (one man one vote).  Ian Smith 
opposed this policy as it was not the custom of the tribal rulers in Rhodesia.  Britain refused to grant Rhodesia 
independence nevertheless Rhodesia declared independence on the 11
th
 November 1965.  This was followed by 
sanctions imposed by Britain.  Mr. Wilson instructed the Bank of England to seize Rhodesian funds and Lloyd’s to 
refuse payment on Rhodesian claims.  Six months after the declaration of UDI talks began between London and 
Rhodesia.  Only on the 2
nd
 of March 1970 was Rhodesia declared a Republic and finally severed all connections 
with Britain (Reed, 1967: 41, 53; Smith, 2001: 112). 
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face the same difficulties in South Africa and revised the legislation dealing with the operation of 
Lloyd’s in South Africa.  Several fundamental changes were introduced.  As an aside it is 
pointed out, as emphasised by the former Lloyd’s representative in South Africa, that in the end 
all Rhodesian claims were eventually paid.  This took place as soon as the British government 
lifted the sanctions (Napier, 2009; Hansard, 1966: col. 3092). 
 
The aim of the 1966 amendment to the Insurance Act of 1943 was to introduce a new basis for 
Lloyd’s underwriters to carry on insurance business in South Africa.  The 1943 Act had 
permitted Lloyd’s to do business in South Africa without the need to hold any assets in the 
country except for the lump sum deposit of R60 000 and the deposit of R10 000 made by each 
Lloyd’s agent.186  In 1966 Lloyd’s had 25 agents in South Africa providing the Treasury with 
R250 000 in total deposits. 
 
Through the 1966 Amendment Act the deposit of R10 000 was increased to R20 000 for each 
agent trading in South Africa, doubling the total deposits to R500 000 (Hansard, 1966: col. 3088-
3091).  The deposit of R20 000 either in money or approved securities needed to be made within 
6 months of commencing business in South Africa by any person authorized by the Committee 
of Lloyd’s to act on behalf of Lloyd’s in South Africa187 (Napier, 1988: 14; Alston, 1992b: 15).  
If the value of that deposit drops below R20 000 for any reason that person has to immediately 
discontinue issuing Lloyd’s policies and collecting premiums until such time the deposit is 
increased back to R20 000.
188
  If the person transacting insurance business on behalf of Lloyd’s 
ceases to transact business in South Africa the Treasury shall return the deposit of R20 000.
189
 
 
Two fundamental changes were implemented, firstly the government wanted someone in South 
Africa to represent Lloyd’s and the position of the General Lloyd’s Representative was mandated 
and secondly, to ensure that current claims could be paid the South African Deposit
190
 was 
created into which Lloyd’s premiums had to be deposited and from which claims and expenses 
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paid.  The operation of the deposit ensured that henceforth, sufficient funds were kept in South 
Africa to pay claims.  The Lloyd’s representative and the deposit are discussed below. 
 
6.4.4.1. Lloyd’s General Representative and Lloyd’s Offices 
 
Depending on the market and the size of the business Lloyd’s determines what type of 
representation is required in the respective market.  Lloyd’s has four categories of representative 
offices.  A category 4 office is one where the representative is an independent third party; a well 
respected individual in the country which provides basic services to Lloyd’s.  These services 
include discharging Lloyd’s obligations under the Insurance Act i.e. to adjust any deposits when 
notified and to send in annual returns, usually operating from their usual place of business.  A 
category 3 representative office performs more functions depending on the size of the market and 
how much business Lloyd’s underwriters’ transact in that market.  This is followed by a category 
2 office and Lloyd’s South Africa falls into this category.  Lloyd’s licence in South Africa offers 
a variable distribution model and it is a key market for Lloyd’s which has been established for 
many years.  However, there is no trading platform on the ground where insurance business can 
be transacted with Lloyd’s underwriters directly other than through Lloyd’s service companies 
such as Kiln SA.  The final category is a category 1 type of operation such as Lloyd’s Asia based 
in Singapore.  This can be viewed as a mini Lloyd’s of London in the country with Lloyd’s 
managing agents co-locating with Lloyd’s and Lloyd’sunderwriters sitting in one location where 
local brokers bring their risks to be underwritten (Khilosia, 2010). 
 
S57 of the Short Term Insurance Act of 1998 requires that Lloyd’s appoint a natural person as a 
representative of Lloyd’s and a deputy representative to act on behalf of the representative if he 
is unavailable.
191
  Both individuals have to be fit and proper to hold the positions of 
representative and deputy representative.
192
  The appointment has to be approved by the 
Registrar
193
 subject to any conditions he may have.
194
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 S57(1) of the Short Term Insurance Act No 53 of 1998; Havenga (2001: 161). 
192
 S57(4). 
193
 S57(2). 
194
 S57(3). 
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The first South African general representative of Lloyd’s was appointed on the 15th March 1966 
who was Michael Barry, from the leading legal firm WWB.
195
 From the letter dated 9
th
 March 
1966 from the Chairman of Lloyd’s addressed to Michael Barry with a proviso that he could not 
also accept a seat on the board of any insurance company or act as an insurance broker 
(Chairman of Lloyd’s, 1966; Barry, 1966).  His duties were, inter alia, to liaise between Lloyd’s 
and the South African government, supervise the financial arrangements made by Lloyd’s in 
South Africa, to assist in safeguarding Lloyd’s business in the republic and to inform Lloyd’s of 
any issues that arise which might affect Lloyd’s underwriting interests.  The remuneration would 
be the form of an annual retainer to be reviewed after one year (Chairman of Lloyd’s, 1966). 
 
Ronnie Napier, senior partner of WWB, became the deputy to Michael Barry from 1970 when 
South Africa required for a deputy to be appointed (Ronnie, 2010; Financial Mail, 1986: 67).  In 
June 1984 Michael Barry entered into negotiations with Lloyd’s as to who should be the general 
representative to succeed him.  During discussions with Ken Goddard (Michael Barry’s superior 
in WBB) it was decided that the person who was to be chosen would unlikely be from the 
insurance industry as it would be difficult to get someone in an important position to take on 
additional responsibilities.  No regard to race or religion but the individual would have to be a 
professional person with an international perspective.  It was decided to recommend to Lloyd’s 
that a partner from WWB would be appointed.  Ronnie Napier was considered as he was the 
deputy at that time and was familiar with the duties to be performed (Barry, 1984).  Ronnie 
Napier was appointed the General Representative of Lloyd’s in South Africa in July 1986 on the 
tragic death of Michael Barry (Cockell, 1986). 
 
S60 of the Insurance Act of 1943 as well as the terms of reference given to Ronnie Napier laid 
down the statutory obligations that applied to the South African general representative of Lloyd’s 
(Napier, 1986; Napier: 1988: 14-16).  The committee of Lloyd’s has to appoint a natural person 
authorized to act on behalf of the committee as well as the underwriters of Lloyd’s and the 
general representative has to report to the Council of Lloyd’s.  Any legal proceedings against an 
underwriter of Lloyd’s may be served to the address of the general representative in South 
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Africa; the general representative is to sue or be sued on behalf of Lloyd’s underwriters in their 
capacity as licensed South African insurers
196
 (Napier, 1988: 14).  The representative’s name is 
to be cited as the defendant or respondent on behalf of Lloyd’s and any summons may be served 
on him.
197
  The representative may conduct any proceedings on behalf of Lloyd’s in his name as 
the plaintiff or applicant regarding any short term insurance policies in South Africa.
198
  The 
summons is sent to the office of the general representative who in turn sends it to London where 
further instructions would be received as to how the matter should be handled (Napier, 2009; 
Sibanda, 2010; McGovern, Levene, Sibanda, 2008).  A Lloyd’s representative must have an 
office in South Africa,
199
 notify the registrar of the principal address of business
200
 and any 
changes in address that may occur.
201
 
 
The general representative on behalf of the committee of Lloyd’s is required to open up a trust 
account with a banking institution in South Africa and has to deposit 130% of all premiums 
received from South African business less certain deductions; supervise the operation of bank 
accounts in the name of Lloyd’s underwriters; has to deal with any complaints from 
policyholders, brokers or any other parties involved with Lloyd’s underwriters.  Such complaints 
are then referred to Lloyd’s in London; has to act in the best interests of South African Names, 
provide assistance to such members and liaise with the Lloyd’s South African Members 
Association; is required to issue Sasria and Nasria coupon policies on a daily basis on the 
instruction from brokers; liaise with the South African Insurance Association (Saia) and the 
South African Insurance Brokers Association (Saiba) regarding matters of common interest 
between Lloyd’s and the South African insurance market; liaise with the Registrar of Insurance 
on a regular basis to keep the Registrar informed of any developments at Lloyd’s; advise Lloyd’s 
of any legislative changes in the South African market that may affect the position of Lloyd’s in 
South Africa; maintain contact with South African authorities to promote and further Lloyd’s in 
South Africa; to liaise with the London Market Associations when required; maintain records 
required to be kept in compliance with insurance legislation; protect and service the Lloyd’s 
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Underwriters’ Licence in South Africa; further develop Lloyd’s underwriters interests in South 
Africa; and have annual visits to Lloyd’s to keep up to date with any changes made by Lloyd’s 
that will affect the South African insurance market.  These duties are subject to annual review by 
the Committee of Lloyd’s (Havenga, 2001: 162 - 164). 
 
Ronnie Napier retired in 2007 after 21 years of being the South African representative of Lloyd’s 
and his successor, Litha Mveliso Nyhonyha was appointed for a period of only three months 
(Cover, 2007a: 67; Napier, 2010; Sutherland, 2007: 1).  The current general representative of 
Lloyd’s is John Sibanda who was appointed as such on the 7th of August 2008 (McGovern, 
Levene & Sibanda, 2008: 1). 
 
John Sibanda’s duties and responsibilities overlap with that of Ronnie Napier’s to some extent 
but also differ in some regards.  Napier was only responsible for regulatory delegatory issues 
within South Africa (Sibanda, 2010).  Napier dealt heavily with South African Names whereas 
Sibanda has no responsibility to the Names.  He represents the Names to the underwriters but the 
contract is between himself, the Society of Lloyd’s, the underwriters and the Lloyd’s office in 
South Africa and not with Names (McGovern, Levene & Sibanda, 2008: 1).  This is a part time 
non-executive role allowing John Sibanda to have other interests
202
 (McGovern, Levene & 
Sibanda, 2008: 8; Sibanda, 2010). 
 
The main duty of John Sibanda as the general representative is to represent Lloyd’s and 
underwriters at Lloyd’s with all dealings with South African authorities and third parties.  Other 
functions include: Ensure compliance with all legal regulations and requirements regarding 
Lloyd’s i.e. the Short Term Insurance Act No. 53 of 1998.203  Ensure that the trustees of the 
Lloyd’s South African Transitional Trust (LSATT) and the Lloyd’s South African Trust Deed 
(LSATD) comply with these trust deeds.
204
  Carry out instructions from Lloyd’s and if no 
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instruction is forthcoming to act in a way that is reasonable, loyal and most beneficial to Lloyd’s.  
The general representative also reports to the Lloyd’s Director of International Markets and keep 
in daily contact with the Lloyd’s office in South Africa.  From time to time the representative has 
to manage the relationship between South African government officials and Lloyd’s, the 
relationship between South African businesses and Lloyd’s, as well as representing Lloyd’s and 
speaking on their behalf at agreed events (McGovern, Levene & Sibanda, 2008: 7-8).  The role 
profile is “to support, enhance and promote the interests of Lloyd’s in South Africa and to ensure 
that Lloyd’s is, and is perceived to be, a positive and dynamic corporate citizen and a strong 
contributor to the South African economy” (McGovern, Levene & Sibanda, 2008: 8). 
 
6.4.4.2. The South African Deposit 
 
A Trust account was set-up in South Africa in the name of the General Representative.
205
  
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, acting through the South African representative, had to maintain a 
deposit with a banking institution or invest in other South African assets up to 70% of net 
premiums
206’207 (less return premiums, the 2.5% required tax on aggregate premiums of each 
agent and any commissions received from policies).  These assets, together with the deposit 
given to the Treasury by Lloyd’s agents (R20 000 deposited by each agent) and premiums still 
held by agents before payment of such premiums is made to Lloyd’s (such premiums held in 
South Africa are equal to 3 months net premiums at any one time) are used as collateral for any 
outstanding liabilities incurred in South Africa by Lloyd’s underwriters208 as well as to satisfy 
any judgements made in South Africa.
209
  These assets and deposits must be held under the 
control of the South African Representative of Lloyd’s.210.  Withdrawals from these funds may 
only take place after the expiry of a 12 month period allowing the funds to build-up for Lloyd’s 
to have enough assets in South Africa for outstanding claims (Hansard, 1966, col. 3089). 
 
                                                 
205
 S60(1)(i) of the 1943 Insurance Act. 
206
 Shaw (1988: 21); Williams (1991: 32); Alston (1992b: 15); Havenga (2001: 150). 
207
 Registrar of insurance, Twenty third Annual report 1967. 
208
 S60(1)(o)(i). 
209
 S60(1)(o)(ii). 
210
 S60(1)(l) & S60(1)(m). 
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This percentage was later changed to 130% 
211
 of all premiums (Shaw, 1988: 21; Williams, 
1991: 32; Alston, 1992b: 15).  Underwriters at Lloyd’s, had to deposit 130% of all premiums 
into the trust account in South Africa
212
 (Napier, 1988: 14).  This deposit had to be made on the 
first day of every month from the commencement of the Insurance Amendment Act 1966.
213
  
The amount of money held in the trust fund was recently changed from a premium based 
calculation (130% of all premiums) to an outstanding claims basis.  Since 1999 the funds have 
been be maintained based on known outstanding claims, allowing a substantial amount of funds 
being released.  This forgoes the problem of a sudden drop in funds if Lloyd’s was to ever stop 
writing insurance business in South Africa (One Lime Street, 1997: 4; One Lime Street, 1998: 20; 
Khilosia, 2010). 
 
If an asset in the trust account is sold, the proceeds of the sale must be placed into the trust 
account.
214
  Any information regarding the trust fund and any assets held must be disclosed to 
the Registrar of Insurance.
215
  The amount that can be withdrawn from the account cannot exceed 
the money originally deposited in that month plus any investment gains.
216
  In 1988 there was 
approximately R300 million in the trust account (Napier, 1988: 14). 
 
The trust account which was set up by the 1966 Insurance Amendment Act was replaced, by the 
Short Term Insurance Act No. 53 of 1998 by the creation of two trust funds.
217
  Lloyd’s was 
required to create the Lloyd’s South African Transitional Trust as well as the Lloyd’s South 
African Trust to be used as such security.
218
  The Lloyd’s South African Trust fund is where all 
securities are to be placed for any policies that commence cover from 1 January 1999 onwards, 
and the Lloyd’s South African Transitional Trust where all securities are to be placed for any 
polices that commenced prior to and including 31 December 1998.  If, however, a policy is 
reinsured through the RITC process into the 1999 year it will be placed in the Lloyd’s South 
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 s60(j)(i) of the Insurance Act of 1943. 
212
 S60(1)(j)(i) of the Insurance Act of 1943. 
213
 S60(1)(j)(ii) of the Insurance Act of 1943. 
214
 S60(1)(o)(iii) of the Insurance Act of 1943. 
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African Trust.  Lloyd's correspondents no longer submit individual returns to the FSB but to the 
Lloyd's South Africa directly. 
 
The underwriter involved in South African short term insurance policies is exposed to several 
and not joint and several liability.  Therefore any contributions made into the fund by an 
underwriter can only be used to pay for the liabilities of that individual underwriter and not for 
the liabilities of other underwriter’s part of this fund (Lloyd’s South African Trust Deed, 1999, 
D). 
 
Therefore the South African trust fund is an additional form of security on a Lloyd’s policy.  If a 
South African policyholder has a claim against a Lloyd’s policy there are many levels of 
security: firstly the premium trust fund, secondly deposits and personal reserves, thirdly the 
Names certified means, fourthly the Lloyd’s central reserve fund and finally, if none of the above 
avenues are able to pay the claim then only does Lloyd’s turn to the South African trust fund 
(Williams, 1991a, 32; Havenga, 2001: 152). 
 
Table 3: Assets held in the trust fund(s) from the year 1968 till 2009 
 
Year 
Nominal Value 
(R) 
Rounded Nominal 
Value (R'000) 
Extrapolated 
Nominal Value 
(R'000) 
Inflation Rate 
Coefficient 
Real Value 
(R'000) 
2009 1,759,000,000 1,759,000 1,759,000 0.58 1,020,220 
2008 1,561,000,000 1,561,000 1,561,000 0.63 975,625 
2007 1,381,000,000 1,381,000 1,381,000 0.70 962,369 
2006 1,438,000,000 1,438,000 1,438,000 0.75 1,073,134 
2005 1,401,000,000 1,401,000 1,401,000 0.78 1,094,531 
2004 1,355,000,000 1,355,000 1,355,000 0.81 1,094,507 
2003 1,266,000,000 1,266,000 1,266,000 0.82 1,036,855 
2002 1,123,000,000 1,123,000 1,123,000 0.87 973,137 
2001 1,322,000,000 1,322,000 1,322,000 0.95 1,250,710 
2000 1,130,000,000 1,130,000 1,130,000 1.00 1,130,000 
1999 971,000,000 971,000 971,000 1.05 1,023,182 
1998 828,000,000 828,000 828,000 1.18 981,043 
1997 592,709,000 592,709 592,709 1.11 657,105 
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Year 
Nominal Value 
(R) 
Rounded Nominal 
Value (R'000) 
Extrapolated 
Nominal Value 
(R'000) 
Inflation Rate 
Coefficient 
Real Value 
(R'000) 
1996 542,681,000 542,681 542,681 1.29 698,431 
1995 
  
544,187 1.38 751,640 
1994 
  
545,694 1.50 819,360 
1993 547,200,000 547,200 547,200 1.63 894,118 
1992 731,551,000 731,551 731,551 1.80 1,313,377 
1991 659,651,000 659,651 659,651 2.04 1,346,227 
1990 482,647,585 482,648 482,648 2.36 1,138,321 
1989 394,952,766 394,953 394,953 2.70 1,064,563 
1988 327,024,951 327,025 327,025 3.09 1,009,336 
1987 259,431,156 259,432 259,432 3.48 903,944 
1986 222,901,196 222,902 222,902 4.05 902,437 
1985 197,720,964 197,721 197,721 4.81 950,582 
1984 132,507,557 132,508 132,508 5.59 740,268 
1983 73,144,695 73,145 73,145 6.21 454,317 
1982 29,321,693 29,322 29,322 6.99 205,049 
1981 22,336,031 22,337 22,337 8.00 178,696 
1980 17,594,417 17,595 17,595 9.26 162,917 
1979 18,187,075 18,188 18,188 10.53 191,453 
1978 16,648,665 16,649 16,649 11.90 198,202 
1977 13,043,921 13,044 13,044 13.16 171,632 
1976 13,509,262 13,510 13,510 14.71 198,676 
1975 10,753,262 10,754 10,754 16.39 176,295 
1974 7,926,545 7,927 7,927 18.52 146,796 
1973 5,213,166 5,214 5,214 20.83 108,625 
1972 4,143,749 4,144 4,144 22.73 94,182 
1971 3,902,094 3,903 3,903 23.81 92,929 
1970 3,782,916 3,783 3,783 25.64 97,000 
1969 3,727,403 3,728 3,728 27.03 100,757 
1968 3,727,000 3,727 3,727 27.78 103,528 
 
Source: Summaries of Returns Deposited with the Treasury 1925 – 1940; Annual Reports of the 
Registrar of Insurance 1950 – 1997 & FSB Annual Reports of the Registrar of Short 
Term Insurance 1998 – 2007. 
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Note: The total of the two new trust funds is shown above from the year 1998 till 2009.
219
 
 
The amount of assets held by Lloyd’s in South Africa has grown from a real value of R103 528 
000 in 1968 to R1 020 220 000 in 2009. 
 
Graph 1: Assets held in the Trust Fund(s) from 1968 to 2009 
 
 
 
Another issue targeted in the Hansard Parliamentary debates was the 2.5% of its gross premium 
income Lloyd’s had to pay in South Africa as decided in 1943.  Since 1943 taxes in South Africa 
had undergone considerable changes and have increased forcing local companies to pay higher 
taxes.  However, the separate provision for Lloyd’s of 2.5% of gross premiums had never been 
changed in line with the increasing tax rates.  An increase from the 2.5% was proposed (Hansard, 
1966: col. 3093) but it was not increased and remained at 2.5%
220
 until it was repealed in January 
2002.
221
 
                                                 
219
 1998 FSB reports, p9. 
220
 S60(1)(f) of the Insurance Act of 1943. 
221
 Refer to 7.6 below. 
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Any person authorised to transact insurance business on behalf of Lloyd’s has to have an office 
in the Republic of South Africa where any legal process can be served.  The policy issued to 
policyholders must clearly state the currency in which premiums and claims are to be paid
222
 as 
well as the name and address of the where the premiums and claims are to be paid.
223
  No person 
shall offer or renew insurance business through a broker which is not underwritten by a Lloyd’s 
underwriter.
224
 
 
6.4.5. Short Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998 
 
As Lloyd’s became more dominant in South Africa, legislation changed to embrace and accept 
Lloyd’s as part of the South African insurance market.  The Short Term Insurance Act 
summarises how Lloyd’s is regulated in South Africa encompassing all the changes through the 
years as discussed above.  It also outlines under which circumstances the Registrar has the power 
to impose prohibitions on the activities of a Lloyd’s underwriter.  The Registrar has the power to 
prohibit Lloyd’s underwriters from continuing in short term insurance business in South Africa 
in the following circumstances: 
 If any bye laws are amended where the rights and obligations of Lloyd’s underwriters are 
materially changed.
225
  If Lloyd’s changes or enacts a new law or bye-law the Lloyd’s 
Council must notify the Registrar within 21 days of such change.
226
 
 Should Lloyd’s, the Lloyd’s representative or a Lloyd’s underwriter fail to comply with 
their duties
227
 as set out in section 57, section 60, schedule 3 and the Trust Deed. 
 
The Registrar must give written notice to Lloyd’s as well as to the Lloyd’s representative of his 
intention to prohibit its activities giving reasons for his decisions.  Lloyd’s or the Lloyd’s 
representative then have 30 days in which to respond.
228
  If the Registrar chooses to continue 
                                                 
222
 S60(1)(q)(i) of the Insurance Act of 1943. 
223
 S60(1)(q)(ii) of the Insurance Act of 1943. 
224
 S60(2) of the Insurance Act of 1943. 
225
 S56(2)(a) & S56(2)(b) of the Short Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998. 
226
 S56(3) of the Short Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998. 
227
 S62(b)(i) & S62(b)(ii) of the Short Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998. 
228
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with the prohibition after representation made by Lloyd’s, he has to publish a notice in the 
Government Gazette stating the date when the prohibition is to come into effect.
229
  If the 
trustees of the two trust funds fail to comply with any provisions in Schedule 3 the Registrar may 
exercise the powers of the trustees under the trust deed.
230
  If Lloyd’s is unable to pay its 
liabilities the Registrar may request Lloyd’s to provide any information needed regarding the 
liabilities
231
 in which case Lloyd’s has up to a maximum period of 60 days to pay the money that 
is owed into the Lloyd’s South African Transitional Fund or the Lloyd’s South African Trust 
Fund.
232
 
 
S61 of the Short Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998 shows that if a Lloyd’s underwriter fails to pay 
its liabilities under a South African short term insurance policy, the Lloyd’s South African 
Transitional Fund or the portion of the Lloyd’s South African Trust Fund held for such liabilities 
shall be used to pay the liability.  These two trust funds can be used where the claimant has a 
final judgement for the payment of the liability or the Lloyd’s South African Transitional Fund is 
being wound up or Lloyd’s agrees to make such payment from the Trust funds.233 
 
The carrying on of Lloyd’s business in South Africa is dependent on its compliance with the 
Short Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998.  If the requirements of the Act are not met Lloyd’s shall 
be guilty of an offence and, on conviction, shall be liable for a fine.
234
 
 
6.4.6. Lloyd’s acceptance into the SA insurance market as a fair competitor 
 
In the 1980s local insurance companies felt that Lloyd’s was providing unfair competition to 
their detriment by offering premiums below the rates in the South African insurance market.  
South African insurers found that Lloyd’s competition was hard to beat (Duigan, 1988b: 11; 
Alston, 1989a: 25; Alston, 1989b: 8; One Lime Street, 1993: 27).  To resolve these issues the 
South African Insurance Association (SAIA) meets annually with Lloyd’s underwriters through 
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230
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South African sub-committees referring complaints to Lloyd’s in London (Napier, 1988: 14, 15).  
However, many of the complaints were found to be unfounded as Lloyd’s underwriters focus on 
offering insurance that is not easily available in the South African insurance market (Napier, 
1988: 15; One Lime Street, 1993: 27).  If however, Lloyd’s does offer insurance in direct 
competition with the local market the rates represent fair competition and should not intimidate 
local insurers.  Competition is healthy for the purchasers of insurance and should be allowed 
(Way, 1988: 26; Duigan, 1988b: 11).  “Lloyd’s is a valued part of the South African market.  It 
introduces competition but, because of its different nature and treatment, care must be taken to 
ensure that the playing field stays level” (Duigan, 1988a: 12).  Lloyd’s has a role to play in South 
Africa particularly regarding mega-risks and providing an international business link (Alston, 
1988: 7; Alston, 1989a: 25).  By the early 1990’s the local market was finally accepting Lloyd’s 
as fair competition (Hazel & Williams, 1991: 4; One Lime Street, 1996: 12).  Lloyd’s insures big 
risks such as SAA and Sasol which the South African Market is unable to insure on its own and 
has to look to the international market for the necessary capacity (One Lime Street, 1993: 27). 
 
By 1963 Lloyd’s was well on its way making profits in South Africa as its correspondents 
received a total of R5 023 000 in premiums and paid a total of R2 396 000 in claims (Hansard, 
1966: col. 3093).  On the 30
th
 of June 1964 there were a total of 93 domestic and 79 foreign 
insurance companies in South Africa.  Of these 79 foreign insurers 28 were empowered to do 
business as Lloyd’s correspondents.  This was a relatively high number showing the significant 
influence Lloyd’s already had by the year 1964.  By December of 1995, 31 years later, the 
number of Lloyd’s correspondents registered with the FSB in South Africa increased to 92 
(Gallimore, 1995: 10). 
 
The South African representative of Lloyd’s is in continual contact with SAIA and the South 
African brokers association (Saiba), which was replaced by the Financial Intermediaries 
Association of Southern Africa (FIA),
235
 on matters involving Lloyd’s and the South African 
insurance market (Napier, 1988, 15).  In 1990 Lloyd’s received approximately 5% of the South 
African insurance market (+/- R280 million) per annum and this percentage has remained the 
same over the last 15 years which consists mainly of risks that the local market is not able to 
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retain (Hazel & Williams, 1990: 6).  By 1994 Lloyd’s share of the South African short term 
insurance market was still 5% (Cover, 1996c: 14). 
 
In the year 1988 Lloyd’s, was admitted as a registered South African insurer (Alston, 1989b: 8) 
through Section 60 of the Insurance Act of 1943, applied to SAIA for membership.  This 
membership cemented the presence of Lloyd’s in South Africa (Napier, 1988: 14; Way, 1988: 
26).  A month later Lloyd’s received de facto membership with certain requirements for Lloyd’s 
to make a few changes to its constitution.  As noted in the February edition of Cover 1989 
Lloyd’s was accepted as a member of SAIA at their AGM meeting in May (Cover, 1989a: 32; 
Cover, 1996c: 14; Cover, 1997: 13).  This membership gave rise to benefits for both Lloyd’s and 
the South African insurance market through increased communication between both parties; the 
local market is able to receive information about Lloyd’s; the removal of the uncertainty that 
Lloyd’s receives an unfair competitive advantage and Lloyd’s involvement in South African 
industry decisions (Cover, 1989a: 32).  Through Lloyd’s being admitted as a registered South 
African insurer and its acceptance as a SAIA member Lloyd’s is now for all purposes a domestic 
insurer as opposed to a foreign one (Shaw, 1989: 20; Cover, 1993b: 16) and this membership 
provides confirmation that Lloyd’s is an integral part of the South African market.  The former 
Lloyd’s representative, Mr. Ronnie Napier, subsequently became the chairman of SAIA (Napier, 
2010). 
 
Since Lloyd’s is part of the South African insurance market it was also part of the South African 
Special Risks Insurance Association (Sasria)
236
 which is limited to South Africa, as well as the 
National Special Risks Insurance Association (Nasria) which is limited to Namibia (Napier, 
1988: 15). 
 
The problems which Lloyd’s experienced in the 1980s in the UK (discussed previously) also had 
an impact on South African Names as many where Names on the syndicates involved in the 
troubles.  Overall Lloyd’s made losses of R2.6 billion in 1988, R11 billion in 1989 and an 
anticipated loss of approximately R5 billion for the year 1990 (Newton, 1992: 4).  The extent of 
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 SASRIA was subsequently nationalised and is currently owned by the government 
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the catastrophically high losses faced by South African Names were illustrated by Newton 
(1992: 4) whereby in 1989 a member with a £20 000 (approx R100 000) share in a syndicate 
involved in the losses, suffered a loss close to R1.5m.  In an attempt to diminish the huge losses 
that would have to be borne by Names Lloyd’s raised £500m by increasing members’ 
contributions for the years 1990, 1991 and 1992 (Alston, 1994a: 14). 
 
Two of Lloyd’s leading underwriters, Michael Williams and Dick Hazell, who made up the 
Lloyd’s SA liaison committee, visited South Africa on an annual basis during the time of the 
Lloyd’s troubles between 1989 and 1992 (Alston, 1992a: 56; One Lime Street, 1993: 27).  The 
liaison committee was established at Lloyd’s to enable Lloyd’s, centrally, to have a link with the 
general representatives world-wide and with the Names.  That liaison committee came to South 
Africa once or twice a year and talked to Names.  The South African representative at the time, 
Mr. Ronnie Napier, organised meetings of Names throughout South Africa in Johannesburg, 
Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban so that the liaison committee could talk directly to the 
South African Names about the troubles at Lloyd’s as well as to deal with the allegations of 
fraud at Lloyd’s.  A better relationship was established between Lloyd’s and the South African 
insurance market through these annual visits (Hazel & Williams, 1990: 6).  After the problems at 
Lloyd’s were resolved the liaison committee was disbanded and thus the South African liaison 
committee no longer exists (Napier, 2010). 
 
In October 1991 the Chairman of Lloyd’s, David Coleridge, visited South Africa for the same 
reasons as the South African liaison committee - to talk to the Names to reassure them that things 
were not as bad at Lloyd’s as the media was making it out to be.  This was the first time that a 
chairman of Lloyd’s had made an official visit to South Africa.237  He met with SA Names, local 
brokers, any clients whose business was insured at Lloyd’s and with senior finance and 
government officials.  “In this way he will be officially cementing the many relationships built 
up over many years between SA and Lloyd’s” (Williams, 1991b: 28).  On the 18th October 1993, 
the then chairman of Lloyd’s David Rowland delivered an opening address on ‘Lloyd’s and the 
International Market’ at the South African Risk & Insurance Management Association (Sarima) 
in Pretoria (Cover, 1993c: 57).  Peter Lane, the Director, Marketing and Public Affairs at Lloyd’s 
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also came to South Africa in 1994 discussing his anticipation for Lloyd’s to experience profits 
for 1993 (Cover, 1994b: 51). 
 
The formation of Equitas through the Reconstruction and Renewal program was not isolated to 
the UK but had a major impact for all Lloyd’s Names including the South African Names.  Ms 
Heidi Hutter, the Director of the Equitas project (Major, 1995: 3), came to South Africa in April 
1995 to make an address to the South African Names to portray the benefits and the importance 
of Equitas, to answer any questions and to minimise any doubts and uncertainties that Names 
might have about the program.  Heidi Hutter was appointed the Project Director of Equitas in 
October 1993 with 20 actuaries as well as additional staff of 185 people to work with her on the 
project of Equitas (Hutter, 1995: 1).  Heidi Hutter addressed South African Names in 
Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town (Hutter, 1995: 16). 
 
David Rowland, chairman of Lloyd’s at the time, visited South Africa in 1996 to speak to Names 
regarding Equitas.  This was his third visit to South Africa to talk to Names (Rowland, 1996: 1).  
Lloyd’s needed to get approximately 98.4% acceptance from South African Names in order for 
Equitas to go ahead (Napier, 2010).  The Names had to vote whether they wanted to be part of 
Equitas or not (Roland, 1996: 1; Cover, 1996b: 55).  David Rowland made it quite clear that 
Names who do not accept this settlement offer proposed through Equitas will receive no benefits 
from it at all (Rowland, 1996: 10).  The liability for each Name would be capped at £100 000 
above the funds already available at Lloyd’s which would be the maximum that any Name would 
be required to pay if the offer of Equitas was accepted (Rowland, 1996: 19).  Equitas did manage 
to get 95% acceptance by Names. 
 
As an indication of the position that Lloyd’s holds in South Africa, David Rowland was asked to 
speak at an African Insurance Organisation conference hosted by the Insurance Institute of South 
Africa (IISA) on the 28
th
 May 1996 at Sun City (One Lime Street, 1996: 12).  Mr Amit Khilosia, 
now the Managing Director of Lloyd’s South Africa, accompanied David Rowland on his visit to 
South Africa.  At the conference they took the opportunity to speak to the people attending the 
conference on what Lloyd’s should do next in South Africa.  The overwhelming response was 
why does Lloyd’s not have a presence in South Africa? Lloyd’s plays a large role in the South 
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African insurance market but is represented by one individual.  Amit Khilosia then came back to 
South Africa for three months to put together a business plan for a Lloyd’s representative office 
to be opened in South Africa.  The aim was not to take over the role and responsibilities from the 
general representative but to support the role and take over the onerous administrative duties 
involved in executing such responsibilities (Khilosia, 2010). 
 
Mr. Amit Khilosia came to South Africa to set up the operations of Lloyd’s South Africa and a 
milestone was reached in 1998 when Lloyd’s opened an office in SA to oversee the South 
African activities.  Mr. Ron Sandler, then the CEO of Lloyd’s, came to South Africa to open the 
new offices in Sandton, Johannesburg on the 23
rd
 June 1998 to support the already existing 
business in SA (Catlin et al, 1998: 30 & 124; Alston, 1998: 30).  This demonstrated the 
commitment of Lloyd’s to the South African insurance market (One Lime Street, 1998: 20).  The 
primary functions of the office is to handle all the administrative duties, forge and maintain 
strong relationships with brokers and coverholders and the relevant government bodies (Cover, 
1998b, 43; One Lime Street, 1998: 20).  The role of the general representative is a statutory one 
and cannot be done away with therefore the post of general representative continues in parallel to 
that of the new representative.  In practice the staff of the Lloyd’s office discharges the 
responsibilities and functions of the general representative (Sibanda, 2010; McGovern, Levene & 
Sibanda, 2008: 8).  “Our role here is to be the custodian for the Lloyd’s platform in South 
Africa” (Khilosia, 2010). 
 
Kiln South Africa, a subsidiary of Lloyd’s Managing Agents R.J. Kiln and Co Limited, opened 
an office in South Africa on the 1
st
 September 1999 after underwriting risks in South Africa for 
over 35 years.  It is the first wholly-owned overseas subsidiary operating as a service company 
holding a binding authority for syndicates managed by R.J. Kiln & Co (Morgan, 1999: 23).  Kiln 
SA operates as an underwriting manager and is authorized as an intermediary by the FSB.  It 
started off with three staff members and after trading for 10 years it had grown to 50 staff 
members with branches in Johannesburg and Cape Town (Cover, 2009: 70).  South Africa 
received its own site added to www.lloyds.com which was launched in 2000 (Cover, 2000a: 66). 
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John Sibanda was approached by Amit Khilosia on behalf of Lloyd’s at a time when Lloyd’s was 
looking to improve its footprint in South and Southern Africa.  John Sibanda had such contacts 
and assisted Lloyd’s in developing an initial strategy for Sub-sahara Africa (Sibanda, 2010; 
Khilosia, 2010). 
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7. Certain Aspects of Lloyd’s in South Africa 
 
Lloyd’s is well established and successful in South Africa having a Lloyd’s office in 
Johannesburg.  This chapter will focus on some of the dynamics of the Lloyd’s office with a 
brief look at binding authorities, binder agreements, intermediaries of Lloyd’s, tribunalisation 
and taxation of Lloyd’s in South Africa. 
 
7.1. Binding authority 
 
As discussed above, an underwriter at Lloyd’s only accepts risks through a Lloyd’s accredited 
broker and the risk has to be underwritten in the Room at Lloyd’s.  However, there is one 
exception to this rule; where binding authority is given to individuals in other countries allowing 
them to write Lloyd’s policies (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 121).  Binding authority occurs 
where an underwriter grants authority to a third party allowing that third party to bind the 
underwriter including the Names as set-out in the contract (Hodgson, 1986: 249; Havenga, 2001: 
157).  The third party is referred to as a ‘coverholder’ and is usually a broker working abroad.  
Lloyd’s uses this method to access overseas risks for its accounts (Davison, 1987: 46; Mance, 
Goldrein & Merkin, 2003).  Such broker is allowed to accept certain clearly defined classes of 
insurance at rates predetermine by the underwriter (S.C, 1943: 8; Grundlingh & Meyburgh, 
2002: 6). 
 
A bye law was passed in 1985 stating that every binding authority has to be put into writing and 
presented to the LPSO.  No binding authority can be given to an individual until that individual 
has been approved by a tribunal setup by the Lloyd’s Non-marine Underwriting Association 
(Hodgson, 1986: 267).  Once the coverholder has been approved by a panel of underwriters he 
can receive binding authority and was known as ‘tribunilised’238 (Davison, 1987: 137).  Binding 
authority is mostly used in non-marine business (Davison, 1987: 136). 
 
                                                 
238
 As indicated in 7.3 below, the word ‘tribunalised’ is no longer used at Lloyd’s. 
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7.2. Lineslip 
 
A lineslip is similar to that of binding authority but is mostly used in marine business.  However, 
there is one difference: A binding authority gives an individual outside Lloyd’s the authority to 
accept insurance business on behalf of a Lloyd’s underwriter (Flower & Jones, 1981: 179) 
whereas a lineslip needs the signature of the lead underwriter for each risk binding all other 
underwriters on that slip to that risk (Davison, 1987: 136).  Brokers make use of lineslips to 
ensure that they will be able to get adequate underwriting capacity for risks they introduce into 
Lloyd’s.  Lineslips are commonly used for risks that have similar features and the underwriters 
frequently accept risks falling within those characteristics (Mance, Goldrein & Merkin, 2003).  
 
7.3. Tribunalisation process 
 
As shown above, all business underwritten by Lloyd’s has to be brought to Lloyd’s via 
accredited Lloyd’s brokers (Gibson, 1988: 4).  Any South African broker or underwriting 
manager that wants to become a Lloyd’s correspondent has to be tribunalised at Lloyd’s (Alston, 
1991b: 8 & Gallimore, 1995: 10).  The following procedure is followed if a South African broker 
wants to become a Lloyd’s correspondent (Cover, 1996d: 6): Firstly, the applicant has to have a 
registered office in South Africa.  Secondly, the applicant has to find a Lloyd’s broker through 
whom the insurance business will be placed in the Lloyd’s market.  This broker is known as the 
sponsoring broker and does his own investigation into the commercial ability of the applicant.  
Thirdly, the applicant must then fill out an application form which is lodged with the 
Correspondents department at Lloyd’s.  Fourthly, the general representative of Lloyd’s is 
informed of the application and conducts his own independent investigation into the financial 
status and reputation of the applicant.  Once satisfied the general representative of Lloyd’s makes 
a recommendation to the Brokers Department at Lloyd’s.  Finally, the tribunalisation of the 
applicant is then approved.  The tribunalisation process often takes between 3 to 4 months to 
complete. 
 
Once tribunalised, the FSB is informed and the applicant is required to deposit the statutory R20 
000 with the FSB as mentioned previously.  The applicant must make annual statutory returns to 
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the FSB as well as to Lloyd’s.  Once a broker/agent has been tribunalised it does not mean that 
the broker has received binding authority. He still has to receive the actual binding authority in 
writing.  He is only able to transact business as an open market correspondent via a Lloyd’s 
broker.  The applicant has to make a further application involving further investigation to 
Lloyd’s to receive binding authority.  This can only be done after some time has passed to prove 
that the broker has a suitable track record.  If this application is approved then the broker is 
allowed to “hold a pen” on behalf of Lloyd’s (Cover, 1996d: 6).  The word tribunalisation is a 
very old Lloyd’s term that is no longer used today (Khilosia, 2010). 
 
7.4. Binder agreements 
 
As soon as the policy is signed by a coverholder with binding authority the policy becomes 
effective even before the premium is received.  For a small period of time after the contract has 
been accepted claims can be brought against the policy even if no premium has yet been paid 
(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995, 50). 
 
7.5. Lloyd’s Intermediaries 
 
There are two types of intermediaries in South Africa, a Lloyd’s coverholder and a Lloyd’s open 
market correspondent (Khilosia, 2010). 
 
7.5.1. Lloyd’s Coverholder 
 
A coverholder is a broker or underwriting manager who has been given binding authority by a 
Lloyd’s syndicate to accept and underwrite business on their behalf.  “A ‘Coverholder’ means a 
company or partnership authorised by a managing agent to enter into a contract or contracts of 
insurance to be underwritten by the members of a syndicate managed by it in accordance with 
the terms of a binding authority.”239  Essentially the coverholder allows Lloyd’s syndicates to 
operate in foreign countries as if they were a local insurer.  The document setting out the terms 
                                                 
239
http://www.lloyds.com/The-Market/I-am-a/Coverholder/Information-for-Brokers-and-Agents/What-is-a-
coverholder. 
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and conditions of the delegated authority given to the coverholder by a Lloyd’s underwriter is 
referred to as a binding authority.
240
  Coverholders are, as explained, individually considered and 
approved by Lloyd’s (HM Treasury, 2008: 37).  Coverholders can conclude insurance contracts, 
pay claims and collect premiums on behalf of Lloyd’s (Grundlingh & Meyburgh, 2002: 6; 
Havenga, 2001: 166).  Coverholders are seen as financial services providers and are subject to 
the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 2002 (Speight, 2000). 
 
7.5.1.1. Nuclear Pool 
 
As an aside, Lloyd’s is very much involved with the South African nuclear pool (One Lime 
Street, 1998: 21).  An interesting development occurred in 2010 where the nuclear pool, 
administered by SAIA, created a new company, which had become a Lloyd’s coverholder and 
must adhere to all of Lloyd’s regulations and VAT requirements.  The nuclear pools have been 
changed from being a loose association of people administrating the pools to becoming a legal 
entity
241,242
 and obtaining Lloyd’s coverholder status (Hitchcock, 2010). 
 
7.5.2. Local (Open) Market Correspondents (OMC) 
 
An open market correspondent is a South African broker that has been accredited and approved 
by Lloyd’s to produce business into London via a Lloyd’s broker.  They do not have binding 
authority to accept business on behalf of Lloyd’s and are seen as independent intermediaries and 
not representatives, and must therefore go through a Lloyd’s broker (Grundlingh & Meyburgh, 
2002: 6; Havenga, 2001: 165, 167).  A local market correspondent does not have the same status 
as a Lloyd’s approved coverholder and, to be approved by the Lloyd’s office, faces a less 
onerous process for accreditation (Khilosia, 2010).  Table 4 below shows the number of Lloyd’s 
approved correspondents in South Africa between 1999 and 2007. 
 
                                                 
240
http://www.lloyds.com/The-Market/I-am-a/Coverholder/Prospective-Coverholder/Tell-me-more-about-
coverholders 
241
 www.insurancegateway.co.za/4.8.45.Irn=2303  
242
 http://www.docstoc.com/docs/83549214/SAIA_Annual_Review_2007_2008 
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Table 4: Number of Lloyd’s approved correspondents in South Africa between 1999 and 
2007 
Year Number of correspondents in SA 
June 1999 115 
June 2000 116 
June 2001 110 
June 2002 95 
June 2003 83 
June 2004 72 
Dec 2004 72 
Dec 2007 75 
 
Lloyd’s South Africa has reduced the number of correspondents over the years as seen from the 
above Table.  Not all approved intermediaries were producing business.  Amit Khilosia 
investigated focusing on who was trading with Lloyd’s and how, and who was not trading at all.  
Lloyd’s then decided to lapse approval of those firms not producing business to Lloyd’s.  This 
resulted in a smaller number of firms producing more and, better quality business, into Lloyd’s 
(Khilosia, 2010).  Approved open market correspondents are seen as financial services providers 
and are subject to the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 2002 (Speight, 2000). 
 
7.6. Taxation of Lloyd’s in South Africa 
 
The taxation of profits made by Lloyd’s Names as well as Lloyd’s syndicates is governed by the 
provisions in the Double Taxation Convention between South Africa and the UK (Louw, 1997).  
Residents of South Africa who are Names or members of a syndicate, according to the 
convention, have permanent establishment situated in the UK and are accordingly taxed in the 
UK.  The Double Taxation Treaty
243
 was signed in London on the 4
th
 July 2002 and came into 
force from the 17
th
 of December 2002. 
 
                                                 
243
 UK/South Africa Double Taxation Convention signed 4 July 2003 entered into force 17 December 2002 
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Through s60 of the Insurance Act of 1943 Lloyd’s agents were required to pay a premium tax of 
2.5% of their aggregate premium income to the Treasury.  The South African Minister of 
Finance announced that the tax would be withdrawn from 1 January 2002 regardless of the date 
of the policy inception.  As from 1 January 2002 Lloyd’s no longer pays the 2.5% tax and instead 
is subject to the payment of VAT
244
 (McLeod, 2002: 1; Grundlingh & Meyburgh, 2002: 9; 
Manuel, 2002: 22). 
 
7.6.1. Value Added Tax (VAT) 
 
VAT was introduced into South Africa from 30 September 1991 replacing the general sales tax 
(Delfin, Kearney, Robinson et al, 2005: 2).  As pointed out, initially Lloyd’s was treated as a 
foreign insurer and was not charged VAT on premiums received in South Africa
245
 (Cover, 
1991c: 73; One Lime Street, 1993: 27).  As from 1 January 2001 the position changed and 
Lloyd’s underwriters are no longer exempt from paying VAT.  This change in the law had 
different effects on open market correspondents (OMC) and coverholders.  OMC will not be 
subject to VAT and Lloyd’s underwriters will not have to register for VAT or be charged VAT 
on premiums received since South African authorities do not see OMC as supplying insurance 
business in South Africa as they do not fall under the definition of a South African enterprise as 
per the Value-Added Tax Act
246
 since the business is concluded outside of South Africa. 
 
Coverholders, on the other hand, write business under a binding authority and the South African 
authorities view the role of a coverholder to be supplying insurance business in South Africa and 
therefore those underwriters are subject to VAT.  However, contracts concluded in London are 
not subject to VAT i.e. if a South African coverholder refers business to Lloyd’s in London and 
an underwriter, after going over the details of the risk, accepts the business, the contract is 
deemed to be concluded in London and VAT is not charged.  Contracts concluded in South 
Africa are subject to VAT i.e. where a coverholder merely asks the underwriter in London for 
general advice on the risk but actually binds the risk on behalf of the underwriter himself, the 
                                                 
244
 http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2002/review/Chapter%204.pdf 
245
 Conceptually it is doubtful if VAT should be paid on premiums paid but rather should be paid on claims. 
246
 No. 89 of 1991 as amended 1992 and 1999. 
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contract is deemed to be concluded in South Africa and therefore subject to VAT.  Where there 
is uncertainty as to whether the contract was concluded in London or in South Africa, it is 
assumed to be concluded in South Africa.  Coverholders must maintain separate accounting 
records with respect to the VAT charged on Lloyd’s transactions (Manager, 2000a; 2000b; Mail 
& Guardian, 2000; Grundlingh & Meyburgh, 2002: 9, 20, 22, 23, 26, 35). 
 
John Sibanda, current general representative of Lloyd’s, has the authority to act as fiscal 
representative of the underwriters in South Africa (McGovern, Levene, Khilosia & Sibanda, 
2008: 1).  Duties include: representing underwriters to the South African tax authorities in 
conjunction with the Lloyd’s office of South Africa and Lloyd’s London; signing and reviewing 
all tax documentation that is to be lodged with the South African tax authorities and to provide 
Lloyd’s with copies of such documentation; inform Lloyd’s of any request made by the South 
African tax authorities for further documentation; and lastly, to direct any inquiries from 
members directly to Lloyd’s (McGovern, Levene, Khilosia & Sibanda, 2008: 7).  The Lloyd’s 
representative must work in conjunction with the Lloyd’s office regarding fiscal duties. 
 
Considering the administration of Lloyd’s VAT, South African coverholders are required to 
provide a bordereaux to Lloyd’s South Africa at the end of every month providing their records, 
as an invoice, on VAT on premiums, claims, commissions and expenses.  Lloyd’s South Africa, 
on behalf of Lloyd’s underwriters, uses a central system to account for VAT paid consolidated 
into one VAT return (McLeod, 2002: 1; Manager, 2000b; Grundlingh & Meyburgh, 2002: 14, 
16, 19, 35).   
 
In summary the Lloyd’s office in South Africa is involved in the preparation and submission of 
any tax documentation required under South African law, and the submission to the tax 
authorities of any money received from Lloyd’s/Lloyd’s coverholders in South Africa for the 
payment of taxes due in South Africa (McGovern, Levene, Khilosia & Sibanda, 2008: 8). 
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8. Graphical representation of the growth of Lloyd’s in South Africa 
 
Data
247
 was derived from the South African Treasury, Registrar of Insurance Annual Reports and 
the Financial Services Board (FSB) Reports.  This data was used to construct Tables 6 to 10 and 
Graphs 2 to 7.  These Tables and Graphs show how Lloyd’s has grown in South Africa through 
the increase in premium income, claims paid and commissions paid.  The analysis also shows 
Lloyd’s growth compared to the growth of the South African insurance market. 
 
8.1. Methodology: Adjusting the data 
 
Data showing the premiums and commissions received as well as the claims paid by Lloyd’s 
from the year 1925 through to 2000 was used to construct the following Tables and Graphs.  The 
results are shown as Nominal and Real values. 
 
Data for the years 1941 – 1949, 1960, 1994 – 1996 and 1998 – 2000 is missing and results have 
been linearly extrapolated for these periods using averages.  The extrapolated results are shown 
in bold and italics in the relevant Tables.  Table 5 shows an example of how the data was 
extrapolated.  In this example a period of 5 years is used with only the years 1993 and 1997 
having original data.  The data for the remaining years (1994 - 1996) is extrapolated.  The 
missing data is determined by establishing what the average increase (or decrease) is year on 
year, and then adding this increase (or decrease) to the missing years as illustrated below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
247
 The data is taken from Summaries of Returns Deposited with the Treasury 1925 – 1940; Annual Reports of the 
Registrar of Insurance 1950 – 1997; FSB Annual Reports of the Registrar of Short Term Insurance 1998 – 2007. 
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Table 5: Example of data extrapolation 
 
Year 
Original 
Value (R) 
STEP 1 (total increase 
over 4 years - R) 
STEP 2 (incremental 
increase per year - R) 
STEP 3 (Year 1 + each 
increment - R) 
1997  758,149 
 116,667 
+ 29,166  758,149 
1996 
 
+ 29,166  728,982 
1995 
 
+ 29,166  699,816 
1994 
 
+ 29,166  670,649 
1993  641,482  641,482  641,482  641,482 
 
The extrapolation equation can be represented as follows: 
 
                   [
       
          
] 
Where: 
 Yn-1 = Rand value of base year 
 Yn+1 = Rand value of top year 
 Yn = Missing Rand value 
 Xn-1 = Year of base year 
 Xn+1 = Year of top year 
 Xn = Year of missing value 
 
Therefore, in Table 5, to calculate the missing value of Year 1996: 
 Yn-1 = Rand Value of Base Year = R641,482 
 Yn+1 = Rand Value of Top Year = R758,149 
 Xn-1 = Year of base year  = 1993 
 Xn+1 = Year of top year  = 1997 
 Xn = Year of missing value  = 1996 
 
                   [
       
          
] 
                            [
         
         
] 
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                    [
  
 
] 
                     
           
 
The currency used in South Africa up until 14 February 1961, when South Africa became a 
Republic, was the British Pound (£), thereafter the South African Rand (R) was used introduced 
at a value of 2 to 1.  Due to this a conversion was necessary for the period of 1925 – 1961 to 
convert the £ into R.  This conversion was taken as a constant factor of 1 £ to 2 R (Liebenberg, 
2011).  This factor was applied to all £ data pre-1961, thus providing Nominal R data from 1925 
through to 2000.  The Nominal R data was then adjusted using the CPI inflation rate to show the 
Real values as at 2000 in South African Rand (Lehohla, 2010).  After all adjustments the final 
Real data consists of South African Rand values as at 2000 for the period 1925 – 2000. 
 
8.2. Historical figures of Lloyd’s 
 
8.2.1. Premiums received 
 
Table 8 and Graph 2 show how Lloyd’s premiums have increased.  The Table contains the 
methodology explained above and can be seen in Appendix 6. 
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Graph 2: Lloyd’s Premiums in South Africa (1925 - 2000) 
 
 
 
Lloyd’s premium income has steadily increased from R2, 000,000 in 1925 to R1, 006,980,000 in 
1994 thereafter it decreased slightly to R967, 984,000 in 2000.  Overall Lloyd’s has been very 
successful in South Africa. 
 
8.2.2. Claims Paid 
 
Table 9 (Appendix 7) and Graph 4 show the claims that Lloyd’s has paid to South African 
policyholders. 
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Graph 3: Lloyd’s claims paid in South Africa (1925 - 2000) 
 
 
 
Lloyd’s has never failed to pay a claim and with rising premium income so too did the claims 
paid increase.  This graph follows a similar pattern to that of premiums received – as premium 
income increases, the number of claims increases. 
 
8.2.3. Commission Paid 
 
Table 10 (Appendix 8) and Graph 5 show the commissions that Lloyd’s has paid to 
intermediaries for business secured by them on behalf of Lloyd’s in South Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
0
75
150
225
300
375
450
525
600
1
9
2
5
1
9
2
8
1
9
3
1
1
9
3
4
1
9
3
7
1
9
4
0
1
9
4
3
1
9
4
6
1
9
4
9
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
5
1
9
5
8
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
7
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
0
N
o
m
in
al
 L
lo
yd
's
 C
la
im
s 
p
ai
d
 in
 S
A
 (
R
m
) 
R
e
al
 L
lo
yd
s 
C
la
im
 p
ai
d
 in
 S
A
 (
R
m
) 
Real Nominal
195 
 
Graph 4: Lloyd’s commission paid in South Africa (1925 - 2000) 
 
 
 
8.2.4. Paid Claims Ratio, Combined Paid Claims Ratio and Commission Ratio 
 
It must be noted that the claims paid data used in this Table and Graph only includes the claims 
paid by Lloyd’s and does not include outstanding claims still to be paid.  Using only claims paid 
can be misleading especially when looking at the loss ratio and combined loss ratio.  Table 7 and 
Graph 3 are an illustrative example of how a claims paid ratio differs from a loss ratio.  The data 
used for this illustrative example is the South African insurance market information found in the 
FSB reports. 
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Table 6: Illustrative example of the difference between the claims paid ratio and the loss 
ratio 
 
Year 
Premiums Received 
(R’000) 
Claims paid 
(R’000) 
Claims 
outstanding 
(R’000) 
Claims paid & 
outstanding 
(R’000) 
Claims paid 
ratio (%) 
Loss ratio 
(%) 
1972  273,965  22,851  17,267  40,118 8.34 14.64 
1973  314,760  27,868  19,273  47,141 8.85 14.98 
1974  350,083  36,133  26,131  62,264 10.32 17.79 
1975  404,726  52,207  30,318  82,525 12.90 20.39 
1976  473,499  61,056  37,625  98,681 12.89 20.84 
1977  583,871  77,194  43,111  120,305 13.22 20.60 
1978  664,956  86,106  48,510  134,616 12.95 20.24 
1979  745,550  101,617  55,823  157,441 13.63 21.12 
1980  934,816  117,129  63,137  180,266 12.53 19.28 
1981  1,154,560  140,747  69,943  210,690 12.19 18.25 
1982  1,385,379  171,969  74,202  246,171 12.41 17.77 
 
Graph 5: Illustrative example of the difference between the claims paid ratio and the loss 
ratio 
 
 
 
The loss ratio is a more accurate depiction of the claims that are payable by Lloyd’s as it includes 
outstanding claims that still need to be paid and as such is higher that the claims paid ratio.  
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However the data used often did not provide information on outstanding claims therefore only 
paid claims were used. Table 11 (Appendix 9) and Graph 6 show Lloyd’s South African paid 
clams ratio, combined claims paid ratio and commission ratio (1925 - 2000). 
 
Graph 6: Lloyd’s South African paid claims ratio, combined paid claims ratio and 
commission ratio (1925 - 2000). 
 
 
 
In the above graph it can be seen that for the majority of Lloyd’s operation in South Africa the 
loss ratio has been low, and the solvency high, except for brief periods in 1950 and 1960. 
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8.3. Lloyd’s and the South African insurance market (1925 - 2000) 
 
The data to construct these Tables and Graphs is used as it is shown in the financial reports.  
Gross premiums figures have been used except where the financial report has only provided net 
premiums.  The data comprises of figures from South Africa for domestic insurers and foreign 
insurers operating in South Africa.  The lines of business included in these figures are of the 
short term insurance market i.e. fire, marine, motor, personal accident, guarantee and 
miscellaneous.  Life insurance has been excluded.  Table 12 (Appendix 10) shows the Gross 
premium received in the South African insurance market excluding Lloyd’s and Table 13 
(Appendix 11) shows the Gross premiums of the South African insurance market and Lloyd’s 
premiums in South Africa.  Graph 7 contrasts the South African premiums received and the 
Lloyd’s premiums received and Graph 8 shows Lloyd’s percentage market share in South Africa. 
 
Graph 7: Total gross premiums received by the South African market and total gross 
premiums received by Lloyd’s in South Africa. 
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Lloyd’s premium income in South Africa is increasing steadily.  It must be noted that the 
increase in Lloyd’s premiums when compared to the whole South African insurance market is 
very small due to the highly concentrated nature of the market i.e. two insurers, Santam and 
Mutual & Federal (Table 7) dominate the insurance market with 20% and 14% respectively with 
a cumulative total of 34% of the whole South African insurance market.  However, the South 
African insurance market has grown very rapidly and has outpaced Lloyd’s. 
 
Graph 8: Percentage of Lloyd’s market share regarding Gross Premium written in 
comparison to the total South African insurance market 
 
 
 
The above graph shows Lloyd’s premiums as a percentage of the South African insurance 
market.  Lloyd’s started off slowly and expanded during the war years followed by relatively 
continual growth until 1988.  Thereafter Lloyd’s percentage of the market dropped from 10.07% 
in 1988 to 3.41% in 2000. 
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Table 7: Market Share (%) of Short Term Insurers by Gross Premiums Written, 1998 – 
2003  
 
  
Company  Segment 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 
Cumulative 
Total 
1 Santam General  13.2 12.1 16.9 20.7 20.0 20.0 
2 Mutual & Federal General  12.0 11.6 11.2 13.3 14.0 34.0 
3 Hollard General  4.6 4.6 4.1 6.5 7.7 41.7 
4 SA Eagle (renamed Zurich) General  6.6 6.4 6.1 7.4 7.4 49.1 
5 AIG (SA) (renamed Chartis) General  1.8 1.8 1.9 3.9 4.0 53.1 
6 Guardrisk Captive 4.1 
 
4.2 3.1 3.7 56.8 
7 Lloyd's General 
 
4.4 5.2 3.5 3.4 60.2 
8 Outsurance General  0.0 0.3 0.4 0.8 2.7 62.9 
9 
RMB Structured (previously 
Quantum) Captive 2.3 4.6 1.8 3.7 2.5 65.4 
10 Auto & General General  
 
2.2 1.8 2.0 2.3 67.7 
(Vivian, 2007: 722). 
 
From the year 1998 onwards Lloyd’s has been in the top 10 insurers in South Africa (One Lime 
Street, 1993: 27; One Lime Street, 1996: 12; One Lime Street, 1998: 20).  From the year 1998 to 
2003 Lloyd’s has consecutively been the 7th largest insurer in South Africa with Santam and 
Mutual & Federal dominating the market by a wide margin. 
 
8.4. Conclusion 
 
When looking at the above graphs a similar trend can be seen.  Around the year 1988 Lloyd’s 
premiums, claims paid, commissions paid and percentage of the South African market drop 
substantially.  However, as can be seen from the South African market it too drops around the 
same time period.  Lloyd’s is merely following the South African market. 
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Lloyd’s has grown in South Africa through increased premiums received from the period 1925 to 
2000.  Lloyd’s has made a significant contribution to the South African insurance market as it 
provides insurance cover that South Africa cannot insure on its own and is a benefit to the 
continued growth of the industry.  It is therefore important to document the history of such a 
substantial participant in the South African insurance market. 
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9. Conclusion  
 
Lloyd’s originated as a coffeehouse where men would meet to insure their ships against perils of 
the sea, men-of-war, fire, enemies, pirates and thieves.  Over time and under the care and 
guidance of many influential individuals Lloyd’s coffee house grew to be known as the world’s 
largest insurance market.  It had a turbulent history in the 1980s but despite countless inquiries, 
investigations and lawsuits Lloyd’s as a society remained unscathed.  Through Equitas Lloyd’s 
was able to break away from the bad publicity of the 1980s and rebuild its good reputation. 
 
Lloyd’s is present in many countries, one of which is South Africa.  The first record of 
communication between Lloyd’s and South Africa dates to 20 January 1823 regarding the 
creation of a Lighthouse.  This is evidence of an interaction between South African business and 
Lloyd’s.  There is, however, not a sign of South Africa having a Lloyd’s agent.  The first record 
of Lloyd’s operation in South Africa dates to the 17 July 1850 when George Christopher Cato 
was appointed as an agent for Lloyd’s of London in Natal.  His duties as a Lloyd’s agent 
included hoisting the Lloyd’s flag.  It can thus be accepted that Lloyd’s had at least one agent in 
South Africa by the year 1850.  This agent may not have sold insurance as there is no evidence 
of George Cato having the authority to accept insurance business.  He was an agent appointed to 
look after Lloyd’s interests and keep it informed about ship movements and any other shipping 
intelligence.  The first detailed mention of South African property actually being insured by 
Lloyd’s appears on the 4th July 1913 where it was noted that Park Station as well as the Star 
offices in Johannesburg were insured against civil commotion risk.  By the early 1900s Lloyd’s 
definitely had a strong presense in South Africa. 
 
The passing of the Insurance Act of 1923 regulated Lloyd’s in South Africa.  Lloyd’s agents 
were, for the first time, required to deposit £2000 with the Treasury.  The Insurance Act of 1943 
regulated that the deposit made by each agent was increased from £2000 (R4000) to £5000 (R10 
000) and in addition to the deposits made by the agents Lloyd’s as a society made a lump sum 
deposit of £30 000 (R60 000).  S60 imposed a tax on Lloyd’s since up until this point Lloyd’s 
paid no tax in South Africa.  Lloyd’s agents, for the first time, had to pay 2.5% of their aggregate 
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premium income to the Treasury.  After the unfortunate situation of Rhodesia, the South African 
government did not want to face the same difficulties in South Africa and revised the legislation 
dealing with the operation of Lloyd’s with the introduction of the South African general 
representative of Lloyd’s and the South African trust fund.  As Lloyd’s became more dominant 
in South Africa, legislation changed to embrace and accept Lloyd’s into the South African 
insurance market.  The Short Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998 summarises how Lloyd’s is 
regulated in South Africa encompassing all the changes through the years.  A milestone was 
reached in 1998 when Lloyd’s opened an office in SA to oversee the South African activities.  
This demonstrated the commitment that Lloyd’s has to the South African insurance market.  As 
well as being licenced in Namibia, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Mauritius.  Lloyd’s is now working 
on improving its licence footprint in Sub-sahara Africa. 
 
In addition to the documented history of Lloyd’s in South Africa, this dissertation graphically 
shows how Lloyd’s has grown in South Africa through increased premiums received from the 
period 1925 to 2000.  Lloyd’s has made a significant contribution to the South African insurance 
market and will continue to do so due to the nature of the risks that Lloyd’s is willing to insure. 
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10. Appendix 1 
 
 
 
(Liebenberg, 2011). 
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11. Appendix 2248 
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12. Appendix 3 
 
Examples of some litigation brought against Lloyd’s by aggrieved Names. 
 
The Lloyd’s Act of 1982 protects the Society of Lloyd’s from any litigation brought against it by 
any insiders of Lloyd’s for an action of damages (Ferguson, 1983: 64).  Lloyd’s as a society does 
not owe its members any duty of good faith.  However, the managing agents and underwriters of 
the syndicates are not protected by the Lloyd’s Act 1982 and were exposed to possible insider 
litigation (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 43).  Lloyd’s Names had a choice to either pay the 
amounts that Lloyd’s was demanding of them or fight in court.  Many chose to sue (Raphael, 
1995: 269).  After the huge scale of losses suffered by the Names during the end of the 1980s, a 
large wave of litigation was brought against the underwriters at Lloyd’s by the angry Names 
(Lane, 1996: 1).  Names were of the opinion that they were recruited with malicious intent as 
Lloyd’s knew the claims from long-tailed risks were imminent and they needed the capital to pay 
for such claims (Kelley, 1995: 6). 
 
The only exception to the protection the Act offers the society of Lloyd’s is that Lloyd’s can be 
held liable for damages only if it can be proved that the society acted in bad faith.  To prove bad 
faith is difficult under the English legal system as it follows the insurance principle of ‘let the 
buyer beware’ (McClintick, 2000: 50). 
 
One of the first cases of litigation brought against Lloyd’s underwriters was made by the Names 
of the syndicate Outhwaite 317 but was resolved with a settlement agreement (Luessenhop & 
Mayer, 1995: 28) whereby Outhwaite’s E&O insurer (which was Stephen Merrett) settled the 
claim for 2/3rds of the losses suffered by the Names before 1989 (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 
93).  However, most E&O policies had been placed inside the Lloyd’s market which led to 
Names suing other Names in attempts to get their own money back and in certain cases would 
even be suing themselves.  This led to a surge of lawsuits within Lloyd’s as the market was at 
war with itself (Raphael, 1995: 271).  The Outhwaite Action Group also showed Names that it 
was possible to successfully sue Lloyd’s managing agents and that Lloyd’s was subject to 
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commercial tests of prudence and competence just like all companies and corporations (Raphael, 
1995: 270). 
 
Another example of a large lawsuit was the Names that banded together to sue the Merrett 418 
syndicate.  The Merrett 418 Action Group consisted of over 2000 Names and cost up to $8m in 
legal fees (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 94).  By 1994 law suits were flowing into the courts on a 
daily basis alleging that negligent agents were liable for the losses suffered by the Names 
(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 42). 
 
Another well known case was brought against Gooda Walker and was described as the largest 
lawsuit in English history with 3000 plaintiffs claiming over $1.3bn in April 1994 (Luessenhop 
& Mayer, 1995: 286).  Lloyd’s lost this case to the joy of the Names (Kelley, 1995: 8).  
However, this joy was short lived as Lloyd’s declared its intention to seize the winnings of the 
court case for the Central Fund.  This led to all the Chairman of all the action groups to come 
together and form a united action group to stop Lloyd’s from seizing the winnings of the Gooda 
case (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 298). 
 
American, Canadian as well as English Names initially took legal action against the long tailed 
asbestos and pollution syndicates claiming that underwriters were negligent in not finding out all 
the details on the risks they chose to underwrite and breached their duty of disclosure by not 
informing the Names of how risky the risks were (Raphael, 1995: 272).  The second wave of 
litigation hit Lloyd’s through Names on spiral syndicates suing Lloyd’s for the amount of large 
losses they suffered due to the spiral on the grounds that the underwriters did not calculate their 
PML accurately regarding catastrophe claims and did not take out adequate reinsurance.  A 
couple of the Names and underwriters’ E&O insurers settled without going to court (Raphael. 
1995: 273).  Some US courts rejected to hear any cases brought by Names against Lloyd’s on the 
grounds that they do not have jurisdiction of the London market and the Names must sue in the 
UK courts (Raphael, 1995: 276). 
 
Names brought a lawsuit against Lloyd’s alleging fraud throughout the whole of Lloyd’s 
including at the highest level of the hierarchy of Lloyd’s in the case of Society of Lloyd's v. 
211 
 
Jaffray (2000) England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decision 51 (Comm).  Other 
allegations in the trial include suppressing vital information regarding asbestos, misrepresenting 
the books to show profits which in truth did not exist and trying to get as many new Names into 
Lloyd’s as possible to increase their capital base (McClintick, 2000: 39).  An aggrieved Name 
involved in the lawsuit stated that “Lloyd’s perpetrated one of the greatest commercial and 
political crimes of the 20th Century” (McClintick, 2000: 39).  The allegations of fraud against 
Lloyd’s in this case were rejected by the courts stating that the Committee of Lloyd’s had acted 
honestly at all times (Cover, 2000b, 42).  There was much at stake with this lawsuit.  If the 
Names had lost this case they would have been ruined since Lloyd’s would have demanded all 
the money they owed on their syndicates as well as the legal costs attributed to the trial.  
However, if they had provde that the Lloyd’s was aware of the fraud and did nothing to stop it, 
Lloyd’s would have been in trouble (McClintick, 2000, 39) with public opinion of Lloyd’s being 
severely damaged.  A question that needed to be considered was whether it was merely a 
coincidence that most of the new Names at Lloyd’s were put onto the syndicates deeply involved 
in the long tailed asbestos and pollution claims.  Lloyd’s firmly denied all the allegations brought 
against it (McClintick, 2000, 41).  There were 220 Names involved in the Society of Lloyd’s v 
Jaffray case and they are all part of the approximate 6% minority that did not accept the 
settlement offer made by Lloyd’s in 1996 through the formation of Equitas (Alston, 2000: 28). 
 
Lloyd’s fought against the litigation brought against its managing agents by trying to bury the 
case before it even got to trial claiming that procedural requirements were not met or constantly 
appealing against actions being brought against them based on trivial technicalities.  Lawyers 
would then have to do extra work over a longer period of time thereby increasing the legal 
expenses for the Names causing some of them to stop their legal actions due to a lack of funds 
(Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 252).  However, not all action groups gave up and once the 
procedural delays were over evidence was presented to court and the news of the fraud at 
Lloyd’s was finally made public.  By 1995 when the R&R program was about to be implemented 
various action groups started working with Lloyd’s to find suitable solutions to the problems 
faced by Lloyd’s and supported the R&R program (Cover, 1995: 16).  Despite the number of 
Names turning to litigation against their agents it was acknowledged by all that an overall 
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negotiated settlement was the best likely outcome for all Names concerned (Anonymous, 1995: 
9; Major, 1995: 18). 
 
By 2000 it was safe to say that Lloyd’s had avoided bankruptcy.  However, there were still 
Names that refuse to pay their share of asbestos related losses stating that they were fooled into 
becoming Names on losing syndicates without being told the severe losses they were being 
exposed to.  The Names are adamant that Lloyd’s misrepresented the profits the syndicates were 
making for them to seen more appealing (McClintick, 2000: 38). 
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13. Appendix 4 
 
Inquiries into the lack of capacity problem, open year problem and large losses. 
 
The public was not sympathetic about the crisis at Lloyd’s and did not want the government to 
assist Lloyd’s making their feelings public knowledge through newspaper articles.  Their view 
was that the taxpayers should not be made to pay for the mistakes of Lloyd’s (Raphael, 1995: 
293).  A Society of Names (SON) was formed around 1991 to represent the Names who suffered 
the worst losses since it was felt by many that the Association of Lloyd’s Members (ALM) – a 
voluntary organization consisting of external members previously set up to represent the Names 
of Lloyd’s249 - inadequately represented the worst affected Names.  This society wanted to 
expose to the public the full information on fraudulent syndicates, spirals, the true value of the 
losses incurred including the dishonesty of managing directors and misrepresentations made in 
attracting new capital to Lloyd’s.  This society then gave birth to a new representative body 
known as the Lloyd’s Names Associations’ Working Party (LNAWP), called the Super Group 
for short (Raphael, 1995: 295). 
 
The new chairman and team at Lloyd’s chose a different approach than its predecessors during 
the 1980s and instead of denying that problems existed they admitted to mismanagement at 
Lloyd’s (Raphael, 1995: 331; Ferguson, 1983: 59).  Many Names had the following view: “since 
last year we have moved from no admission of guilt to a bizarre situation in which both the 
chairman and the chief executive freely admit massive mismanagement including deception, 
misregulation, incompetence and lack of professionalism.  We don’t want sympathy – confession 
and contrition are not enough – we require restitution” (Raphael, 1995: 333).  Names were angry 
at the way they had been treated for the benefit of the insiders at Lloyd’s. 
 
Three problems had to be tackled by Lloyd’s – lack of capacity that it now faced after the 
admission of the problems in the 1980s, open year of accounts that could not be closed due to the 
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http://www.lloyds.com/Lloyds_Market/Market_participants/Committees_and_associations/Association_of_Lloyd
s_Members.htm  
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unknown extent of future claims and the high administrative costs involved in righting the 
wrongs of the past (Raphael, 1995).  A number of inquiries and systems were set-up to deal with 
these problems, often mentioning similar recommendations, these included the Fisher Report, the 
Neill Report, the Walker Inquiry, the Roland Task Force and the Members Hardship scheme. 
 
The Fisher Report (1980) 
 
The fraud that was exposed in the Sasse, Moran, Posgate and Vaughan syndicates in the 1980s 
led to Lloyd’s looking into updating the regulation at Lloyd’s as it was realised that the Lloyd’s 
Act of 1871 was outdated and needed to be modernised (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 144; 
Flower & Jones, 1981: 183).  Sir Henry Fisher, a former high court judge, was appointed by the 
Lloyd’s chairman, Ian Findlay, in 1979 to perform a review of Lloyd’s after some people 
requested Lloyd’s to be subjected to external regulation and “his report modernized the market” 
(Rasmussen, Owen & Smith, 1997: 11; Raphael, 1995: 91). 
 
The committee consisted of four people from inside the market – a broker, a Name’s agent, two 
underwriters (one marine and one non-marine), as well as a banker and a journalist from outside 
of Lloyd’s (Hodgson, 1986: 289).  They were to focus on the self- regulation at Lloyd’s without 
any governmental intrusion (Gwilliam, Macve & Meeks, 2000: 71).  They published a report by 
the name of Self-Regulation at Lloyd’s in 1980 which was freely available to the public.  The 
report found the main problem at Lloyd’s was the power to make rules and regulations as well as 
take disciplinary measures lay in the hands of the members at General Meetings and not with the 
Committee.  This was no longer practical as the number of members had grown exponentially 
over time and very few members actually attend the general meetings.  General meetings had 
become unsuitable for the creation of legislation, adjudication or discipline (Hodgson, 1986: 
293).  The task fell to the Committee who had no official power to do so.  The Fisher Report 
suggested the creation of a Council of Lloyd’s to be formed and be given the power to legislate, 
adjudicate and discipline. 
 
In 1983 this working party also looked into the allegation of a serious conflict of interests.  
Before the 1980s Lloyd’s was governed by a Committee of sixteen members, the majority of 
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which were comprised of leading underwriters at Lloyd’s as well as brokers and members’ 
agents.  By the 1980s it was realised that this was a serious conflict of interests since it could be 
said that underwriters could favour themselves with the authority they held as committee 
members.  Sir Henry Fisher combated these conflicts of interest (to make the interests of the 
external Names more represented in the committee of Lloyd’s) by exchanging nine of the current 
committee members with six external Names and three outsiders that were approved by the Bank 
of England.  In 1989 the committee was changed again to further combat the still existing 
problem of conflicts of interest, by replacing four committee members with four professionals 
that had nothing to do with Lloyd’s, thereby making the insiders of Lloyd’s only a small 
minority on the committee.  A third change was made in 1993, through a newly formed Business 
Plan,
250
 whereby the duties of the committee were split into two categories (1) a board focusing 
on the business of the market composed of professionals - a market board and, (2) a regulatory 
board to regulate the market composed of outsiders (Kelley, 1995: 7; Alston, 1993b: 16; Major, 
1995: 16).  Raphael (1995: 74) comments that all these changes show that “Lloyd’s is a place 
where individualism flourishes and where suspicion of authority runs deep”.  By 1995 Lloyd’s 
had six working members, five external members and five members nominated by the Bank of 
England (Bannister, 1995: 17). 
 
The Business Plan was put together by Lloyd’s “to maintain the confidence that is vital to our 
business, we must reconstruct our finances, maintain our solvency and deal with the problems of 
the past.  This will involve compromise by all sections of our Society.  The market and our on-
going Members will be asked to contribute towards a fair settlement of the liabilities of the 
Names who are unable to pay all their past losses” (Anonymous, 1995: 1). 
 
Further recommendations made by the Business Plan report were:
251
 (1) a bye-law should be 
made to make sure that an agent cannot include a clause in the agency agreement to limit his 
legal liability or to include a clause that would give an agent unilateral power to alter terms in the 
                                                 
250
 The first business plan was published in 1991 and the second one was published in 1993 showing the substantial 
progress already made by Lloyd’s in the implementation of the 1991 plan (Anonymous, 1995: 2).  The 
Reconstruction and Renewal (R&R) program then took the business plan even further through the development of 
Equitas (Major, 1995: 8). 
251
 Luessenhop & Mayer (1995: 145); Flower & Jones (1981: 183). 
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agency agreement; (2) underwriting agents should have professional indemnity insurance; (3) if 
an active underwriter can no longer perform his duties accurately the committee should be given 
the power to intervene; (4) underwriters should be discouraged from relying on the services 
provided by the brokers regarding the settling of claims; (5) a scheme has to be devised that can 
detect syndicates who exceed their premium income limit; (6) the council should control what 
can be included as a syndicate expense and what has to be borne by the agent from the agency 
fee; (7) the council of Lloyd’s should be made up of insiders as well as outsiders from the public 
to be the new policy-making body at Lloyd’s.  However, a committee made up of only insiders 
should still remain to handle the daily affairs at Lloyd’s; (8) Names agents were required to have 
Errors and omissions (E&O) insurance.  However, in 1991 this requirement was deleted as E&O 
insurers were no longer willing to cover Lloyd’s professionals after the extent of the exposure 
became clear at Lloyd’s; and lastly (9) the Fisher Report also mentioned another conflict of 
interest problem between brokers who owned underwriters as stated in the Cromer Report of 
1969.  The Fisher Report saw the danger that an underwriter may accept a risk contrary to his 
better judgement for the benefit of the broker or the broker may give certain risks to the 
syndicates owned by him without looking at the best interests of the policyholder.  To tackle this 
conflict of interest the report recommended that brokers were no longer allowed to acquire any 
underwriting agents and had five years in which to divest themselves of the managing agents 
they already owned (Hodgson, 1986: 296; Davison, 1987:48). 
 
Concerns of the Fisher Report included (1) underwriters would place the interests of Lloyd’s 
above the interests of the Names; (2) Names did not receive enough information on the 
syndicates they were about to be placed on by their managing agents; and (3) agents did not 
understand the obligations they had towards the Name which was to always act in the best 
interests of the Name and to exercise due care, reasonable skill and diligence in performing 
business for the Name (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 145; Raphael, 1995: 93). 
 
“The Fisher Report was used as the lever to prod Parliament to deliver a new Lloyd’s Act” to 
implement the recommendations and to alleviate the concerns (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 
146).  The Report concluded that a new Lloyd’s Act is definitely needed at Lloyd’s and the 
report reaffirmed that Lloyd’s was to stay a self regulated organization (Davison, 1987: 47).  
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Parliament accepted the recommendations made by the Fisher Report and a new Lloyd’s Act was 
formed (Davison, 1987: 48). 
 
The Neill Report (1987) 
 
After Davison resigned the government decided to appoint an inquiry into the defects of the 
existing constitution of Lloyd’s.  The Government starting taking notice of Lloyd’s problems in 
April 1985 when the members of Lloyd’s were suffering large losses due to the PCW syndicate 
and by August/September of that same year the use of baby syndicates to the detriment of Names 
became known, adding fuel to the suspicion of negligence, fraud and dishonesty at Lloyd’s 
(Davison, 1987: 2).  Lloyd’s had a major flaw – its current constitution was unable to effectively 
regulate the market.  Lloyd’s did not share the view of Davison for the need of more reform and 
reconstruction and took offence to his resignation at the weakest point in Lloyd’s history.  
Davison was of the opinion that “change would not have occurred without the outside pressures 
caused by my resignation and the resulting Neill Inquiry” (Davison, 1987:2). 
 
A government inquiry into Lloyd’s, led by Sir Patrick Neill, the vice-chancellor of Oxford 
University (Raphael, 1985: 125) started in January 1986 to inquire into the regulation of Lloyd’s 
and whether it was correctly structured to look after the needs of its investors i.e. its Names.  The 
inquiry looked at the scandals at Lloyd’s from 1982 onwards and the conflict of interests at 
Lloyd’s.  The Neill Report was published in February 1987 which would bring to an end the 
control of the market by a few professionals at Lloyd’s.  The Report stated that many 
underwriters completely disregarded their legal obligation to always act in the best interest of 
their Names, with full disclosure of what is happening with the investors’ money and had 
secretly made profits at their Names expense.  An example of how this was done was thorough 
baby syndicates, not all of them were corrupt (Raphael, 1985: 126).  “Baby syndicates were too 
often a way of putting additional profits in the pockets of the professional underwriters and their 
friends at the expense of external Names” (Raphael, 1995, 126).  This led to the Report 
recommending that baby syndicates should not be allowed at Lloyd’s.  This recommendation 
was implemented two years later, in 1989. 
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Another comment contained in the Neill’s Report was that “standard underwriting agreements 
failed to protect the interests of the Names” (Raphael, 1995: 127).  A further criticism was 
Lloyd’s refusal to publish agents’ charges to stop agents from charging high commission rates. 
 
The Neill Report brought attention to the fact that over the previous 20 years Lloyd’s had been 
accepting outsiders as investors at Lloyd’s in addition to the internal Names.  The insiders were 
not happy with the collapse of the exclusive club of Lloyd’s and looked at the new outsiders with 
contempt.  From 1982 things started to go horribly wrong with the creation of the Howden, PCW 
and Brooks & Dooley where some exclusive insiders took advantage of their superior knowledge 
of the market and dishonestly took millions from their external investors for their own personal 
gain (Davison, 1987: 2).  This problem at Lloyd’s could not simply be solved by expelling the 
bad apples as the problem was much more deeply rooted in that many members at Lloyd’s, 
including senior members, were completely ignorant of their duty to always act in the best 
interest of their Names without making any secret personal profits and had no knowledge of their 
duty to disclose material facts to their investors (Davison, 1987: 3). 
 
Another issue that the Neill Report dealt with was the close relationship between the delinquent 
members and the Society of Lloyd’s.  Only a handful of the members at Lloyd’s were negligent 
and made personal profits at the expense of others. The rest of the members were innocent of any 
wrongdoings, but the public held the perception that all members at Lloyd’s were alike.  The 
wrongdoings of a few seriously tarnished the reputation of the whole of Lloyd’s.  This perception 
needed to be dealt with. 
 
In summary: The recommendations of the Neill Report (Davison, 1987; Raphael, 1995) 
 
 The Neill Report put forward the idea that the market should be self regulated and that 
market practitioners in investment markets should be independently scrutinized.  It also 
recommended that adequate supervision should be made of self regulating markets. 
 Auditors and accountants should be used to check the accounts of the market and approve 
them if they are correct.  This procedure will decrease the possibility of any negligence, 
fraud or dishonestly being concealed (Davison, 1987: 4). 
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 The Council at Lloyd’s should consist of a majority of independent nominated members 
leaving the working members in the minority.  This would diminish the power given to 
the insiders at Lloyd’s to control the market, thereby diminishing the attempts made by 
insiders to benefit themselves at the expense of investors.  This was the “end of a 
shameful era at Lloyd’s which, more than anything else, buried the myth that ‘utmost 
good faith’ still held sway” (Raphael, 1995: 127).  The Names no longer trusted the 
underwriters and their confidence in Lloyd’s was fading (Raphael, 1995: 128). 
 
The Walker Inquiry (1992) 
 
Lloyd’s realised that the damaging accusations would not merely disappear with time.  David 
Coleridge, the chairman at Lloyd’s, asked Sir David Walker to carry out an independent inquiry 
into the allegations of a rigged market through the placing of only external Names on the more 
risky syndicates.  This led to Lloyd’s releasing records of which members were part of which 
syndicates which demonstrated that fewer internal working Names were part of the syndicates 
which suffered the majority of the losses while they were over-represented on the most profitable 
syndicates.  However, there was also some evidence that some syndicates which made 
substantial losses had a fair number of internal Names.  Newspapers were of the view that since 
internal Names had inside knowledge at Lloyd’s therefore they stayed clear of the spiral 
syndicates and were putting external Names on such syndicates (Raphael, 1995: 305). 
 
Roland Task Force (1992) 
 
An attempt to deal with the problem of open years was made by David Roland, a broker, who 
headed the Lloyd’s task force in the 1990s named the Roland Task Force.  The idea of 
investigating the capital needs at Lloyd’s was first put into motion by Murray Lawrence and was 
chaired by David Rowland (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 79), who took over from David 
Coleridge as the chairman of Lloyd’s in 1993.252  He reassured the Names that the future would 
hold many profits for Lloyd’s (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 19).  Lloyd’s published a report for 
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 He become the first paid chairman at Lloyd’s with a starting salary of £450 000 pounds a year (Alston, 1993a: 
33; Cover, 1995: 16). 
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the future and it was focused on making profits (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 77).  “The overall 
aim of the Lloyd’s task force is to achieve, through evolution, steady real growth in capacity and 
income” (Alston, 1992a: 57).  The Rowland Task Force published a report entitled ‘Lloyd’s: A 
route forward’ in 1992 revealing the real reason for the sudden increase in Names.  New Names 
were being placed on syndicates that were reinsuring the risks of older syndicates.  By 1995 
Lloyd’s had lost up to $14 billion to claims (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 29). 
 
The Roland Task Force document can be divided into two sections.  The first section contains 
recommendations which do not require a change in the law governing Lloyd’s and can be 
implemented as soon as the Lloyd’s council makes a decision.  The second section recommended 
changes to be made to the Lloyd’s Act and took much longer to implement (Alston, 1992a: 56). 
 
The Task Force stated that the main cause of the crisis was the failure of inadequate market 
regulations to keep Lloyd’s in line (Raphael, 1995: 297).  Underwriters were able to take on way 
too much risk (were allowed too much capacity) and the number of Names increased 
dramatically to provide capital for the increased amount of risk.  The report went further to say 
that during this time of increased capital flow the price of insurance was decreasing while the 
cost of administration of such risks was increasing i.e. costs were rising while premiums were 
decreasing (Raphael, 1995: 298). 
 
The findings were published on the 15
th
 January 1992 with the Task Force proposing that the 
following issues need to be considered at Lloyd’s (Raphael, 1995): 
 Open years on asbestos and pollution needed to be dealt with – it was suggested that 
Names try to trade through their losses
253
 (Alston, 1992a: 50).  The old year losses that 
Lloyd’s had accumulated over the period 1985 – 1988 amounted to £1.6billion as a result 
of the under-reserving done by Lloyd’s.  The Task Force stated that there was not really a 
way to fix the problem of open years, they should just be accepted and recommended that 
                                                 
253
 Trading through a loss means that if a company makes a loss in one year, it is allowed to continue working in the 
next year in an attempt to make up for the loss suffered in the previous year.  Over the years, as the company starts 
making a profit it can be used to cancel out previous loss years.  A Name was able to defer the payment of a loss to 
the following year, accept a 5% credit given to them by Lloyd’s as an advanced payment on the assumed profits 
made in that following year which allowed Names to meet their deposit requirements and be allowed to underwrite 
in that following year (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 85). 
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Lloyd’s focus on a better reserving method for the future (Raphael, 1995: 299).  
Centrewrite
254
 was to continue to offer quotes to interested Names after amending its 
approach to the open year problem (Alston, 1992a: 57). 
 The Capital base needed to be kept at Lloyd’s through the introduction of corporate 
capital.  This was a departure from the tradition of using individuals on an unlimited 
liability basis only.  Lloyd’s must be able to offer capacity for risks to its clients; the task 
force recommended that Lloyd’s introduce corporate capital on limited liability only.255  
This was done with 25 corporate firms joining Lloyd’s in 1994.256  By 1996 there were 
165 corporate members that had joined the Lloyd’s market (Cover, 1996a: 35).  
Continuing Names had the choice to either convert to limited liability or to stay with 
unlimited liability (Major, 1995: 16). 
 Change the administration of the market to reduce admin costs.  The Task Force 
suggested that Lloyd’s be split into two sections (the same suggestion that was made by 
the Fisher Report).  The first dealing with the executive functions and the daily running’s 
of Lloyd’s where a board was to be set up that would prescribe the trading policy at 
Lloyd’s i.e. the Market Board, and the second focusing solely on regulation of the market 
i.e. the Regulatory Board (Alston, 1993b: 16).  This particular recommendation was 
initially not accepted by the Lloyd’s council but eventually Lloyd’s conceded to review 
the idea via a working group set up for this purpose (Alston, 1992a: 57).  The Market 
board and Regulatory Board were later replaced by the formation of the Franchise Board 
as from January 2003 (Cover, 2002e: 57; HM Treasury, 2008: 7). 
 Changing the underlying principle of Lloyd’s from unlimited liability to limited liability 
in an attempt to restore the faith of the public in Lloyd’s (Fields, Klein & Myskowski, 
1998: 175).  All losses were recommended to be capped as from 1993.  However, the 
report was silent on the Names that had already suffered looses based on the old regime 
of unlimited liability.  The Task Force was of the opinion that “the losses of the worst hit 
were so concentrated that it made neither commercial nor political sense to bail them out” 
                                                 
254
 For a discussion on Centrewrite refer to 4.4.1.2. 
255
 Alston (1992a: 57); Alston (1993c: 14); Bailey (1994: 40); Noonan (1996: 48). 
256
 Catlin, Harrison, James et al (1998: 54); Cover (1993d: 4); Cover (1994a: 4); Cover (1997: 13); Bannister (1995: 
17). 
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(Raphael, 1995: 300).  The introduction of limited liability is a fundamental change to the 
structure of Lloyd’s. 
 Retention of the three year method of accounting (Alston, 1992a: 57). 
 Strengthening of Names rights (Alston, 1992a: 57). 
 Introduction of Members’ Agents’’ Pooling Arrangements (MAPA) as from January 
1993 (Alston, 1992a: 57). 
 
Two main recommendations from the Rowland Report needed urgent attention by Lloyd’s: 
Firstly, the diversification of the risks taken on by Names.  This was done through the creation of 
the Members’ Agents Pooling Arrangements (MAPAs).  Diversification was needed for the 
Names to spread their risks and not suffer major looses all at the same time.  Secondly, the 
capital received from current and new Names was not enough to boost the capacity at Lloyd’s.  
The Roland Task Force recommended allowing corporate capital to be introduced on a limited 
basis (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 258; Kelley, 1995: 7).  Corporations however would have to 
be completely isolated from all previous losses suffered by Lloyd’s otherwise no corporation 
would join (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 259).  This clearly called for a fundamental 
restructuring of Lloyd’s. 
 
Following the restructuring Lloyd’s was split into four separate divisions i.e. Regulatory 
services, Marketing services, Systems & operations and Finance & operations (Alston, 1993a: 
36). 
 
 
 
 
Members Hardship Scheme 
 
In 1989,
257
 Lloyd’s started a Hardship scheme where Names who were in serious financial 
difficulties stopped further underwriting and were allowed to use some of their deposited money 
                                                 
257
 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/llmanual/llm5030.htm 
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at Lloyd’s to cover basic living expenses.  This stopped the cash calls coming in, however this 
scheme required the Name to sign over all possessions (house and cars) and wealth (including 
any inheritance received or profitable sideline ventures) to be able to receive a small monthly 
payment.  Once the Name died Lloyd’s would be able to sell the possessions to pay for that 
Name’s debts. 
 
For many Names to ask for help from the very institution which caused them the trouble was a 
testament to the strength of their character.  Not many Names chose these hardship offers 
(Raphael, 1995: 278).  However, there were still enough Names to enter the program to force 
Lloyd’s to close the scheme in 1994 as the number of Names applying to this scheme grew 
unmanageable and Lloyd’s was unable to sustain so many people (Luessenhop & Mayer, 1995: 
86; Raphael, 1995: 352). 
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14. Appendix 5 
 
Letter from Commondore Nourse 
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(McCall, 1903). 
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15. Appendix 6 
 
Table 8: Lloyd’s premiums received in South Africa (1925 - 2000)  
 
Year 
Nominal 
Value (£) 
Nominal Value 
(R) 
Rounded 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Extrapolated 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Inflation 
Rate 
Real R Value 
(R'000) 
2000        967,984 1.00  967,984 
1999        898,039 1.05  946,300 
1998    828,094,000  828,094  828,094 1.11  918,064 
1997    758,149,000  758,149  758,149 1.18  898,281 
1996        728,982 1.29  938,201 
1995        699,816 1.38  966,596 
1994        670,649 1.50  1,006,980 
1993    641,482,000  641,482  641,482 1.63  1,048,173 
1992    712,685,000  712,685  712,685 1.80  1,279,506 
1991    628,181,000  628,181  628,181 2.04  1,282,002 
1990    475,600,000  475,600  475,600 2.36  1,121,698 
1989    395,382,000  395,382  395,382 2.70  1,065,720 
1988    273,779,000  273,779  273,779 3.09  844,997 
1987    183,789,000  183,789  183,789 3.48  640,380 
1986        173,751 4.05  703,445 
1985        163,713 4.81  787,082 
1984    153,675,000  153,675  153,675 5.59  858,520 
1983    129,627,000  129,627  129,627 6.21  805,137 
1982    92,467,000  92,467  92,467 6.99  646,622 
1981    65,411,000  65,411  65,411 8.00  523,288 
1980    48,163,000  48,163  48,163 9.26  445,954 
1979    39,626,000  39,626  39,626 10.53  417,116 
1978    37,960,000  37,960  37,960 11.90  451,905 
1977    34,940,000  34,940  34,940 13.16  459,737 
1976    30,941,000  30,941  30,941 14.71  455,015 
1975    22,833,000  22,833  22,833 16.39  374,311 
1974    19,550,000  19,550  19,550 18.52  362,037 
1973    14,644,000  14,644  14,644 20.83  305,083 
1972    10,373,000  10,373  10,373 22.73  235,750 
1971    7,786,000  7,786  7,786 23.81  185,381 
1970    7,153,000  7,153  7,153 25.64  183,410 
1969    6,746,000  6,746  6,746 27.03  182,324 
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Year 
Nominal 
Value (£) 
Nominal Value 
(R) 
Rounded 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Extrapolated 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Inflation 
Rate 
Real R Value 
(R'000) 
1968    7,648,000  7,648  7,648 27.78  212,444 
1967    7,716,000  7,716  7,716 28.57  220,457 
1966    4,999,000  4,999  4,999 29.41  147,029 
1965    5,542,000  5,542  5,542 30.30  167,939 
1964    5,023,000  5,023  5,023 31.25  156,969 
1963    4,800,000  4,800  4,800 32.26  154,839 
1962    4,273,444  4,274  4,274 32.26  137,871 
1961 1,924,940  3,849,880  3,850  3,850 33.33  128,333 
1960        3,886 33.33  129,533 
1959 1,960,855  3,921,710  3,922  3,922 34.48  135,241 
1958 1,795,903  3,591,806  3,592  3,592 34.48  123,862 
1957 1,483,547  2,967,094  2,968  2,968 35.71  106,000 
1956 1,379,597  2,759,194  2,760  2,760 37.04  102,222 
1955 1,238,413  2,476,826  2,477  2,477 37.04  91,741 
1954 1,170,302  2,340,604  2,341  2,341 38.46  90,038 
1953 1,110,698  2,221,396  2,222  2,222 40.00  88,880 
1952 1,086,761  2,173,522  2,174  2,174 40.00  86,960 
1951 883,163  1,766,326  1,767  1,767 45.45  80,318 
1950 743,691  1,487,382  1,488  1,488 47.62  70,857 
1949        1,373 50.00  68,625 
1948        1,257 50.00  62,850 
1947        1,142 52.63  60,079 
1946        1,026 55.56  57,000 
1945        911 58.82  53,559 
1944        795 58.82  46,765 
1943        680 58.82  39,971 
1942        564 62.50  35,250 
1941        449 71.43  32,036 
1940 166,065  332,130  333  333 71.43  23,786 
1939 137,890  275,780  276  276 76.92  21,231 
1938 155,991  311,982  312  312 76.92  24,000 
1937 140,685  281,370  282  282 76.92  21,692 
1936 109,296  218,592  219  219 83.33  18,250 
1935 65,669  131,338  132  132 83.33  11,000 
1934 63,614  127,228  128  128 83.33  10,667 
1933 51,287  102,574  103  103 83.33  8,583 
1932 54,871  109,742  110  110 76.92  8,462 
1931 37,522  75,044  76  76 76.92  5,846 
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Year 
Nominal 
Value (£) 
Nominal Value 
(R) 
Rounded 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Extrapolated 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Inflation 
Rate 
Real R Value 
(R'000) 
1930 30,259  60,518  61  61 71.43  4,357 
1929 23,908  47,816  48  48 71.43  3,429 
1928 24,342  48,684  49  49 71.43  3,500 
1927 27,808  55,616  56  56 71.43  4,000 
1926 16,360  32,720  33  33 71.43  2,357 
1925 13,793  27,586  28  28 71.43  2,000 
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16. Appendix 7 
 
Table 9: Claims paid by Lloyd’s in South Africa (1925 - 2000) 
 
Year 
Nominal 
Value (£) 
Nominal 
Value (R) 
Rounded 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Extrapolated 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Inflation 
Rate 
Real R Value 
(R'000) 
2000        353,722 1.00  353,722 
1999        322,201 1.05  339,516 
1998    290,680,000  290,680  290,680 1.11  322,262 
1997    259,159,000  259,159  259,159 1.18  307,060 
1996        244,309 1.29  314,426 
1995        229,459 1.38  316,932 
1994        214,609 1.50  322,236 
1993    199,759,000  199,759  199,759 1.63  326,404 
1992    204,778,000  204,778  204,778 1.80  367,645 
1991    255,101,000  255,101  255,101 2.04  520,614 
1990    186,752,000  186,752  186,752 2.36  440,453 
1989    124,538,000  124,538  124,538 2.70  335,682 
1988    98,858,000  98,858  98,858 3.09  305,117 
1987    74,415,000  74,415  74,415 3.48  259,286 
1986        67,020 4.05  271,335 
1985        59,624 4.81  286,655 
1984    52,229,000  52,229  52,229 5.59  291,782 
1983    35,501,000  35,501  35,501 6.21  220,503 
1982    25,631,000  25,631  25,631 6.99  179,238 
1981    23,945,000  23,945  23,945 8.00  191,560 
1980    16,647,000  16,647  16,647 9.26  154,139 
1979    14,462,000  14,462  14,462 10.53  152,232 
1978    18,413,000  18,413  18,413 11.90  219,202 
1977    14,626,000  14,626  14,626 13.16  192,447 
1976    13,145,000  13,145  13,145 14.71  193,309 
1975    9,503,000  9,503  9,503 16.39  155,787 
1974    6,974,000  6,974  6,974 18.52  129,148 
1973    5,661,000  5,661  5,661 20.83  117,938 
1972    3,600,000  3,600  3,600 22.73  81,818 
1971    2,683,000  2,683  2,683 23.81  63,881 
1970    3,001,000  3,001  3,001 25.64  76,949 
1969    3,627,000  3,627  3,627 27.03  98,027 
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Year 
Nominal 
Value (£) 
Nominal 
Value (R) 
Rounded 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Extrapolated 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Inflation 
Rate 
Real R Value 
(R'000) 
1968    4,723,000  4,723  4,723 27.78  131,194 
1967    4,802,000  4,802  4,802 28.57  137,200 
1966    2,418,000  2,418  2,418 29.41  71,118 
1965    2,400,000  2,400  2,400 30.30  72,727 
1964    2,396,000  2,396  2,396 31.25  74,875 
1963    2,574,000  2,574  2,574 32.26  83,032 
1962    3,213,123  3,214  3,214 32.26  103,677 
1961 1,089,859  2,179,718  2,180  2,180 33.33  72,667 
1960        2,075 33.33  69,150 
1959 984,356  1,968,712  1,969  1,969 34.48  67,897 
1958 1,009,530  2,019,060  2,020  2,020 34.48  69,655 
1957 779,502  1,559,004  1,560  1,560 35.71  55,714 
1956 742,237  1,484,474  1,485  1,485 37.04  55,000 
1955 783,140  1,566,280  1,567  1,567 37.04  58,037 
1954 514,221  1,028,442  1,029  1,029 38.46  39,577 
1953 731,453  1,462,906  1,463  1,463 40.00  58,520 
1952 450,891  901,782  902  902 40.00  36,080 
1951 388,811  777,622  778  778 45.45  35,364 
1950 321,875  643,750  644  644 47.62  30,667 
1949        596 50.00  29,810 
1948        548 50.00  27,420 
1947        501 52.63  26,347 
1946        453 55.56  25,156 
1945        405 58.82  23,824 
1944        357 58.82  21,012 
1943        309 58.82  18,200 
1942        262 62.50  16,350 
1941        214 71.43  15,271 
1940 82,771  165,542  166  166 71.43  11,857 
1939 62,979  125,958  126  126 76.92  9,692 
1938 59,712  119,424  120  120 76.92  9,231 
1937 60,915  121,830  122  122 76.92  9,385 
1936 34,090  68,180  69  69 83.33  5,750 
1935 41,682  83,364  84  84 83.33  7,000 
1934 29,517  59,034  60  60 83.33  5,000 
1933 29,763  59,526  60  60 83.33  5,000 
1932 26,358  52,716  53  53 76.92  4,077 
1931 11,982  23,964  24  24 76.92  1,846 
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Year 
Nominal 
Value (£) 
Nominal 
Value (R) 
Rounded 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Extrapolated 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Inflation 
Rate 
Real R Value 
(R'000) 
1930 11,379  22,758  23  23 71.43  1,643 
1929 8,240  16,480  17  17 71.43  1,214 
1928 6,585  13,170  14  14 71.43  1,000 
1927 7,975  15,950  16  16 71.43  1,143 
1926 4,838  9,676  10  10 71.43  714 
1925 3,103  6,206  7  7 71.43  500 
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17. Appendix 8 
 
Table 10: Lloyd’s commission paid in South Africa (1925 - 2000) 
 
Year 
Nominal 
Value (£) 
Nominal 
Value (R) 
Rounded 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Extrapolated 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Inflation 
Rate 
Real R Value 
(R'000) 
2000        135,161 1.00  135,161 
1999        121,544 1.05  128,076 
1998    107,927,000  107,927  107,927 1.11  119,653 
1997    94,310,000  94,310  94,310 1.18  111,742 
1996        93,392 1.29  120,196 
1995        92,474 1.38  127,727 
1994        91,556 1.50  137,471 
1993    90,638,000  90,638  90,638 1.63  148,101 
1992    91,551,000  91,551  91,551 1.80  164,364 
1991    87,319,000  87,319  87,319 2.04  178,202 
1990    63,878,000  63,878  63,878 2.36  150,656 
1989    51,862,000  51,862  51,862 2.70  139,790 
1988    37,937,000  37,937  37,937 3.09  117,090 
1987    26,740,000  26,740  26,740 3.48  93,171 
1986        25,625 4.05  103,745 
1985        24,510 4.81  117,837 
1984    23,395,000  23,395  23,395 5.59  130,698 
1983    21,924,000  21,924  21,924 6.21  136,174 
1982    16,287,000  16,287  16,287 6.99  113,895 
1981    11,527,000  11,527  11,527 8.00  92,216 
1980    8,455,000  8,455  8,455 9.26  78,287 
1979    7,687,000  7,687  7,687 10.53  80,916 
1978    6,792,000  6,792  6,792 11.90  80,857 
1977    6,762,000  6,762  6,762 13.16  88,974 
1976    5,210,000  5,210  5,210 14.71  76,618 
1975    3,945,000  3,945  3,945 16.39  64,672 
1974    3,371,000  3,371  3,371 18.52  62,426 
1973    2,458,000  2,458  2,458 20.83  51,208 
1972    1,727,000  1,727  1,727 22.73  39,250 
1971    1,327,000  1,327  1,327 23.81  31,595 
1970    1,171,000  1,171  1,171 25.64  30,026 
1969    1,262,000  1,262  1,262 27.03  34,108 
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Year 
Nominal 
Value (£) 
Nominal 
Value (R) 
Rounded 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Extrapolated 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Inflation 
Rate 
Real R Value 
(R'000) 
1968    1,449,000  1,449  1,449 27.78  40,250 
1967    1,405,000  1,405  1,405 28.57  40,143 
1966    927,000  927  927 29.41  27,265 
1965    1,153,000  1,153  1,153 30.30  34,939 
1964    1,051,000  1,051  1,051 31.25  32,844 
1963    989,000  989  989 32.26  31,903 
1962    926,489  927  927 32.26  29,903 
1961 420,361  840,722  841  841 33.33  28,033 
1960        830 33.33  27,667 
1959 409,467  818,934  819  819 34.48  28,241 
1958 395,386  790,772  791  791 34.48  27,276 
1957 338,000  676,000  676  676 35.71  24,143 
1956 323,851  647,702  648  648 37.04  24,000 
1955 297,912  595,824  596  596 37.04  22,074 
1954 276,095  552,190  553  553 38.46  21,269 
1953 258,480  516,960  517  517 40.00  20,680 
1952 243,223  486,446  487  487 40.00  19,480 
1951 202,921  405,842  406  406 45.45  18,455 
1950 168,739  337,478  338  338 47.62  16,095 
1949        309 50.00  15,455 
1948        280 50.00  14,010 
1947        251 52.63  13,226 
1946        222 55.56  12,356 
1945        194 58.82  11,382 
1944        165 58.82  9,682 
1943        136 58.82  7,982 
1942        107 62.50  6,675 
1941        78 71.43  5,564 
1940 24,464  48,928  49  49 71.43  3,500 
1939 24,203  48,406  49  49 76.92  3,769 
1938 28,951  57,902  58  58 76.92  4,462 
1937 24,731  49,462  50  50 76.92  3,846 
1936 18,875  37,750  38  38 83.33  3,167 
1935 9,080  18,160  19  19 83.33  1,583 
1934 8,706  17,412  18  18 83.33  1,500 
1933 6,292  12,584  13  13 83.33  1,083 
1932 5,395  10,790  11  11 76.92  846 
1931 4,832  9,664  10  10 76.92  769 
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Year 
Nominal 
Value (£) 
Nominal 
Value (R) 
Rounded 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Extrapolated 
Nominal R 
Value (R'000) 
Inflation 
Rate 
Real R Value 
(R'000) 
1930 3,770  7,540  8  8 71.43  571 
1929 3,057  6,114  7  7 71.43  500 
1928 3,159  6,318  7  7 71.43  500 
1927 3,620  7,240  8  8 71.43  571 
1926 2,128  4,256  5  5 71.43  357 
1925 2,160  4,320  5  5 71.43  357 
 
  
235 
 
18. Appendix 9 
 
Table 11: Lloyd’s South African paid claims ratio, combined paid claims ratio and 
commission ratio (1925 - 2000). 
 
Year 
 Paid Claims 
Ratio (%)  
 Commission 
Ratio (%)  
Combined Paid 
Claims Ratio (%) 
2000 37 14 51 
1999 36 14 49 
1998 35 13 48 
1997 34 12 47 
1996 34 13 46 
1995 33 13 46 
1994 32 14 46 
1993 31 14 45 
1992 29 13 42 
1991 41 14 55 
1990 39 13 53 
1989 31 13 45 
1988 36 14 50 
1987 40 15 55 
1986 39 15 53 
1985 36 15 51 
1984 34 15 49 
1983 27 17 44 
1982 28 18 45 
1981 37 18 54 
1980 35 18 52 
1979 36 19 56 
1978 49 18 66 
1977 42 19 61 
1976 42 17 59 
1975 42 17 59 
1974 36 17 53 
1973 39 17 55 
1972 35 17 51 
1971 34 17 52 
1970 42 16 58 
1969 54 19 72 
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Year 
 Paid Claims 
Ratio (%)  
 Commission 
Ratio (%)  
Combined Paid 
Claims Ratio (%) 
1968 62 19 81 
1967 62 18 80 
1966 48 19 67 
1965 43 21 64 
1964 48 21 69 
1963 54 21 74 
1962 75 22 97 
1961 57 22 78 
1960 53 21 75 
1959 50 21 71 
1958 56 22 78 
1957 53 23 75 
1956 54 23 77 
1955 63 24 87 
1954 44 24 68 
1953 66 23 89 
1952 41 22 64 
1951 44 23 67 
1950 43 23 66 
1949 43 23 66 
1948 44 22 66 
1947 44 22 66 
1946 44 22 66 
1945 44 21 66 
1944 45 21 66 
1943 46 20 66 
1942 46 19 65 
1941 48 17 65 
1940 50 15 65 
1939 46 18 63 
1938 38 19 57 
1937 43 18 61 
1936 32 17 49 
1935 64 14 78 
1934 47 14 61 
1933 58 13 71 
1932 48 10 58 
1931 32 13 45 
1930 38 13 51 
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Year 
 Paid Claims 
Ratio (%)  
 Commission 
Ratio (%)  
Combined Paid 
Claims Ratio (%) 
1929 35 15 50 
1928 29 14 43 
1927 29 14 43 
1926 30 15 45 
1925 25 18 43 
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19. Appendix 10 
 
Table 12: Gross premiums received in the South African insurance market excluding 
Lloyd’s (1925 - 2000) 
Year 
Nominal £ 
Value Nominal R Value 
Rounded 
Nominal R 
Value ('000) 
Extrapolated 
Nominal R 
Value ('000) 
Inflation 
Rate 
Real R Value 
('000) 
2000   R 28,359,258,000 R 28,359,258 R 28,359,258 1.00 R 28,359,258 
1999   R 24,428,316,000 R 24,428,316 R 24,428,316 1.05 R 25,741,113 
1998   R 25,933,572,000 R 25,933,572 R 25,933,572 1.11 R 28,751,188 
1997   R 23,445,933,000 R 23,445,933 R 23,445,933 1.18 R 27,779,541 
1996       R 20,714,817 1.29 R 26,659,996 
1995       R 17,983,702 1.38 R 24,839,367 
1994       R 15,252,586 1.50 R 22,901,780 
1993   R 12,521,470,000 R 12,521,470 R 12,521,470 1.63 R 20,459,918 
1992   R 10,650,375,000 R 10,650,375 R 10,650,375 1.80 R 19,120,961 
1991   R 7,452,228,000 R 7,452,228 R 7,452,228 2.04 R 15,208,629 
1990   R 6,121,995,000 R 6,121,995 R 6,121,995 2.36 R 14,438,667 
1989   R 5,493,717,000 R 5,493,717 R 5,493,717 2.70 R 14,807,863 
1988   R 2,719,174,902 R 2,719,175 R 2,719,175 3.09 R 8,392,515 
1987   R 2,611,729,000 R 2,611,729 R 2,611,729 3.48 R 9,100,101 
1986       R 2,423,339 4.05 R 9,811,088 
1985       R 2,234,948 4.81 R 10,744,944 
1984   R 2,046,558,000 R 2,046,558 R 2,046,558 5.59 R 11,433,285 
1983   R 1,696,777,562 R 1,696,778 R 1,696,778 6.21 R 10,538,994 
1982   R 1,385,379,000 R 1,385,379 R 1,385,379 6.99 R 9,687,965 
1981   R 1,154,560,000 R 1,154,560 R 1,154,560 8.00 R 9,236,480 
1980   R 934,816,000 R 934,816 R 934,816 9.26 R 8,655,704 
1979   R 745,550,000 R 745,550 R 745,550 10.53 R 7,847,895 
1978   R 1,329,912,000 R 1,329,912 R 1,329,912 11.90 R 15,832,286 
1977   R 583,871,000 R 583,871 R 583,871 13.16 R 7,682,513 
1976   R 473,499,000 R 473,499 R 473,499 14.71 R 6,963,221 
1975   R 404,726,000 R 404,726 R 404,726 16.39 R 6,634,852 
1974   R 350,083,000 R 350,083 R 350,083 18.52 R 6,483,019 
1973   R 314,760,000 R 314,760 R 314,760 20.83 R 6,557,500 
1972   R 273,965,000 R 273,965 R 273,965 22.73 R 6,226,477 
1971   R 233,428,000 R 233,428 R 233,428 23.81 R 5,557,810 
1970   R 183,100,000 R 183,100 R 183,100 25.64 R 4,694,872 
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Year 
Nominal £ 
Value Nominal R Value 
Rounded 
Nominal R 
Value ('000) 
Extrapolated 
Nominal R 
Value ('000) 
Inflation 
Rate 
Real R Value 
('000) 
1969   R 157,822,000 R 157,822 R 157,822 27.03 R 4,265,459 
1968   R 117,726,000 R 117,726 R 117,726 27.78 R 3,270,167 
1967   R 122,631,000 R 122,631 R 122,631 28.57 R 3,503,743 
1966   R 125,589,000 R 125,589 R 125,589 29.41 R 3,693,794 
1965   R 125,589,000 R 125,589 R 125,589 30.30 R 3,805,727 
1964   R 116,598,000 R 116,598 R 116,598 31.25 R 3,643,688 
1963   R 112,939,000 R 112,939 R 112,939 32.26 R 3,643,194 
1962   R 80,763,645 R 80,764 R 80,764 32.26 R 2,605,290 
1961 £39,534,396 R 79,068,792 R 79,069 R 79,069 33.33 R 2,635,633 
1960 £39,534,396 R 79,068,792 R 79,069 R 79,069 33.33 R 2,635,633 
1959 £34,675,245 R 69,350,490 R 69,351 R 69,351 34.48 R 2,391,414 
1958 £33,665,822 R 67,331,644 R 67,332 R 67,332 34.48 R 2,321,793 
1957 £30,059,678 R 60,119,356 R 60,120 R 60,120 35.71 R 2,147,143 
1956 £28,046,414 R 56,092,828 R 56,093 R 56,093 37.04 R 2,077,519 
1955 £25,551,146 R 51,102,292 R 51,103 R 51,103 37.04 R 1,892,704 
1954 £22,341,845 R 44,683,690 R 44,684 R 44,684 38.46 R 1,718,615 
1953 £20,002,717 R 40,005,434 R 40,006 R 40,006 40.00 R 1,600,240 
1952 £18,392,197 R 36,784,394 R 36,785 R 36,785 40.00 R 1,471,400 
1951 £19,775,876 R 39,551,752 R 39,552 R 39,552 45.45 R 1,797,818 
1950 £16,722,587 R 33,445,174 R 33,446 R 33,446 47.62 R 1,592,667 
1949       R 44,159 50.00 R 2,207,930 
1948       R 54,871 50.00 R 2,743,560 
1947       R 65,584 52.63 R 3,451,779 
1946       R 76,296 55.56 R 4,238,689 
1945       R 87,009 58.82 R 5,118,176 
1944       R 97,722 58.82 R 5,748,329 
1943       R 108,434 58.82 R 6,378,482 
1942       R 119,147 62.50 R 7,446,675 
1941       R 129,859 71.43 R 9,275,671 
1940 £70,285,937 R 140,571,874 R 140,572 R 140,572 71.43 R 10,040,857 
1939 £72,095,752 R 144,191,504 R 144,192 R 144,192 76.92 R 11,091,692 
1938 £71,813,047 R 143,626,094 R 143,627 R 143,627 76.92 R 11,048,231 
1937 £67,876,236 R 135,752,472 R 135,753 R 135,753 76.92 R 10,442,538 
1936 £65,121,526 R 130,243,052 R 130,244 R 130,244 83.33 R 10,853,667 
1935 £66,696,334 R 133,392,668 R 133,393 R 133,393 83.33 R 11,116,083 
1934 £62,485,839 R 124,971,678 R 124,972 R 124,972 83.33 R 10,414,333 
1933 £62,628,429 R 125,256,858 R 125,257 R 125,257 83.33 R 10,438,083 
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Year 
Nominal £ 
Value Nominal R Value 
Rounded 
Nominal R 
Value ('000) 
Extrapolated 
Nominal R 
Value ('000) 
Inflation 
Rate 
Real R Value 
('000) 
1932 £62,301,766 R 124,603,532 R 124,604 R 124,604 76.92 R 9,584,923 
1931 £65,563,333 R 131,126,666 R 131,127 R 131,127 76.92 R 10,086,692 
1930 £65,349,418 R 130,698,836 R 130,699 R 130,699 71.43 R 9,335,643 
1929 £62,763,758 R 125,527,516 R 125,528 R 125,528 71.43 R 8,966,286 
1928 £57,394,665 R 114,789,330 R 114,790 R 114,790 71.43 R 8,199,286 
1927 £53,705,330 R 107,410,660 R 107,411 R 107,411 71.43 R 7,672,214 
1926 £44,107,632 R 88,215,264 R 88,216 R 88,216 71.43 R 6,301,143 
1925 £40,341,977 R 80,683,954 R 80,684 R 80,684 71.43 R 5,763,143 
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20. Appendix 11 
 
Table 13: Lloyd’s as a percentage of the South African insurance market 
 
Year 
SA Market 
Real Premium 
(R'000) 
Lloyds Real 
Premium 
(R'000) 
Lloyd’s 
market share 
(%) 
2000 28,359,258 R 967,984 3.41 
1999 25,741,113 R 946,300 3.68 
1998 28,751,188 R 918,064 3.19 
1997 27,779,541 R 898,281 3.23 
1996 26,659,996 R 938,201 3.52 
1995 24,839,367 R 966,596 3.89 
1994 22,901,780 R 1,006,980 4.40 
1993 20,459,918 R 1,048,173 5.12 
1992 R 19,120,961 R 1,279,506 6.69 
1991 R 15,208,629 R 1,282,002 8.43 
1990 R 14,438,667 R 1,121,698 7.77 
1989 R 14,807,863 R 1,065,720 7.20 
1988 R 8,392,515 R 844,997 10.07 
1987 R 9,100,101 R 640,380 7.04 
1986 R 9,811,088 R 703,445 7.17 
1985 R 10,744,944 R 787,082 7.33 
1984 R 11,433,285 R 858,520 7.51 
1983 R 10,538,994 R 805,137 7.64 
1982 R 9,687,965 R 646,622 6.67 
1981 R 9,236,480 R 523,288 5.67 
1980 R 8,655,704 R 445,954 5.15 
1979 R 7,847,895 R 417,116 5.32 
1978 R 15,832,286 R 451,905 2.85 
1977 R 7,682,513 R 459,737 5.98 
1976 R 6,963,221 R 455,015 6.53 
1975 R 6,634,852 R 374,311 5.64 
1974 R 6,483,019 R 362,037 5.58 
1973 R 6,557,500 R 305,083 4.65 
1972 R 6,226,477 R 235,750 3.79 
1971 R 5,557,810 R 185,381 3.34 
1970 R 4,694,872 R 183,410 3.91 
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Year 
SA Market 
Real Premium 
(R'000) 
Lloyds Real 
Premium 
(R'000) 
Lloyd’s 
market share 
(%) 
1969 R 4,265,459 R 182,324 4.27 
1968 R 3,270,167 R 212,444 6.50 
1967 R 3,503,743 R 220,457 6.29 
1966 R 3,693,794 R 147,029 3.98 
1965 R 3,805,727 R 167,939 4.41 
1964 R 3,643,688 R 156,969 4.31 
1963 R 3,643,194 R 154,839 4.25 
1962 R 2,605,290 R 137,871 5.29 
1961 R 2,635,633 R 128,333 4.87 
1960 R 2,635,633 R 129,533 4.91 
1959 R 2,391,414 R 135,241 5.66 
1958 R 2,321,793 R 123,862 5.33 
1957 R 2,147,143 R 106,000 4.94 
1956 R 2,077,519 R 102,222 4.92 
1955 R 1,892,704 R 91,741 4.85 
1954 R 1,718,615 R 90,038 5.24 
1953 R 1,600,240 R 88,880 5.55 
1952 R 1,471,400 R 86,960 5.91 
1951 R 1,797,818 R 80,318 4.47 
1950 R 1,592,667 R 70,857 4.45 
1949 R 2,207,930 R 68,625 3.11 
1948 R 2,743,560 R 62,850 2.29 
1947 R 3,451,779 R 60,079 1.74 
1946 R 4,238,689 R 57,000 1.34 
1945 R 5,118,176 R 53,559 1.05 
1944 R 5,748,329 R 46,765 0.81 
1943 R 6,378,482 R 39,971 0.63 
1942 R 7,446,675 R 35,250 0.47 
1941 R 9,275,671 R 32,036 0.35 
1940 R 10,040,857 R 23,786 0.24 
1939 R 11,091,692 R 21,231 0.19 
1938 R 11,048,231 R 24,000 0.22 
1937 R 10,442,538 R 21,692 0.21 
1936 R 10,853,667 R 18,250 0.17 
1935 R 11,116,083 R 11,000 0.10 
1934 R 10,414,333 R 10,667 0.10 
1933 R 10,438,083 R 8,583 0.08 
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Year 
SA Market 
Real Premium 
(R'000) 
Lloyds Real 
Premium 
(R'000) 
Lloyd’s 
market share 
(%) 
1932 R 9,584,923 R 8,462 0.09 
1931 R 10,086,692 R 5,846 0.06 
1930 R 9,335,643 R 4,357 0.05 
1929 R 8,966,286 R 3,429 0.04 
1928 R 8,199,286 R 3,500 0.04 
1927 R 7,672,214 R 4,000 0.05 
1926 R 6,301,143 R 2,357 0.04 
1925 R 5,763,143 R 2,000 0.03 
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